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Human population growth is a contributing factor to a number of significant 
environmental problems. My dissertation addresses both the negative environmental effects of 
human population growth and what ought to be done to curtail them. Specifically, I defend two 
main claims: (1) we have a duty to reduce human population, particularly those of us with large 
ecological footprints, and (2) morally permissible social policies can satisfy this duty. 
I begin by addressing three well-known issues in population ethics that could serve as the 
basis for objections to reducing population: the Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity 
Problem, and the Asymmetry. I then argue that we are neither obligated to refrain from 
procreation altogether nor permitted to procreate as often as we like. This groundwork 
establishes that the correct view about the ethics of procreation must lie somewhere in the 
complicated middle ground between these two positions. 
 After surveying the environmental harms caused by rising human population (focusing 
in detail on effects caused by climate change and biodiversity loss), I argue that we have a 
collective duty to reduce human population in order to avoid causing catastrophic harm to future 
people. While we should attempt to reduce environmental degradation by reducing our rates of 
environmentally harmful consumption, it is not possible to do so rapidly enough to avoid 
environmental catastrophe: we must reduce human population as well. 
I then discuss the policies that might be implemented in the near term to slow population 
growth and whether these policies could be implemented in ways that are not profoundly unjust 
or otherwise unethical. I also argue, on the basis of maintaining moral integrity and taking the 
harms of overpopulation seriously, that couples generally ought to avoid having more than two 
children even in the absence of policies incentivizing this behavior and even when they live in 
 
vii 
parts of the world where their individual ecological footprints are relatively small. I close the 
dissertation by highlighting some of the lingering questions that will have to be answered in 
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CHAPTER 1: RISING NUMBERS AND TOUGH QUESTIONS 
Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine in 1796. Up to this point in human 
history, smallpox had devastated human populations, often claiming millions of lives per year. It 
continued to cause deaths for some time afterward but was eventually eradicated. Effective 
treatment for smallpox was one of the major events in human history that paved the way for the 
rapid population growth that followed. When 2-3 million deaths are averted annually and the 
people are already reproducing enough to ensure population stability, then population growth is 
soon to follow. 
Advancements in agriculture and other areas of medicine also facilitated increased 
population growth, and the cumulative effects were stunning. When Jenner was developing the 
vaccine, the world was on the cusp of holding 1 billion people. It took about 200,000 years for 
humanity to reach the 1 billion threshold, and yet we have ballooned to over 7 billion barely two 
centuries later.
1
 The Population Division of the United Nations (UN) Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (1999) estimates that 6-billion threshold was crossed on October 12th, 1999, 
and the UN News Centre (2011) reported that population surpassed 7 billion on October 31, 
2011. These numbers are so staggering that they are difficult to comprehend. 
The global population has also failed to stabilize at 7 billion. The U.S. Census Bureau 
(2017) calculates the current number of people on Earth at about 7.37 billion; the Population 
Reference Bureau (2016) claims that we have already crossed the 7.4 billion threshold. When we 
crunch the numbers, our current rate of annual worldwide population growth hovers just above 
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 I use the pronoun “we” to refer to collective humanity throughout this work, unless otherwise specified. At its core, 
this project is about collective moral obligations and a moral problem that is genuinely global in nature, so the “we” 
should be interpreted as broadly as possible. 




 Such a small percentage may seem insignificant, but 1.1% of 7.4 billion is equivalent to 
81,400,000 people. The severity of this rate of growth can also be highlighted by considering its 
doubling rate – that is, the amount of time the population will take to double. At a growth rate of 
1.1% per year, a population will double in less than 63 years.
3
 
The good news is that population projections predict a drop in the annual rate of global 
population growth. (There probably will not be 14.8 billion people on Earth in 2080.) The most 
recent study by the UN’s Population Division (2015) estimates that global population will, in 
their medium-variant scenario, rise to 9.7 billion by 2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100. This result is 
also consistent with a recent study conducted by Gerland et al. (2014). These findings deviate 
from earlier projections that suggested a swifter path to population stabilization: less than 15 
years ago, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2004) projected that the global 
population would peak in 2075 at 9.22 billion. These more recent projections are 
controversial,
4
but it is clear that the global population is going to increase significantly in the 
near term: there are no realistic population projections in which global population does not reach 
9 billion. 
Some may find it difficult to worry about these projections because claims about 
population crises have been exaggerated in the past. Thomas Malthus (1798) argued that it was 
inevitable that human population growth would outpace improvements in agriculture so 
drastically that a collapse of population – caused by a scarcity of food – was inevitable. Malthus 
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 There is some variance in the annual growth rate depending on what particular numbers are used, but the variance 
is minimal. For some estimates, see data from The World Bank (2017) and Worldometers (2017).  
3
 The mathematical formula for calculating how many years it will take a population to double at a fixed rate is (ln 2 
/ G) where the variable G represents the rate of growth per year. Thus, a population that grows at a constant rate of 
1.1% will double in approximately 63 years: (ln 2 / 0.011)  63. For an overview of the mathematics involved in 
calculating rates of population growth, see Bartlett (1993). 
4
 Lutz (2014), for instance, suggests that improvements in female education will result in a significant decline in the 
fertility rates in Africa, the continent where the biggest population explosions are expected during the 21st century. 
   
3 
did not anticipate technological advancements in agriculture that have enabled human beings to 
continue growing their global population without suffering such a collapse. More recently, Paul 
Erlich (1975) suggested that rising population could lead to hundreds of millions of people dying 
of starvation in the 1970s and 1980s.
5
 This dire catastrophe did not come to pass. Since fears 
about overpopulation disasters have been exaggerated, it is tempting to consider discussion of the 
issue misguided, but the increasing impacts of population growth cannot be denied. 
Earth cannot support continuous population growth because its resources are finite, and 
we are approaching the limits of what the Earth can provide for collective humanity. One 
illuminating example of this problem is our agriculture. Industrial agriculture requires the use of 
technologies that use fossil fuels in great quantities – both in growing the food and transporting 
it. These technologies release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and in some cases, we must 
clear land to grow new crops, often releasing additional greenhouse gases that were trapped in 
carbon sinks. As a result, our means of growing and distributing food accounts for 19-29% of our 
annual greenhouse gas emissions (Vermeulen, Campbell, and Ingram 2012). The effects of 
climate change will be devastating: rising sea levels will displace millions of people and cause 
several island nations to disappear into the ocean, extreme weather events (such as hurricanes) 
will become more intense, and dry regions will become dryer, causing more droughts and lower 
crop yields.
6
 It is not difficult to see how population exacerbates the problem of climate change 
in this scenario: more people need more food to survive, and creating more food requires 
emitting more greenhouse gases. 
                                                 
5
 Erlich presented hypothetical scenarios that illustrated dire outcomes caused by rising population. Although he said 
that these scenarios were “just possibilities” and “not predictions” (Erlich 1975, p. 49), their presentation in 
combination with the alarmist tone of his book created the impression that he viewed these scenarios as realistic. 
6
 This is far from an exhaustive list. The most comprehensive accounts of the effects of climate change can be found 
in the reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). For the most recent report on the 
impacts of climate change, see IPCC (2014a). 
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Rising population also does not just affect people. While it may lead to more animals 
being raised and slaughtered in industrial farming operations, perhaps its greatest impact on the 
nonhuman community is the biodiversity loss that it causes. People are rapidly depleting Earth’s 
biodiversity, leading some conservation biologists to conclude that we are in the midst of the 
sixth mass extinction (Barnosky et al. 2011), and the scientific link between increasing human 
population density and the extinction of plant and animal species is gradually being 
substantiated.
7
 A greater human population makes a greater contribution to climate change – 
which is, and will continue to be, a significant cause of species extinctions – and puts greater 
stress on nonhuman ecosystems through increased habitat destruction, deforestation, and 
pollution. 
A growing population leads to a greater need to consume resources, a greater demand for 
physical space in which to live, a greater need to grow crops or raise livestock, and so on. For 
these reasons, a greater population will (other things equal) yield a greater ecological footprint 
than a smaller one. The growing human population will have devastating impacts on presently 
existing people, future people, and the nonhuman community. Thus, the ethical implications of 
continuing human population growth must be confronted, even if they raise difficult and 
worrisome questions. 
Confronting an Uncomfortable Topic 
Given the severe threats that overpopulation poses for collective humanity, one would 
think that concern about stabilizing and reducing global population would be a central focus in 
policy discussions. Once upon a time, that was true. The rapid population increase that occurred 
                                                 
7
 See Luck (2007) for a recent review of this literature. 
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during the first half of the 20th century drew the attention of both the general public and national 
leaders in the United States during the 1960s and 70s. But as the decades passed, serious 
discussions of crafting policies to reduce population growth started to disappear. Both in the 
United States and globally, the topic has all but vanished from academia and the popular press 
during the last 20 years. 
At first glance, it might appear that academic philosophy has not mirrored this trend. The 
area known as “population ethics” is a growing subfield, and most of its literature has been 
written during the last 30 years.
8
 But once one understands the meaning of “population ethics” in 
this context, it becomes clear that this appearance is misleading. PhilPapers, perhaps the most 
extensive database of philosophy articles that presently exists, defines population ethics as 
follows: 
[Population ethics] covers two major issues concerning the ethics of future persons: (1) 
Population axiology, or what principles determine the value of a population. E.g., does an 
additional happy life make a positive contribution to the value of the world, all else 
equal? (2) The non-identity problem, and the moral evaluation of actions that determine 
who will exist in future. (Gustafsson n.d.) 
Notice what is omitted from this definition: there is no explicit mention of current global 
population growth, the moral significance of the impacts of population growth, concerns about 
whether the present generation’s monopolization of the Earth’s resources is just, or anything else 
explicitly related to how rising global population may affect our moral duties. Philosophical 
discussions of population ethics are primarily theoretical, and while they might be intellectually 
tantalizing, the writings in this subfield usually fail to engage our current population 
                                                 
8
 Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons was first published in 1984, and the last few chapters of this book initiated 
most of the discourse that has come to dominate this subfield.  
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predicament. In fact, in many cases, the discussions are so abstract that there are no clear 
practical conclusions to draw from them. 
 Why has explicit discussion of population policy become relatively rare? Martha 
Campbell (2012) highlights six different reasons for the silence on population. First, since the 
1960s, fertility rates around the world have been declining. The fertility rate at which the global 
population will stabilize is about 2.1 births per woman, and many nations are still well above this 
threshold. Nevertheless, the decline in fertility rates suggests that the population problem is 
resolving itself. Obviously, this perception is incorrect: the statistics mentioned in the previous 
section indicate that the global population is not nearing stabilization. But the point is that the 
decline in fertility rates creates the appearance that population growth will not be a problem for 
much longer.   
Another reason that population discussions have largely ceased is that patterns of 
overconsumption have become more visible, particularly in the context of discussions related to 
climate change. Developed nations have generally consumed far more energy and resources than 
developing nations, and one side-effect of their consumption is that they have been (and continue 
to be) the primary emitters of greenhouse gases.
9
 Any morally acceptable response to climate 
change will require significant reductions in the amount of fossil fuels burned by the inhabitants 
of developed nations. High-consumption lifestyles have other powerful effects on the 
environment as well, some of which I have already mentioned (e.g., pollution, deforestation, 
biodiversity loss). These environmental impacts are easier to see and understand than the subtler 
                                                 
9
 There are certainly some exceptions. Some countries with extremely large populations (such as China and India) 
have larger carbon footprints than some developed nations despite lower per capita greenhouse gas emissions than 
most industrialized nations. The point is simply that people often associated the general tendency of industrialized 
nations to overconsume with the harms of climate change, and that this at least in part explains why concerns about 
population have been dwarfed by concerns about consumption rates in policy discussions about climate change. 
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effects of population growth and the relationship between population growth and the 
environmental impacts of high-consumption lifestyles. As a result, the focus on reducing 
consumption rates has eclipsed concern about stabilizing and reducing population. 
 Perhaps the most significant development in removing population growth from policy 
discourse occurred at the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, Egypt. The unique feature of ICPD, which distinguished it 
from previous population conferences held by the UN, was its emphasis on women’s needs 
around the world. Prior to the conference, discussion of rising population and the connection 
between population growth and environmental destruction became politically incorrect because 
suggestions to stabilize or reduce population were perceived as disadvantageous to women. 
Coercive episodes of family planning in India during the 1970s were highlighted, and China’s 
one-child policy was also examined. These policies were thought to be unacceptable, and 
conference attendees wanted to distance themselves from such policies. This desire resulted in 
the adoption of a new strategy for addressing population issues: family planning and all other 
health-related issues related to women were combined under the heading “reproductive health.” 
Those advocating this change in language, whether intentionally or not, created the impression 
that all the family planning efforts prior to 1994 had been objectionably coercive. These past 
attempts at promoting family planning were derogatorily labeled as means of “population 
control.” Despite the fact that many family planning organizations established prior to 1994 
aimed only to make family planning easier for men and women (rather than trying to limit or 
otherwise control their fertility), this false generalization has proven quite sticky: more than 20 
years later, discussions of population policy are still often associated with unjustifiable coercion. 
   
8 
Although I suspect these are the most significant reasons why population discussions 
have mostly disappeared from contemporary discourse, Campbell (2012) mentions three 
additional contributing factors. First, conservative think tanks and religious leaders opposed to 
abortion and family planning have had some success in reducing the attention paid to population 
growth. Some preach the idea of having as many children as possible.
10
 The broader strategy, 
however, has been to reinforce the notion that world population growth is at an end (Lutz, 
Sanderson, and Scherbox 2001), an idea that has gained a foothold in the media and influenced 
the public’s perception of how significant the population problem really is.
11
 Second, the AIDS 
epidemic in Africa garnered significant attention worldwide, and many believed that it would 
reduce population growth in the region significantly.
12
 Third, classic demographic transition 
theory creates the impression that it is “natural” for people to want many children and that they 
have to be coaxed by changes in society to want a smaller family (Potts and Campbell 2005, pp. 
180-181). According to demographic transition models, people are naturally inclined to have 
high birth rates until their societies develop from a pre-industrial to industrialized economic 
system. According to the theory, it is only after this industrialization occurs (and death rates in 
the society are lowered) that people become inclined to have smaller families. General 
acceptance of this theory (despite the many exceptions to it) leads people to believe that we 
cannot incentivize people in the developing world to have fewer children without unjust forms of 
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 The most common source of this sentiment in Christianity and Judaism originates from Genesis 1:28 in which 
God says to Adam and Eve, “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it” (King James Bible). 
11
 In the United States, for example, there is some evidence that scientists are significantly more worried about 
population growth than the general public. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 59% of the 
general public thought that there will not be enough food and resources to distribute around the globe if population 
growth continues whereas 82% of members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science held this 
position (Funk et al. 2015, p. 51). 
12
 This thought was mistaken: the populations of many African countries are still growing in size. Moreover, given 
that the effect plagues and epidemics is usually quite transitory, it is unlikely that any long-term changes to 
population growth will result from them. 
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persuasion or coercion, and thus, they fear discussion of population policies will lead down a 
slippery slope to discussions of “population control.” 
Taken together, these six factors provide a fairly comprehensive explanation for why 
worries about population growth are so rarely voiced in policy discussions and the popular press, 
but why has the issue been largely neglected by academic philosophers? I cannot offer a detailed 
answer to this question, but perhaps the simplest explanation is that philosophers, even with the 
privileges of academic freedom, can still be affected by public perception of certain issues. 
Alberto Giubilini and Fransesca Minerva (2012) received an enormous amount of attention from 
the media after their paper “After Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?” was published. 
In this paper, they argue that only persons have a right to life and that neither fetuses nor infants 
are persons. Thus, they conclude that both abortion and infanticide are morally permissible in 
many circumstances.
13
 This view was not well received by the general public, and the authors 
found themselves bombarded by hate mail and death threats. Incidents like this one are rare,
14
 
but they highlight the potential costs – even for academic philosophers – for arguing in favor of 
an unpopular position on a controversial issue. 
There is little doubt that most people are morally repulsed by the notion of legalizing 
infanticide or otherwise regarding it as morally permissible. Nevertheless, threatening the lives 
                                                 
13
 Giubilini and Minerva were not the first philosophers to advocate this position. For some other examples, see 
Tooley (1972) and Singer (1993). In fact, philosophers seem far more willing to entertain the permissibility of 
infanticide than the permissibility of a coercive population policy. 
14
 Julian Savulescu (2013), editor of the Journal of Medical Ethics, states that the paper “created unprecedented 
global outrage for a paper published in an academic medical ethics journal” (p. 257). It is worth noting, however, 
that other philosophers have suffered social costs for their defense of controversial views. Because of his views on 
infanticide and euthanasia, Peter Singer’s public lectures in several European countries (especially Germany) have 
often been cancelled due to protests (Schöne-Seifert and Rippe 1991). More recently, Phil Cafaro and Roy Beck 
were disinvited from a conference in Maryland due to complaints (and threats of protest) regarding their views on 
population and immigration (Kolankiewicz 2015). Cafaro has also confirmed (in personal correspondence) that 
some of his published work on the relationship between population growth and climate change has been met with 
hate mail and threats to his family. 
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of those who argue for this view (or otherwise silencing them) is not a productive or permissible 
way to resolve the issue. Those who defend this position do so through philosophical arguments, 
and if we are going to be responsible critical thinkers, we must look at those arguments 
charitably and then explain where they go wrong. 
Of course, discussion of population did not disappear just because people were morally 
repulsed by it. There were at least two morally sensible concerns that motivated suppressing this 
discussion: fears regarding how coercive population policies negatively affected women and 
recognition of the importance of reducing consumption rates. Some also worry that population 
policies will be racist in application, since the countries that have the highest birthrates are 
predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa and other areas of the developing world. Non-white 
populations would be the most affected by any policy placing restrictions on procreation. These 
concerns must be taken seriously, but limiting explicit discussion of population may have caused 
more harm than good. Following ICPD, access to family planning options did not expand 
sufficiently to accommodate the increasing numbers of women who wanted them, and the term 
“reproductive health” was more difficult for governing bodies and the general public to 
understand and support than the narrow term “family planning” (Campbell 2012, pp. 47-48).
15
 
Moreover, the limited visibility of the effects of population growth makes it difficult to notice 
how population growth undermines the overall efficacy of reducing consumption rates.
16
 An 
example will help illustrate this point. 
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 It is possible, of course, that sufficient expansion would have been unachievable even if population growth had 
remained a more explicit focus of discussion. The point, however, is that there was clearly greater improvement that 
could have been made and that limiting discussion of population, rather than facilitating that improvement, may 
have prevented it. 
16
 The effects of population growth are readily visible in certain parts of the world, particularly in areas where 
wilderness is rapidly disappearing. When I refer to “limited visibility,” I refer to the ability of the ordinary person – 
who may be otherwise unconcerned with population growth – to recognize its effects. Those who are insulated from 
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Thousands of dams were built across the United States during the first half of the 20th 
century. Eventually, people realized that these dams caused considerable damage to local 
ecosystems, and a movement emerged to preserve the best remaining rivers in the nation. 
Demand for water was still rising, but taking water from other people or making more water 
available by creating more dams, people tried to make more efficient use of the water that was 
available. They were successful: from 1980 to 1995, per capita use of water in the United States 
decreased by 20% (Jehl 2002). Unfortunately, the United States population grew by 16% during 
the same 15-year time period, which means that the progress toward solving the problem was 
negligible: the need for water was virtually as great in 1995 as it was in 1980 despite the 
reduction in the consumption of water.
17
  
The key takeaway from this anecdote is that improvements to efficiency in our use of 
resources are solutions only to the extent that they outpace population growth. They are only 
temporary in the context of an ever-increasing population: if population continues to surge, then 
eventually new solutions will be needed. Surely we have to reduce our consumption rates to 
avoid perilous climate change and a host of other catastrophes, but these reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions per person, energy consumption per person, water consumed per 
person, and so on will not amount to sustainable living if population growth continues 
unchecked. Some even claim that we must ultimately reduce global population to about two 
billion to maintain an adequate to comfortable standard of living in the long term (Smail 1997, 
                                                                                                                                                             
natural environments and rather unaware of the empirical research on population growth are unlikely to recognize 
how pervasive or significant its effects really are. 
17
 I borrow this example from Palmer (2012, pp. 98-99). 
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Foreman 2012). Whether or not one agrees with such an extreme proposal, it should be obvious 
that we must stop ignoring the moral significance of rising human population. 
Tackling overpopulation certainly means that we must confront difficult, often 
uncomfortable moral questions. We must consider the moral status of future people and how 
their needs should be weighed against the needs of present people. We must examine the moral 
significance of population growth’s effects on the nonhuman community. We must confront the 
possibility that non-coercive population measures may not stabilize or reduce global population 
effectively or swiftly enough to be morally satisfactory. In taking these issues seriously, we may 
discover that some of our moral values are in conflict with one another. It may not be possible, 
for instance, to allow for maximal reproductive freedom while looking out for the interests of 
posterity and the nonhuman community. Similarly, it may not be possible to allow a nation with 
high rates of consumption, such as the United States, to grow its population through immigration 
even if doing so enables many immigrants to improve their lives. 
This dissertation will not answer all the questions relevant to developing ethically 
acceptable population policies or making morally responsible procreative decisions as 
individuals, though it will address the most significant moral questions that global population 
growth currently raises in an anthropocentric context. My central hope is that this dissertation 
will advance the philosophical discussion of overpopulation and help to break the silence on 
overpopulation in the realm of academic philosophy.
18
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 Since starting work on this project, two books – Sarah Conly’s (2016) One Child and Travis Rieder’s (2016b) 
Toward a Small Family Ethic – have been published that address the overpopulation problem. Time will tell whether 
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Is Overpopulation a Genuine Moral Problem? 
Based on what I have said thus far, it is probably obvious that I give a resounding 
affirmative answer to the question that titles this section: overpopulation is undoubtedly a 
genuine moral problem. One might dissent, however, by arguing that genuine moral problems 
require some uncertainty regarding what we ought to do and that virtually everyone agrees what 
we ought to do with respect to population. Brian Barry (1999) claims that “virtually everybody 
who has made a serious study of the situation and whose objectivity is not compromised by 
either religious beliefs or being in the pay of some multinational corporation” has concluded that 
concern for posterity demands a significant reduction in population (pp. 62-63). Furthermore, 
Barry is not the only philosopher to think that the need to reduce population is a moral 
requirement. David DeGrazia (2012) mentions avoiding disastrous overpopulation in his list of 
obligations to future generations (p. 200), and John Nolt (2015) identifies population reduction 
as one of five clear moral imperatives in the domain of environmental ethics (pp. 219-221). But 
if Barry is right in thinking that it is clear what we ought to do regarding overpopulation, then 
one may worry that a detailed philosophical examination of the issue is not too valuable. Further 
scrutiny might appear unnecessary. 
For the sake of argument, grant that those who have studied our population predicament 
generally agree that we need to stabilize and then reduce global population.
19
 It does not follow 
from the truth of this claim that all the relevant moral questions pertaining to population policy 
are resolved. We are still left with many questions regarding the moral permissibility of 
particular ways to achieve that stabilization and reduction and the relative moral significance of 
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a consensus on what we collectively ought to do.  
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achieving these goals when they conflict with other moral values (e.g., reproductive freedom). 
Agreement on one of the broadest questions in population ethics does not entail agreement about 
all the subsidiary questions that must then be answered. Moreover, agreement on controversial 
issues can arise for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with the philosophical merits of 
the adopted position. Thus, it is important to subject all positions to rigorous philosophical 
scrutiny. Widespread agreement would not in itself provide us with a reason to cease 
philosophical examination of the issue. Thus, Barry’s claim does not ground a significant 
objection to the pursuit of this philosophical project. 
Juha Räikkä (2000) tries to refine Barry’s claim into a more focused and sophisticated 
argument. He claims that the issues commonly discussed within the philosophical subdiscipline 
of population ethics are not genuine moral problems. Räikkä (2000) defines “genuine moral 
problems” as those moral questions that “(1) are open in the sense that there are various plausible 
answers to them and (2) have practical relevance in the sense that they concern the issue of what 
should actually be done” (p. 401). He does not believe that anything typically discussed within 
population ethics satisfies both of these conditions. While this restricts the scope of the objection 
to some extent, its truth would imply that large portions of this dissertation do not concern 
questions of philosophical interest. Given that this objection could undermine the value of this 
project, it must be addressed before we proceed. 
Räikkä begins by differentiating moral problems from social problems and empirical 
uncertainties. He claims that the questions related to the socially detrimental effects of certain 
population policies are merely social problems (Räikkä 2000, pp. 402-403) and that many of the 
issues in population ethics hinge on disagreements about empirical claims (pp. 405-406). He is 
certainly right to note that certain concerns, such as how relevant government actors can be 
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motivated to act as they should or how family planning programs could earn public support, are 
not moral in nature, but what about the questions about population policy that have an explicitly 
ethical component? Consider the following question: should the United States government 
restrict immigration in order to stabilize the U.S. population? This question clearly meets both 
conditions of Räikkä’s definition of a genuine moral problem: there is certainly no consensus 
regarding what immigration policy the U.S. ought to adopt, and this question clearly addresses 
what should be done to resolve the moral problem. It is not difficult to pose other questions 
concerning population that appear to be genuine moral problems by the criteria Räikkä provides. 
Here are a few that will be addressed elsewhere in the dissertation: 
1. What are the limits (if any) on the number of children a couple can permissibly have 
in the context of overpopulation? 
2. Are any coercive population policies morally permissible in light of the history of 
abuses and human rights violations that have resulted from them? 
3. What are the implications of overpopulation with respect to the moral permissibility 
of abortion? 
Even Räikkä’s handpicked examples of issues in population ethics that are not genuine moral 
problems actually meet his criteria. 
Räikkä highlights three issues that have been widely discussed in population ethics: the 
Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Asymmetry. The Repugnant 
Conclusion can be represented as the following claim: for any given population, there exists a 
vastly greater population whose existence would be better even if the members of this population 
have lives that are barely worth living (Parfit 1987, p. 388). The Non-Identity Problem refers to 
the following puzzle: how can future people claim to have been harmed by our actions if they 
   
16 
have lives worth living and they would not have existed at all if we had refrained from 
performing those actions? Finally, the Asymmetry refers to a union of two claims in procreative 
ethics: it is morally wrong to bring a child into existence who will have a miserable life, but it is 
permissible not to bring a child into existence who will have a blissful life. 
Räikkä claims that none of these issues constitute genuine moral problems because we 
know what to do in all of them. We know that we are not obligated to bring about an 
overcrowded world of people with lives barely worth living (even assuming that we had the 
means of creating a world with those enormous numbers of people). We know we are not free to 
do whatever we wish with the distant future even if the identities of future people are dependent 
on what we do. We know that the two principles of the Asymmetry are correct. Since there is no 
substantive disagreement about what we ought to do in these cases, they fail the first condition of 
Räikkä’s definition of a genuine moral problem. 
There are two problems with Räikkä’s assessment of these issues. First, his outlook 
unjustifiably privileges philosophical intuitions. Philosophers typically acknowledge that the 
positions Räikkä favors are the most intuitive ones on offer – the ones that seem most consistent 
with common sense and ordinary practice. But to stop inquiry here favors intuition far too much. 
I will explain why in greater depth in the next section, but the short explanation is that 
philosophical intuitions are often mistaken. Trivially, since philosophers often have conflicting 
intuitions, some philosophical intuitions must be mistaken. Moreover, even widely shared 
intuitions can be incorrect, since they can result from biases and other distorting factors. So even 
if intuitive positions turn out to be correct, we can only reach that conclusion after serious critical 
evaluation. 
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Second, Räikkä inaccurately assesses the level of agreement that has been achieved on 
these three issues. All three of these topics are controversial. Many philosophers have suggested 
that the Repugnant Conclusion, regardless of how counterintuitive it might seem, should be 
accepted (Sikora 1975, pp. 409-419; Anglin 1977, p. 754; Sikora 1981, pp. 128-133; Ng 1990; 
Attfield 1991, pp. 127-130; Ryberg 1996; Fotion 1997, pp. 95-96; Tannsjo 1998, pp. 160-163; 
Tannsjo 2002; Huemer 2008). Michael Huemer (2008) even identifies several reasons for 
thinking that the specific intuition underlying the repugnant conclusion is mistaken (pp. 907-
911). 
Philosophers have come closer to consensus on rejecting the conclusion of the Non-
Identity Problem – the claim that we cannot wrong future people whose identities are dependent 
upon our actions so long as we do not make their lives no longer worth living. Nevertheless, 
anyone who attends a conference presentation on a topic in intergenerational ethics will likely 
discover that many philosophers still take the problem seriously. David Boonin (2014), author of 
the first book-length treatment of the Non-Identity Problem, claims that the conclusion of the 
Non-Identity Problem is actually correct. According to his view, it is not possible to wrong a 
future person whose identity is dependent upon your actions unless you make that person’s life 
no longer worth living. It follows from this claim that it is not morally wrong to conceive a 
person who will be born with a severe physical or mental impairment, provided that the person 
cannot exist without this impairment and that the person will still have a life worth living.
20
 
Philosophers have also not achieved a consensus with regard to the Asymmetry. Many 
philosophers have been unable to provide coherent theoretical support for the Asymmetry (e.g., 
McMahan 1981, 2009, 2013; Singer 1993; Persson 2009); others have posed creative, though 
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controversial, ways of vindicating this view (e.g., Benatar 2006, esp. pp. 32-34; Roberts 2011b). 
Thus, it is not clear whether the two claims in the Asymmetry can be held consistently. 
This brief synopsis should be sufficient to demonstrate that it is not obvious what we 
ought to do with respect to these three issues. Furthermore, as we shall see in chapter 2, one’s 
views with respect to these issues could have significant implications with respect to addressing 
our current population crisis. Specifically, one’s positions on these issues affects whether one has 
reasons to object to a duty to reduce global population. Thus, according to Räikkä’s own criteria, 
all three of these issues are genuine moral problems. 
At this juncture, we can see that the moral questions raised regarding population – both 
theoretical quandaries and problems that arise in the real world – are genuine moral problems. 
We must now consider how they should be addressed. 
The Philosophical Method 
Many philosophers approach ethical dilemmas through the lens of a particular moral 
theory. Perhaps they have adopted the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and apply his 
Categorical Imperative to moral controversies. Or perhaps they think the utilitarian imperative to 
maximize total welfare provides the proper decision procedure for moral dilemmas. There are 
plenty of other possibilities as well.
21
 Unfortunately, any approach grounded solely in a single 
moral theory has two significant shortcomings. First, an analysis of an ethical dilemma that is 
grounded explicitly in a single theoretical outlook will only have a limited audience. There is 
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ground right action in what the virtuous person would do and emphasize moral character rather than adhering to 
moral duties or acting so as to bring about the best consequences. Care ethics (Held 2006) and contractualism 
(Scanlon 1998) have also recently been defended, and there exist many other lesser-known moral theories. 
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profound disagreement among philosophers regarding which moral theory is correct,
22
 and thus, 
any analysis of a moral dilemma grounded in a single theory will be unappealing to many 
philosophers. Second, it may be impossible to condense all morally relevant considerations into a 
single theory. Part of the reason that different families of moral theories have persisted in 
philosophy is that they all appear to get an essential piece of the moral puzzle correct despite 
their fundamental differences. But if no comprehensive unified theory of ethics is achievable, 
then any approach to a moral problem based on a single theory is destined to provide only an 
incomplete moral outlook on the issue. 
Rather than attempting to examine the ethical dilemmas created by the rising human 
population through moral theory, I will instead attempt to do so by crafting plausible moral 
principles that offer guidance as to what we ought to do. While I am not confident in my ability 
to defend any particular theory from its competitors or to craft a comprehensive, unified theory 
of ethics, I believe I can articulate and defend certain fundamental moral principles. Ideally, 
these principles could be derived from many, if not all, plausible moral theories. The pressing 
methodological question is how we should determine what these principles are. 
Following many moral philosophers, I will adopt the method of reflective equilibrium to 
determine what moral principles we should endorse.
23
 In broad terms, reflective equilibrium 
refers to the method of trying to explain our considered judgments – those moral convictions that 
survive sustained critical reflection under conditions conducive to good reasoning (e.g., no 
manipulation, an absence of social biases) – in terms of moral principles that can be unified into 
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 In their survey of philosophers, Bourget and Chalmers (2014) found that participants “accepted” or “leaned 
toward” the major positions in normative ethics with the following frequency: deontology, 25.9%; consequentialism, 
23.6%; virtue theory, 18.2%; and other, 32.3%.  
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 Nelson Goodman (1955, pp. 65-68) appears to be the first philosopher to explicitly describe and endorse this 
method, though Goodman employed it as a means of justifying principles of deductive and inductive inferences. 
John Rawls (1999, pp. 18-19, 42-45) is responsible for popularizing the term. 
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a coherent system. A state of perfect coherence among all our theoretical principles and 
considered judgments is the ideal equilibrium at which the method aims. 
Reflective equilibrium has been used in normative theory by both nonconsequentialists 
(e.g., Rawls 1999, 2005; Scanlon 1998, 2014) and consequentialists (e.g., Nielsen 1994, Hooker 
2003). This method has also been used in conjunction with normative theory specifically to 
address controversial issues in applied ethics (e.g., Carruthers 1992, DeGrazia 1996, Boonin 
2003). Nevertheless, reflective equilibrium has a significant shortcoming, one that can be 
highlighted by examining how other philosophers describe the method. Consider an excerpt from 
Boonin’s (2003) description of reflective equilibrium: 
We begin by accepting, at least provisionally, our moral intuitions about a variety of 
types of actions, giving more initial weight to those which seem especially clear or 
forceful. We then attempt to develop a credible moral theory that would serve to unify 
and underwrite these various judgments (pp. 9-10). 
The concern about this method of reasoning is the starting point: what exactly is a moral 
intuition, and why would these intuitions be serviceable starting points for moral inquiry? 
A growing trend in moral philosophy is to employ research in experimental psychology 
to shed new light on age-old philosophical problems.
24
 We know that people’s moral intuitions 
can vary, but the worries about their reliability run deeper than that. Some recent research 
suggests that intuitions are grounded in automatic, unreflective responses (e.g., Haidt 2001, 
Greene et al. 2001). One may also worry that our intuitions are just remnants of our evolutionary 
history, cultural heritage, or the teachings of our parents. The way that some philosophers use 
reflective equilibrium creates the impression that the method privileges moral intuitions in an 
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unacceptable way: since intuitions are not reliable guides to truth, we cannot be confident that 
the principles reached through reflective equilibrium will be true either. 
This concern about reflective equilibrium arises in part because philosophers are 
sometimes unclear about what they mean by “moral intuitions.” Some philosophers use the term 
“moral intuition” to refer to a considered judgment, some consider moral intuitions to be 
spontaneous initial judgments (e.g., McMahan 2000), others believe that moral intuitions refer to 
the combination of both sets of judgments, and many fail to specify what they mean by the term. 
I understand moral intuitions to be spontaneous initial judgments, and I consider this category of 
judgments to differ greatly from considered judgments. Drawing in part on Rawls (1951), I 
believe that considered judgments must meet the following criteria (pp. 181-183):  
1. The judge (i.e., whomever is making the judgment) must be able to make the 
judgment without her own interests hinging in some way on what judgment is made. 
2.  The judgment must concern a case with which the judge is familiar and preferably 
one in which the details are simple and easily graspable. 
3. The judgment should not be made spontaneously. Instead, the judge should give the 
details of the case careful consideration, and a judgment should be made only after all 
the facts of the case are fully understood. 
4. The judge feels strongly that her judgment is correct. 
5. The judgment must be stable over time: there must be some evidence that others have 
rendered similar judgments about similar cases. 
6. The judgment should not be reached by the conscious, systematic application of a 
moral theory or a complex series of moral principles, though it may involve sustained 
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critical reflection and perhaps the application of a basic moral rule (e.g., promises 
should be kept, equals ought to be treated equally).
25
 
Intuitions frequently fail to meet conditions (2), (3), or (5). Some philosophers draw on intuitions 
about complex thought experiments that are difficult to comprehend; these are not considered 
judgments because they violate (2). Some philosophers portray intuitive judgments as 
spontaneous, violating (3). As I mentioned earlier, I understand “intuitions” to have this feature, 
so I believe condition (3) captures one of the fundamental differences between intuitions and 
considered judgments. Some philosophers also appeal to intuitions that many other philosophers 
do not share, which violates (5). 
What makes considered judgments better than mere intuition? Focusing on (2), one might 
ask why we cannot trust our intuitions about outlandish cases that are unlikely to be realized in 
the real world. The central reason is that it is typically difficult to fully understand the features of 
these outlandish cases and the moral import of these features (Elster 2011, pp. 150-153). To 
illustrate this point, consider the following claim: there is no circumstance in which one would 
prefer two years of intense torture to having a hangnail for her entire life, no matter how long her 
life is. Larry Temkin (1996) uses this claim in a complex argument designed to show that the 
“all-things-considered better than” relation is not transitive (pp. 179-180). His support for the 
truth of this claim is a mere intuition: he has a spontaneous initial judgment that the claim is 
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other areas of philosophy. We might, for instance, be able to form considered judgments about certain kinds of 
Gettier-style cases in epistemology: cases that use luck as a means of deriving counterexamples to the claim that 
knowing a proposition is equivalent to holding a justified true belief about that proposition (Gettier 1963). 




 Does this intuition give us good reason to think that the claim is true? I contend that it 
does not. 
The problem with this example is that it is not possible to reasonably conceive of the 
details that the case describes. If we were the kinds of beings who ordinarily lived for 100 
million years, it is hard to know how we would feel about two years of torture. If we typically 
lived so long, this period of torture would constitute a mere 0.0000002% of a person’s life; in an 
ordinary human life of 80 years, this period of torture would take up 2.5% of a person’s life. 
Thus, it’s not hard to think our intuitions about the case might be different if we had a better 
grasp on what it would be like to live for 100 million years (or a similar length of time). 
Unfortunately, knowing what it would be like to live that long is beyond our imaginative 
capacities. As a result, we should not be surprised if our judgment about this case is misguided. 
Judgments about these kinds of cases – those that are remarkably idealized and radically foreign 
to ordinary human experience – are not reliable. 
In a similar fashion, spontaneous judgments are often unreliable, which is why 
considered judgments must satisfy (3). Spontaneous judgments, by their nature, do not involve a 
careful consideration of the relevant facts, and sometimes even simple cases require careful 
deliberation if a reliable judgment is to be reached. Many have the intuition that it would be 
permissible to flip a switch to redirect a runaway trolley away from a track with five workers in 
its path and onto a siding with only a single worker. But many also have the intuition that it 
would be impermissible to push a large gentleman off a bridge and into the trolley’s path even if 
doing so were the only way to derail the trolley and save the 5 workers.
27
 But these intuitions 
                                                 
26
 Temkin has presented this example to many audiences, and the intuition does appear to be fairly common. 
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appear to be in conflict because the cases are very similar: both involve sacrificing one person’s 
life to save the lives of five other people. Even if the intuitive judgments can ultimately be 
vindicated, it is clear that these spontaneous initial judgments are not, in themselves, enough to 
justify holding these views. We have to see if these judgments can survive critical scrutiny. 
A further indication of an intuition’s unreliability occurs when another expert on the 
subject does not share that intuition. Appealing to our own personal intuitions to support our 
claims is a foolhardy enterprise if others have intuitive judgments that differ from our own. 
Appealing to controversial intuitions is problematic because “it seems unreasonable to have any 
confidence that a judgment is correct if competent persons disagree about it” (Rawls 1951, p. 
183). After all, our intuitions may merely reflect our own personal idiosyncrasies rather than 
tracking anything of philosophical significance. 
Chapter Outline 
I will ultimately argue that we – that is, collective humanity – are morally obligated to 
reduce our population over the next several generations.
28
 I will then explore some implications 
of this moral duty, including what policies we should implement to achieve it and the 
implications of this duty for individual moral decision-making. The journey towards this 
conclusion begins with the extant literature on population and procreative ethics. 
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, population ethics has traditionally been dominated 
by three issues: the Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Asymmetry. I 
address these issues in chapter 2. Beyond their prevalence in the literature, each of these issues 
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can generate an objection to a duty to reduce population, so I will address them at the outset to 
preemptively refute any objections that could later arise from them. We will see that they fail to 
provide compelling reasons to reject a duty to reduce population. 
In chapter 3, I examine two extreme positions in procreative ethics that, if correct, would 
provide clear moral imperatives regarding population. The first of these is Antinatalism – the 
position that we ought not to reproduce at all. If such a position were correct, it would follow 
that we ought to try to reduce the human population to zero. While such a view would be 
unlikely to get any traction with the general public, it has become a relatively hot topic in the 
academic literature on procreative ethics and warrants serious treatment. The other extreme 
position is the view that we have a right to procreate freely and have as many children as we like. 
If this view were correct, then it would follow that we ought to not regulate procreation at all 
because it would violate individual rights. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. 
Procreation is sometimes (but not always) permissible, and individuals do not have a right to 
procreate as often as they want. Our right to procreate is constrained by the effects that the 
exercise of this right has on others. In the context of harmful overpopulation, the moral 
constraints on this right may be quite limited. Hence, an appeal to individual rights does not 
establish that all forms of procreative regulation are objectionable. 
I begin presenting my positive view in chapter 4. This task starts with getting a firm grasp 
on precisely how bad the population problem really is. Although I discuss a few of the problems 
caused in part by overpopulation that are not primarily environmental in nature (e.g., 
overcrowding), my main topics of emphasis are climate change and biodiversity loss. Both these 
environmental problems could have catastrophic and long-lasting impacts on future people. 
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After highlighting the severity of the problems looming on the horizon, I argue in chapter 
5 that we have a moral imperative to either significantly reduce human population, radically 
reduce our rates of environmentally destructive consumption, or pursue reductions in both 
human population and rates of consumption. If we properly recognize the moral status of future 
people and treat their rights and interests with the moral seriousness they warrant, then it 
becomes clear that we cannot continue with our currents trends in population growth and 
destructive consumption. Something must change. Unfortunately, although some reductions in 
consumption can be made, I further argue that it is not possible to make sufficient cutbacks in 
environmentally destructive consumption – particularly in the short timescale in which they must 
be made – to reliably avoid the worst outcomes these environmental crises may cause. Some 
reduction in the human population will be necessary. The only viable path toward a solution 
involves making efforts to both reduce consumption and reduce population. 
In chapter 6, I consider what policy measures could be pursued to permissibly hasten the 
stabilization of the global population and then aid its reduction. I argue in favor of a combination 
of policies that would help lower fertility rates in both developing and developed nations. These 
policies include increasing access to contraception and family planning services, implementing 
preference-adjusting media campaigns that promote having smaller families, and providing 
economic incentives that reward people for having smaller families. One of these economic 
incentives is the ability to trade one’s right to an “allowed” number of children in an open 
marketplace.
29
 All people would be able to sell their allowance (or a portion of it) to those who 
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ecological footprint remains low, may be permitted to have 2 or 3 children without purchasing additional rights to 
have children. 
   
27 
wanted to purchase the ability to have a larger family. To offer an example, if a couple was 
allowed a total of two children but wanted a third, they could purchase the legal right to have a 
third child from a seller (or group of sellers) in this marketplace. 
We would not begin with the economic incentives, however. Our goal would be to 
implement the least coercive set of policies that would solve the population problem, so we 
would start with non-coercive measures such as increasing the availability of contraception and 
family planning services, particularly in those countries with large unmet needs for these 
services. Assuming that these measures did not have a large enough impact, we would then 
implement preference-adjusting interventions that might motivate people to choose to limit their 
family size voluntarily. Should we need to go further, we can provide economic incentives for 
individuals to have fewer children, such as tax breaks for childless couples. Along these lines, we 
could consider punitive measures to encourage compliance, though I argue that these measures 
could not in practice go beyond heavy fines. More severe punishments, such as mandatory 
sterilizations or abortions, carry too great a risk of abuse and may violate individuals’ rights to 
privacy and bodily integrity even if they are not abused. Thus, they are too morally problematic 
to be a feature of a satisfactory population policy. I conclude chapter 6 by considering some 
objections to the policies I have proposed and considering whether unjust outcomes resulting 
from these policies can be avoided. 
While prior chapters address the collective moral duties that we have with respect to 
reducing population, chapter 7 focuses on individual procreative choice. Whether or not policies 
are eventually implemented to limit procreation, many people will have the freedom to decide 
how many children they have for some time to come. What are they morally required to do? Our 
individual obligations cannot be to remain childless: a universalized obligation of this sort would 
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lead to our extinction. Moreover, many view having a child as a central feature of the ideal 
human life, so requiring such people to remain childless would be to demand too great a sacrifice 
on their parts. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I argue that it is morally wrong for couples to 
intentionally have more than two children, given the impacts of continued population growth on 
future people. Given the moral seriousness of the situation, we should all acknowledge the 
existence of a collective moral imperative to reduce global population. If one accepts this 
imperative, then maintaining integrity requires that one also not take individual action to increase 
the global population. Practically speaking, this means that individuals should, when possible, 
avoid having more than two children. While having fewer children would be morally better, I 
argue that it would be too onerous to require couples to have only a single child in the absence of 
a collective scheme that provides options for having larger families. 
I conclude the dissertation in chapter 8 by recapping the main arguments presented and 
the central conclusions that I have reached. I also gesture at some of the lingering questions that 
should be addressed in future work, noting in particular the limitations of the anthropocentric 
approach that I have adopted. I also address one final objection: the concern that we should not 
act to prevent overpopulation because the looming environmental crises are not solvable 
regardless of what we try to do. According to this defeatist objection, we should not worry about 
making sacrifices for future people because they are already doomed, meaning that our sacrifices 
will be meaningless. I argue that this objection rests on a mistaken conception of what it means 
to “solve” a moral problem and that there are still opportunities to make a great difference in the 
state of the future even if some of the destructive impacts of our past actions can no longer be 
prevented. 
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CHAPTER 2: FAMILIAR ISSUES IN POPULATION ETHICS 
In the opening chapter, I mentioned the three issues that have traditionally dominated the 
subfield of philosophy known as population ethics: the Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity 
Problem, and the Asymmetry. All three of these issues provide a basis for objecting to a duty to 
reduce population. Moreover, given the theoretical implications of these issues for 
intergenerational ethics more broadly, any adequate discussion of long-term population ethics 
must address them. In this chapter, I examine each of these issues in turn, clarify my views on 
them, and explain why none of them grounds a strong objection to a duty to reduce human 
population. 
The Repugnant Conclusion 
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of what Parfit (1987) calls the Impersonal 
Total Principle: “If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would be 
the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living” (p. 387). This principle implies that for 
any population, no matter how blissful the lives of its members, there exists a much larger 
population that is better even though its members all have lives barely worth living. A population 
with hundreds of trillions of members whose lives are barely worth living may, for instance, 
have a greater total welfare than a population with a billion members who are all living blissful 
lives. Thus, according to the impersonal total principle, the larger population is preferable to the 
smaller population. 
 As the name of this implication suggests, Parfit (1987) finds the conclusion of this 
reasoning “hard to accept” (p. 388). However, he does not explain why in great detail: the 
Repugnant Conclusion is simply counterintuitive and rejected on those grounds. As my 
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discussion of philosophical methodology in chapter 1 indicates, I do not think a mere intuition 
provides strong grounds for rejecting or endorsing philosophical claims. Intuitions are simply too 
unreliable to play such a strong role in our deliberations. 
Perhaps Parfit believes his verdict about the Repugnant Conclusion is a considered 
judgment rather than just a mere intuition. That proposal faces a significant problem, however, 
because it does not seem possible to have a considered judgment about the Repugnant 
Conclusion. I have already mentioned that having a considered judgment about a case requires 
(among other things) familiarity with the case and stability of the judgment over time. It is clear 
that we do not have a deep familiarity with the case described by the Repugnant Conclusion. We 
do not have much experience reasoning about populations with trillions of members (or more), 
and it is also difficult to conceptualize precisely what constitutes a life that is just barely worth 
living. We also have a natural difficulty comprehending extremely large numbers and 
compounding small quantities (Huemer 2008, pp. 908-910), and both of these are required to 
make a judgment about the plausibility of the Repugnant Conclusion. Additionally, as also 
discussed in the prior chapter, many philosophers have dissented from the intuitive verdict about 
the Repugnant Conclusion. Since many people with similar expertise and familiarity with the 
case have rendered different judgments about it, the judgment cannot be considered stable. For 
these reasons, we should not regard the rejection of the Repugnant Conclusion as a considered 
judgment. 
Now suppose that someone accepts the Repugnant Conclusion. This claim could provide 
the basis for an objection to population reduction. If a world with vast numbers of people at low 
welfare can be better than a world with a much smaller population of individuals at a very high 
welfare, then perhaps we should not be so concerned about our increasing population, even if it 
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reduces the average welfare of everyone. After all, the total welfare of a larger population could 
still be higher than the total welfare of a smaller population. 
Whatever theoretical implications the Repugnant Conclusion may have, however, it does 
not in practice entail that we should work toward creating a world in which we have as many 
human beings as possible that have lives barely worth living. Attempting to create such a world 
would run a grave risk of leaving many members of the population with lives not worth living. 
Moreover, we can expect that reductions in average welfare among members of a population will 
be rather drastic once a population begins to exceed the planet’s carrying capacity: resources will 
become more limited, and inhabitants will have greater difficulty satisfying their basic needs. 




Figure 1: The Relationship between Population and Average Utility 
 
This figure is a representation of what the actual relationship between average utility and 
population size appears to be. Initially, increases in population improve the efficiency of 
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resource distribution and production, resulting in an improvement in average welfare. 
Eventually, however, the population increases to the point that it is no longer feasible to 
adequately distribute resources to everyone. Once this threshold is passed, increases to 
population size decrease the average welfare of those in the population. In Figure 1, according to 
the Impersonal Total Principle, the ideal population size is point P because that is the point 
where total welfare, which equals the total population multiplied by the average utility, is 
maximized. As we can see, point P is nowhere near the maximum population size, so the 
Impersonal Total Principle “does not enjoin us, in reality, to pursue the world of cramped 
apartments and daily gruel” (Huemer 2008, p. 930). 
An adherent to the Impersonal Total Principle who thinks long-term may also be 
concerned about the far-reaching consequences of having too many children in the present. 
Doing so may exhaust resources in such a way that larger populations become impossible to 
sustain in the future, which would significantly reduce total welfare. Each person with a life 
worth living increases total utility, so if an overpopulated generation depletes resources so 
severely that the population size must be drastically reduced in subsequent generations, then this 
may result in lower total utility than if a more modest population size had been maintained over 
many generations. 
Additionally, the Impersonal Total Principle is typically thought to include the welfare of 
many nonhuman animals.
1
 Taking animal welfare into account radically alters the calculation of 
ideal population size because we must balance the welfare of our own species with the welfare of 
other species, which entails that we cannot assume that a large human population is the one that 
                                                 
1
 Animals that are sentient (i.e., capable of experience pleasure and pain) are typically included. Whether the biotic 
welfare of plants and other non-sentient organisms should be considered morally significant is more controversial. 
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maximizes total welfare. After all, increasing our numbers may result in significant decreases to 
the numbers of other sentient animals and may cause significant suffering to those that remain. 
Thus, even if we accept the moral principle that we ought to maximize total utility, this principle 
does not imply that we should always strive to increase our population size. 
There are also strong deontological reasons to reject the population-increasing imperative 
of the Impersonal Total Principle. Perhaps the most powerful of these reasons is that an 
imperative to increase population would place enormous burdens on women that would not be 
shouldered by male members of the population. As Christine Overall (2012) explains: 
The Repugnant Conclusion is repugnant in part because it does not direct adequate moral 
attention to the women who would have to do the reproductive labor to generate the 
millions of new human beings. It is mistaken because the premises that lead to it are 
insidiously gender neutral. That gender neutrality at best ignores and at worst mandates 
injustice to women, first by requiring disproportionate sacrifices from women for the 
sake of the alleged goods to be obtained through procreation and second by ignoring 
women’s right not to reproduce. (pp. 73-74) 
If we view the Repugnant Conclusion purely as an abstract exercise in which we are choosing 
among two possible worlds to actualize, perhaps the higher total utility is sufficient for us to 
choose the world with the larger population, but in practice, we would not have such a choice. 
The larger population could only be generated through large-scale human reproduction, and if we 
value gender equity and reproductive rights, we should not endorse an imperative to create such 
a world, even if doing so would ultimately increase total welfare. In this manner, Overall 
highlights a more general problem with the Impersonal Total Principle: it ignores justice and 
equity in cases where these considerations do not contribute to maximizing utility, which is 
perhaps the most fundamental reason why many moral philosophers do not endorse the claim 
that we should always strive to maximize total welfare. There are simply too many other moral 
considerations to weigh in our deliberations, and they are not all significant only insofar as they 
contribute to improving the people’s overall welfare. 
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Rule utilitarians may be able to accommodate some or all of these justice-oriented 
considerations indirectly by emphasizing how their promotion ultimately contributes to overall 
welfare. But if one favors rule utilitarianism, it is not clear that the Repugnant Conclusion will be 
generated. One of the central tenets of rule utilitarianism is that the general rules be followed 
even in rare cases where following the rules does not lead to maximizing utility
2
 – that is, cases 
in which utility would be maximized by violating the rule.
3
 So suppose we implement a rule to 
respect women’s reproductive autonomy – a very plausible inclusion to a rule utilitarian’s list of 
principles given the ways in which a failure to respect their reproductive autonomy has caused 
unnecessary suffering in the past (and continues to do so in the present). Here, we might have a 
case in which violating this rule would promote greater overall utility, but according to rule 
utilitarianism, we ought to respect the general rule nonetheless. Respecting this moral rule would 
not entail the Repugnant Conclusion, since not all women would volunteer to produce such an 
extraordinary number of children. In contrast, if we violate this general rule whenever doing so 
maximizes utility, then we have retreated straight back to the Impersonal Total Principle. Under 
those circumstances, we are really only adhering to one rule: do whatever maximizes aggregate 
impersonal utility, and we return to the worry that we are not properly incorporating justice-
oriented concepts into our moral decision-making.
4
 
                                                 
2
 If a rule frequently leads to non-maximal utility, then the rule may need to be altered, but even generally effective 
rules will likely yield non-maximal utility on occasion. 
3
 This feature of rule utilitarianism has led some philosophers to reject it because they consider it inconsistent with 
the central goal of utilitarianism – maximizing utility. The classic representation of this view comes from J. J. C. 
Smart (1956). 
4
 There is obviously much more that could be said about why one should reject the utilitarian outlook that gives rise 
to the Repugnant Conclusion, but this is not the venue for a detailed discussion of the merits of different moral 
theories. While my own outlook is rather pluralistic, it may be worth mentioning that the core arguments of later 
chapters do not appeal explicitly to any particular moral theory – only to moral principles that I consider plausible. 
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Ultimately, we have strong theoretical reasons to reject the Impersonal Total Principle 
that gives rise to the Repugnant Conclusion, and even if we accepted the Impersonal Total 
Principle, it would not in practice require us to pursue radical population expansion. Thus, 
accepting the Repugnant Conclusion is not a strong reason to object to an imperative to reduce 
the global human population.  
The Non-Identity Problem 
A second objection to a proposed obligation to reduce population could arise from the 
Non-Identity Problem. To illustrate this moral quandary, imagine that Wilma is thinking about 
having a baby (Boonin 2014, p. 2).
5
 She learns from her doctor that if she conceives a child in 
the near future, that child will have a severe and irreversible disability, though that disability will 
not render her child’s life not worth living. Fortunately, Wilma can prevent her child from 
having a disability by taking a tiny pill once a day for two months before conceiving the child. 
Her health insurance will cover the costs of the medication, and the pill boasts no side effects. 
But Wilma decides to conceive at once despite the doctor’s advice, and her child – Pebbles – is 
born with incurable blindness. 
Here’s the moral puzzle created by Wilma’s decision: most believe that she acted 
wrongly in conceiving Pebbles in this manner, but if she had taken the pill for two months, the 
child she would have conceived would not have been Pebbles – it would have been someone 
else. After two months, an entirely new sperm and egg pair would be united, and since the child 
would have a complete different genetic constitution than Pebbles, it could not have been 
Pebbles. Why does this matter? It matters because it raises a serious question about whether 
                                                 
5
 This case is heavily influenced by Parfit’s (1982) Handicapped Child case (p. 118). 
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Pebbles was harmed by being born with blindness: since it is impossible for Pebbles to exist and 
not be blind, she is not made worse off than she otherwise would have been. 
David Boonin (2014) uses Wilma’s case of decision-making to present what he calls the 
Non-Identity Argument (p. 27): 
P1: Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day for two months 
before conceiving does not make Pebbles worse off than she would otherwise have 
been. 
P2: If A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off than B would otherwise have 
been. 
P3: Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day for two months 
before conceiving does not harm anyone other than Pebbles. 
P4: If an act does not harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone. 
P5: If an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not morally wrong. 
C: Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles is not morally wrong. 
If we cannot find a premise in the argument to reject, then we have to accept the conclusion that 
Wilma did not act wrongly in conceiving Pebbles. 
This particular case might not seem relevant to the rising global population, but the 
argument can be tweaked to have some significant moral implications for population policy. 
Suppose that we were considering whether to implement an international policy that only allows 
couples to have a maximum of two children rather than allowing individuals to have as many 
children as they wish. Under full compliance to a global two-child policy, the global population 
would eventually stabilize and then gradually reduce, but this outcome would take some time to 
occur. Suppose that demographic momentum ensures that population stabilization will take 100 
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years. Under this policy, many people will have children at different times or refrain from having 
children that they otherwise would have had, and over time, some people who would otherwise 
never have met will meet and start families together. Iterated over many generations, these 
outcomes result in a completely different set of people existing in 100 years than would have 
existed under the more liberal procreative policy. But this means that the people who would have 
existed under the more liberal procreative policy would not have been harmed had we not chosen 
the more restrictive policy. In fact, they needed us to choose that policy in order for them to exist 
at all. If it is true that we cannot wrong those that we cannot harm, then it appears that allowing 
for a more liberal procreative policy – even one that lowered overall welfare by promoting 
overpopulation – would not have wronged any future people. 
Admittedly, the case sketched above requires a number of idealized conditions, but the 
thought experiment nevertheless illustrates how the Non-Identity Problem could ground an 
objection to certain population policies if the basis for those policies is that they harm future 
people. This strategy fails, however, because the Non-Identity Argument is unsound: the second, 
fourth, and fifth premises are all false. It is possible for one to be harmed by actions that do not 
make one worse off than she otherwise would have been, it is possible to wrong someone 
without harming them, and it is possible for actions to be morally wrong even if they do not 
wrong anyone. 
Let’s begin with the second premise: if A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off 
than B would otherwise have been. This premise reflects what is known as the counterfactual 
comparison notion of harm (CCH). The standard defense of CCH is that it is the notion of harm 
that best accords with common sense. On this basis, Boonin (2014) presents CCH as the default 
position “unless a better alternative comes along” (p. 52). There are important methodological 
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questions about appeals to common-sense morality (some of which were discussed in chapter 1), 
but even granting that common sense is an appropriate starting point for moral inquiry, this 
defense of CCH is flawed. Boonin provides no compelling evidence for the claim that CCH is in 
fact a part of common-sense morality. 
Boonin supports CCH with some hypothetical anecdotes about how people would explain 
why they were harmed or did not harm someone else. Suppose I vandalize your car. What 
justification would you offer if you were pressed to explain why you had been harmed? Boonin 
(2014) claims that “you are likely to reply by pointing to the various ways in which my act has 
made you worse off than you would have been had I not vandalized your car” (p. 52). If you 
asked for compensation, it would presumably be the amount that would come closest to 
nullifying the extent that you have been made worse off. Additionally, if you had to explain why 
scratching your nose did not harm me, then “you are likely to appeal to the claim that your act 
did not in any way make me worse off than I would otherwise have been by way of rebutting the 
complaint” (p. 52). 
This defense of CCH has a very serious shortcoming. The way to determine the contents 
of common sense morality would be to poll the general public on their views. Boonin has not 
conducted such surveys, and I am not aware of anyone who has done so. He is simply 
postulating that CCH is a part of common sense morality, and that strategy is indefensible. Why 
assume that ordinary people have any firm convictions about what account of harm is correct? 
Although harm is a component of virtually everyone’s moral reasoning, I doubt it is common for 
ordinary people to reflect on what constitutes harm or what its necessary or sufficient conditions 
are. Thus, I suspect that their understanding of harm will usually be a mish-mash of inconsistent 
intuitions that does not converge neatly on any extant view. In the absence of evidence showing 
   
39 
convergence on a particular conception of harm, there is no reason to grant Boonin’s assumption 
that CCH is part of common-sense morality. 
A deeper problem with Boonin’s defense of CCH is that it fails to handle cases of 
preemption. Consider this case from Hanser (2008): 
The Two Hit Men: Mr. Bad orders Hit Man 1 to shoot and kill you. Hit Man 1 doesn’t 
always follow his orders, so Mr. Bad orders Hit Man 2 to shoot and kill you if Hit Man 1 
fails to shoot and kill you. Hit Man 2 always follows his orders. As it happens, though, 
Hit Man 1 shoots and kills you and Hit Man 2’s orders prove to be unnecessary. (p. 436)
6
 
According to CCH, Hit Man 1 does not harm you because he does not make you worse off than 
you otherwise would have been. It would be an odd result if the most plausible account of harm 
entails that an act of murder does not constitute a harm so long as someone else was also 
planning to murder you! Boonin (2014) recognizes this point but still claims that a proponent of 
CCH should just bite the bullet (p. 58). In contrast to Boonin, I think the proper conclusion to 
draw is that CCH is wrong. Clearly, there are cases in which people can be harmed without being 
made worse off than they otherwise would have been. Given my earlier skepticism about CCH 
occupying a privileged position as an account of harm (because of its supposed presence in 
common-sense morality), I see no reason to cling to it as Boonin does.
7
 
Boonin’s main strategy for countering this concern is to highlight that the other accounts 
of harm have bigger problems than CCH, but this approach is misguided. Even if he succeeded 
in showing that CCH was better than all rival accounts currently on offer, that would not 
establish that CCH was true. We do not have to establish a full account of harm to reject the 
                                                 
6
 Plenty of other philosophers have presented variants of preemption cases as a problem for CCH. For some 
examples, see Thomson (2011, pp. 446-447), Woollard (2012, p. 484), and Bradley (2012, p. 397). 
7
 The non-identity problem is also frequently mentioned as a problem case for CCH, but it would be question-
begging to present it as a problem case in this context. We would have to assume the Non-Identity Argument is 
unsound to make that claim, and determining the argument’s soundness is precisely why we are examining CCH in 
the first place. 
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second premise of the Non-Identity Argument; we only have to establish that CCH should be 
rejected. We have more than enough reason to abandon CCH, even if we are unsure what a full 
and comprehensive account of harm would be.
8
 
We can now turn to the fourth premise of the Non-Identity Argument: if an act does not 
harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone. This premise is false because it is vulnerable 
to a wealth of counterexamples. Some of these counterexamples are cases that involve violations 
of rights that do not harm anyone. Voyeurism, for instance, is wrong even when the act is never 
discovered by anyone because it violates a person’s right to privacy. Similarly, sexually 
assaulting a person who is unconscious is wrong, even if no one ever learns about the act and it 
causes no physical harm, because it violates a person’s right to bodily integrity. Another class of 
counterexamples would be instances of non-harmful promise-breaking. Even when one can 
break a promise without it being known and without harming anyone, this does not obviously 
permit one to break the promise. After all, the whole point of promises is that they should be 
upheld except in dire and extreme circumstances. 
There are also counterexamples to this premise that relate to the mere risk of harm. 
Driving while intoxicated is wrong even in circumstances where no harm occurs because there is 
a non-trivial risk of harming someone else. But the wrongness of the action surely does not 
originate from whether or not the person actually harms someone. Whether a person is injured by 
a drunk driver may be solely a matter of luck – a result of where a person happens to be on the 
                                                 
8
 In previous work (Hedberg 2013), I argued that fully capturing the relevant notion of harm required two principles 
– one that captured CCH (or something similar to it) and one that specified a non-comparative component. Although 
I no longer think the particular account offered there is correct, I am still receptive to the more general idea that a 
full account of harm will contain (at least) these two distinct components. 
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sidewalk at a particular moment or when precisely someone happens to leave the parking lot.
9
 
Whether one’s conduct is wrong, however, cannot hinge exclusively on luck. If luck alone can 
make that much of a difference to our moral responsibility, then we would have little control 
over our own moral conduct, and judgments about one’s moral character would be arbitrary.
10
 
Boonin’s response to this line of reasoning is to highlight how these explanations do not 
account for how Wilma’s specific act is wrong. He thinks it is possible to modify the fourth 
premise to avoid these shortcomings. Thus, “the question is not whether we can show that P4 is 
false. The question is whether we can show that it is false enough” (Boonin 2014, p. 109).
11
 Even 
so, I believe that we can show this premise to be “false enough” to render the Non-Identity 
Argument unsound. 
The most plausible objection to P4 is what Boonin refers to as a direct rights-based 
argument. The best candidate for a right that Wilma violates is a child’s right “not to be born 
with important opportunities foreclosed” (Jecker 2012, p. 34).
12
 Such a right explains not only 
why it is generally wrong to intentionally have a child who will be blind (or suffer some other 
significant disability) but also why it is wrong to have children in circumstances where they will 
not have a reasonable chance at a good life (e.g., because they are born into severe poverty, 
because they are born addicted to drugs). Pebbles is wronged by having her right to non-
foreclosed opportunities violated, even though this rights violation does not necessarily harm her. 
                                                 
9
 I borrow the example of a drunk driver from Rahul Kumar (2003, p. 103).  
10
 The extent to which moral luck is an obstacle for contemporary moral theorizing remains a topic of controversy. 
For an overview, see Nelkin (2013). 
11
 Strangely, Boonin never explicitly presents a version of this fourth premise that is immune from all these 
counterexamples and still makes the Non-Identity Argument work. He leaves that reconstruction to the reader. 
12
 Velleman (2008) proposes a similar alternative: children have “a right to be born into good enough 
circumstances” (p. 275). These “good enough circumstances” would presumably include the condition that 
important opportunities have not been foreclosed. 
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Of course, one important aspect of Wilma’s circumstances is that she can conceive a 
child whose right to non-foreclosed opportunities will not be violated. If Wilma were unable to 
conceive a child who would be sighted, then we might reason that her action is permissible even 
though it would violate a right of the child. The violation of a right is prima facie morally wrong, 
but an inability to conceive a sighted child might provide a basis for violating this right, so long 
as Wilma would be able to give her child a good life despite the child’s blindness. The general 
point, however, is that there is a very strong presumption against violating a child’s right to non-
foreclosed opportunities. 
Boonin (2014) expresses considerable skepticism that anything that happens to Pebbles 
could be considered a rights violation (pp. 111-113). He reasons that the only viable candidate 
for a right that Wilma could violate is Pebbles’ right not to exist in her present condition, which 
is the strategy that Doran Smolkin (1999) adopts. Since Pebbles’ present condition results in her 
having certain opportunities foreclosed, this interpretation is consistent with the aforementioned 
right of non-foreclosed opportunities.
13
 
Boonin (2014) objects to this strategy on the grounds that it is not properly motivated: he 
claims that the only reason to endorse this solution is to avoid the conclusion of the Non-Identity 
Argument, which violates what he calls the “Independence Requirement” (pp. 20-21). According 
to the Independence Requirement, any reason for rejecting a premise in the Non-Identity 
Argument must be independent of the fact that rejecting that premise would enable us to avoid 
accepting the Non-Identity Argument’s conclusion. Boonin focuses on Smolkin’s (1999) 
presentation of a direct rights-based argument, and he is right that Smolkin offers little to 
                                                 
13
 Smolkin’s considered position does not perfectly match the language used here. He later refines his claim to the 
following: “a person’s life is complaint-warranting if and only if some act that was necessary for her to come into 
being also resulted in her being unable to lead a good life in any particular life stage” (Smolkin 1999, p. 206). 
   
43 
motivate his rights-based account other than the claim that it allows us to avoid the Non-Identity 
Problem. But the same is not true of the right not to have one’s opportunities foreclosed. As I 
suggested earlier, this right has plausible support independent of any discussion of the Non-
Identity Problem: it explains why it is wrong not to provide children with circumstances that are 
conducive to them living a good life. Since rights violations are prima facie morally wrong, the 
burden of proof would be on Wilma to show that she was justified in committing this rights 
violation when it could have easily been avoided at no significant cost to her. Since she could 
have easily had a child that was not born blind – a child that would not have had this right 
violated – the wrongness of her conceiving Pebbles is not overridden.
14
 Thus, her conceiving 
Pebbles was morally wrong. 
The flaws with P2 and P4 are hopefully sufficient to reject the Non-Identity Argument, 
but if further evidence is needed, there are also good grounds for rejecting P5. According to this 
premise, an act is not morally wrong if it does not wrong anyone. A straightforward way to 
refute this claim is via appeal to virtue ethical considerations. Virtue ethics is principally 
concerned with one’s moral character. Its focus is not on the rightness or wrongness of particular 
actions but on our dispositions to behave in certain ways. Now imagine what the ideally virtuous 
parents would be like. They would deeply love and cherish their child, promote their child’s 
welfare, respect their child’s autonomy, and so on. Now consider what decision such a parent 
would make if placed in Wilma’s position. Is there any virtuous parent who would choose to 
conceive a child immediately instead of taking the pill for two months and then conceiving? 
                                                 
14
 There is an assumption here that rights apply universally to all persons and specify appropriate thresholds of 
treatment below which no one should fall. As Caney (2010b) states, “[H]uman rights specify minimum moral 
thresholds to which all individuals are entitled, simply by virtue of their humanity, and which override all other 
moral values” (p. 165). This approach to rights is also defended by Shue (1996) and Bell (2011, pp. 104-110). 
Hence, the fact that Pebbles could not have existed without suffering this rights violation does not change the fact 
that her rights were violated. 
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Even if we assume that Pebbles herself was neither harmed nor wronged, conceiving 
Pebbles was still wrong because it instantiates a vice. Wilma is not properly concerned with 
conceiving a child who has the best possible chance at a good life. Parents should care about 
their child’s welfare and potential for a good life regardless of who their child turns out to be. 
Intentionally choosing to create a child who will have lower welfare or greater obstacles toward 
living a good life than another child demonstrates that the parents are not sufficiently concerned 
with their child’s welfare. Admittedly, few claim that parents are required to do everything they 
can to maximize their child’s chances of living a flourishing life,
15
 but we usually do expect 
parents to do what’s reasonably possible to ensure that their children have a good chance at 
living such a life. Deliberately choosing to conceive a blind child rather than a sighted child for 
such frivolous reasons as Wilma’s is inconsistent with this feature of being a good parent. 
Wilma’s choice and the reason she makes it reveal that she does not have a strong commitment 
to promoting her children’s flourishing. Her action is wrong because it manifests morally 
defective character. 
Boonin (2014) does briefly acknowledge this virtue ethical objection to P5 (pp. 184-188), 
but he identifies the relevant vice as an insensitivity to suffering, particularly as discussed by 
Urbanek (2010). I do not think that the relevant character flaw is necessarily an insensitivity to 
suffering, however; it can be understood as a kind of parental negligence – a failure to care 
sufficiently about the impersonal welfare of one’s future children. Consider David DeGrazia’s 
(2012) remarks about a case very similar to Wilma’s: 
                                                 
15
 Julian Savulescu (2001) is a notable exception. He defends the principle of Procreative Beneficence: “couples (or 
single reproducers) should select the child of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best 
life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information” (p. 415). For further defense 
of this position, see Savulescu and Kahane (2009). 
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...it is very clear that the parents did not make this choice in order to benefit this very 
child. Indeed, their conduct expressed a highly cavalier attitude about their procreative 
options and their likely consequences. In this way, the parents expressed a profound lack 
of regard for their offspring–whoever it would be. … Although the couples disregard was 
not intentionally directed at the child they had, it was, in a sense, negligently directed at 
whatever child they might have. (pp. 180-181, original emphasis)  
Wilma is displaying the same vice: she should care much more about the circumstances into 
which her child – whoever it will be – will be born, and she should avoid actions that lower the 
impersonal welfare of her future child for frivolous reasons.
16
 Hence, P5 is false. 
Before moving on from the Non-Identity Problem, two final remarks should be made. 
First, the Non-Identity Problem has a surprisingly narrow scope, a fact that is rarely highlighted 
when the issue is discussed.
17
 The Non-Identity Problem only applies to narrow, person-affecting 
theories – that is, those that evaluate the rightness or wrongness of actions on the basis of how 
they affect particular, identifiable individuals. Consequentialist moral theories evaluate the 
rightness or wrongness of actions based on their overall consequences. Since these theories are 
concerned with aggregate goodness, they are not narrow person-affecting theories. Virtue ethical 
theories focus on developing virtuous character and acting in accordance with the virtues. They 
do not ground rightness or wrongness in narrow person-affecting moral principles. 
Typically, the Non-Identity Problem is framed as applying to deontological moral 
theories, but even many deontological theories are not narrowly person-affecting the way that the 
Non-Identity Problem requires. As Rivka Weinberg (2016) explains, 
…[deontological moral theories] are not narrowly person-affecting in the sense relevant 
to the non-identity problem because they do not determine wrongdoing on the basis of the 
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 These remarks should not be confused with strict consequentialist reasoning. How our actions affect the welfare 
of others will be a significant component of any plausible view of morality, and nothing here commits me to the 
claim that only impersonal welfare matters to determining what we morally ought to do. The point is simply that 
parents should strive not to lower the impersonal welfare of their children unnecessarily. 
17
 A notable exception is Weinberg (2016, ch. 3). 
   
46 
of the effect of an act on an individual. They are not theories the determine permissibility 
of an act on the basis of consequences at all. Instead, deontological theories determine the 
permissibility of an act on the basis of its adherence to principles designed to treat people 
as having a special status as moral agents and ends-in-themselves. The non-identity 
problem does not apply to deontology because the non-identity problem is a problem 
only if permissibility of acts is determined by the act’s effects or consequences on a 
particular person. Focusing on the effects or consequences of an act is a fundamentally 
nondeontological approach to ethics. (p. 105, original emphasis) 
Most deontological theories will, for the reasons Weinberg mentions, not accept P4 of the Non-
Identity Argument because the wrongness of an action will be determined by whether the action 
violates a particular moral principle – not by whether or not the action harms some particular 
identifiable person. Thus, the Non-Identity Problem is only applicable to a small subset of 
deontological moral theories that adopt the idiosyncratic notions of harm and wrongness that it 
presupposes. 
Second, the analysis I have offered in this section only scratches the surface of the many 
responses that have been made to the Non-Identity Problem. It has been addressed in literally 
hundreds of venues, and there are dozens of proposed solutions.
18
 Philosophers frequently 
disagree about the best way to address it, but there is broad consensus that it can be resolved in 
some way. The Non-Identity Problem, despite its frequent discussion in philosophical circles, is 




The Asymmetry in the ethics of procreation consists of two distinct ethical claims. The 
first is that it is morally wrong to bring into existence a child who will have an abjectly miserable 
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 For some examples of these responses, see ‘t Hooft (1999, pp. 50-51), Woodward (1986), Kumar (2003), 
Davidson (2008, p. 482), Harman (2009b), Nolt (2011a, pp. 71-72), and Weinberg (2016, ch. 3). 
19
 Even Boonin (2014) acknowledges that the practical implications of the Non-Identity Argument in large scale 
intergenerational cases may not be very significant even if the argument is sound (p. 216). 
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life; the second is that it is permissible not to bring into existence a child who will enjoy a very 
happy life. Both claims of the Asymmetry are supported by strong moral intuitions, but finding a 
plausible moral theory which can accommodate both claims has proven a difficult task. As a 
result, some philosophers have concluded that the Asymmetry is not defensible and that one of 
its claims must be false (e.g., McMahan 1981, 2009, 2013; Singer 1993; Persson 2009). If 
someone holds this position, then unless one is unwilling to abandon the claim that it is wrong to 
create a child who will have a miserable life, one must conclude that we have a moral obligation 
to procreate when doing so will result in the creation of someone with a great life.
20
 But of 
course, this implies that many of us – namely, those who could provide such good lives to future 
people – may have duties to increase the human population rather than reduce it. 
It would be implausible to claim that it is permissible to create a child who will live an 
unremittingly miserable life. Such an action harms the child by putting her in a state that is worse 
than experiencing nothing at all. One of the most basic moral principles is the duty to avoid 
causing suffering (when possible). Creating a child with a miserable life blatantly violates this 
principle. Moreover, parents have a general responsibility to promote the welfare of their 
children, and deliberately having a child with a poor quality of life does not adhere to this 
responsibility. An appropriately beneficent parent would not create conditions that ensure their 
child suffers so much during her life. Thus, the first half of the Asymmetry – the claim that it is 
wrong to create children who will lead miserable lives – is strongly supported. 
Why does this matter with respect to overpopulation? Since the first claim of the 
Asymmetry is plausible, one may worry that we actually have a duty to procreate unless we can 
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 In practice, we obviously cannot predict precisely what a child’s quality of life will be, but we can still make 
reasonably informed judgments about what children would have a high probability of living a good life. 
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vindicate the other half of the Asymmetry. A duty to procreate would complicate the moral 
picture a great deal and make it much more challenging to argue for a duty to reduce the global 
population. Fortunately, it is possible to bypass this obstacle by vindicating an alternative 
procreative asymmetry – one that differs from the Asymmetry that philosophers most frequently 
discuss. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Hedberg 2016), the Asymmetry is actually ambiguous 
between two distinct sets of claims. The first set of claims can be put as follows (Roberts 2011a, 
p. 765): 
Claim 1: It is wrong to bring a miserable child – a child whose life is less than worth living – 
into existence.  
Claim 2: It is permissible not to bring a happy child – a child whose life is worth living or even 
well worth living – into existence. 
These claims are almost always discussed as idealizations: it is assumed that the relevant acts of 
procreation do not impact the lives of anyone else except those who are created. In this manner, 
Claims 1 and 2 refer to instances of procreation in a vacuum. Thus, I label these claims as the 
Abstract Asymmetry. 
The Abstract Asymmetry can be contrasted with the Real-World Asymmetry, which I 
represent as the union of two different claims: 
Claim 3: Under ordinary conditions of human reproduction, people are not morally permitted 
to bring a child into existence who would have an abjectly miserable life. 
Claim 4: Under ordinary conditions of human reproduction, people are not morally obligated to 
bring a child into existence who would have a very happy life.   
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I refer to these claims as the Real-World Asymmetry because they are, unlike their Abstract 
counterparts, explicitly grounded in the conditions of typical human reproduction. It is also 
worth noting that the Real-World Asymmetry leaves open the possibility that we can be 
obligated to perform these procreative actions under certain extreme circumstances. Perhaps, for 
instance, we may have an obligation to procreate if it is required for the continuity of the human 
species. 
This distinction enables us to avoid positing a general duty to procreate. I contend that the 
Abstract Asymmetry is false but that the Real-World Asymmetry is true. The primary support for 
the Abstract Asymmetry is an appeal to intuition: it just doesn’t seem like we have a duty to 
procreate, even in the idealized circumstances specified. But this is precisely the problem: given 
these idealized circumstances, how could anyone have a clear intuition about what our 
reproductive obligations are? No human being has ever witnessed or experienced a case of this 
costless procreation, so there is no reason to believe our judgments about such cases is reliable. 
Thus, we should be suspicious of our intuitions about the Abstract Asymmetry. 
We should be especially willing to revise our intuitions about the Abstract Asymmetry 
because it violates the following moral principle. 
Goodness for Free: if we can perform an action that causes something good to happen 
without sacrificing anything at all, we are morally obligated to perform that action. 
Virtually all moral decisions we make will involve costs of some sort, so this principle often will 
not apply to ordinary moral decision-making. It does, however, apply to Claim 2 of the 
Asymmetry. Goodness for Free is plausible because it highlights one of the most basic aspects of 
moral reasoning: it is morally preferable to bring about good outcomes. Certainly, other moral 
considerations may override the promotion of a good outcome. Donating money to charity may 
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make the world a better place, but it does not follow that I should steal from my friends to 
acquire more money to donate even if the world is made better (in terms of total welfare) by my 
actions. Goodness for Free specifies, however, that there are no other considerations in play – 
moral or otherwise. In Claim 2, we have a morally salient reason to bring a child into existence 
but no countervailing reason not to do so. Thus, we can only conclude that we do have an 
obligation to procreate in that otherworldly case. 
The good news is that we do not need to support the Abstract Asymmetry to defend the 
claim that people generally do not have an obligation to procreate. I have already gestured at the 
reasons for not creating a miserable child: the most central reason is the duty not to cause 
unnecessary suffering. Supporting Claim 4 is more challenging, but there are two routes to doing 
so. The first originates from the existence of supererogatory actions – those that are morally good 
to do but not morally required. The paradigm examples of these actions usually involve heroic 
levels of self-sacrifice,
21
 but they need not be limited to such extraordinarily demanding 
sacrifices. The existence of these actions stems from the recognition that worthy life pursuits are 
not just limited to doing morally good things: we have the moral latitude to sometimes to refrain 
from maximizing the good in favor of pursuing other aspects of our life plans. 
Creating a happy child can be a good thing to do, but it is not something that people are 
morally required to do under ordinary circumstances. Pregnancy can be the most physically and 
emotionally challenging experience of a woman’s life and frequently affects her physical 
appearance for the remainder of her life, and the responsibilities and burdens associated with 
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 J. O. Urmson (1958) is usually credited with initiating the discussion of supererogation in secular moral theory. 
His examples of supererogatory behavior were saints and heroes, and the philosophical literature on this topic has 
often focused on these particular examples. For useful surveys of the literature written in response to Urmson’s 
article, see Jackson (1986) and Stanlick (1999). 
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parenting are among the greatest and most demanding that a person can experience. The 
investments of time, emotion, and financial resources required to be a good parent are 
extraordinary. They are also enduring: children do not typically leave their parents’ care until 
they are close to twenty years old. Burdens of this severity and duration are not typically 
required except under the most dire of circumstances. 
The second route to securing Claim 4 is to acknowledge the gender asymmetry in the act 
of procreation. Women typically bear far more of the costs of reproduction than men. Some of 
these costs are rooted in the biological differences between men and women. Others are rooted in 
culture: compared to men, women are still expected to bear more of the responsibilities in most 
of the world. If we posit a general obligation to produce happy children, women will be the ones 
who are forced to bear most of the responsibilities associated with fulfilling it. Beyond the 
obvious suffering that this would cause many women, this practice would also cultivate 
resentment and distrust in them and impede any serious efforts at the long-term attainment of 
gender equality. The children’s lives may bring much more good into the world, but I doubt 
many would be prepared to make such massive sacrifices with respect to gender equality in order 
to achieve that happiness. Moreover, it is unclear that the long-term consequences of this 
pervasive and systematic oppression of women would ultimately result in the best overall 
consequences: social arrangements of this sort often lead to discontent, subordination, and even 
violent revolts. 
With Claims 3 and 4 secured, the Real-World Asymmetry is supported, and that is all we 
need to deny that there exists a general obligation to create happy children. In this manner, even 
if we deny the Abstract Asymmetry, we do not encounter an objection to reducing human 
population.  
   
52 
Recap  
The Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Asymmetry have all 
become foci of significant philosophical discussions. When we examine these issues in detail, 
however, we see that they do not provide strong reasons for skepticism about a duty to reduce 
population. In fact, on close examination, these problems are revealed to be solely theoretical in 
nature and lacking in practical application to our real-world circumstances. Perhaps in the future 
that will change, but as it stands, these three issues should not be a serious focus when we turn 
our attention to the global population growth under way in the twenty-first century. Our solution 
to this problem will not be meaningfully influenced by reflecting on the Repugnant Conclusion, 
the Nonidentity Problem, or the Asymmetry.
22
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 In chapter 1, I argued that these issues did constitute genuine moral problems according to Räikkä’s (2000) 
criteria. One of these criteria is that the moral questions have “practical relevance in the sense that they concern the 
issue of what should actually be done” (p. 401). I am not reversing my position here. These three issues could 
potentially provide us with insight that would influence what we should do under various circumstances and the 
views we form on these issues could have implications for what we owe future people. In this sense, they certainly 
concern how we actually ought to act. What I have argued is that they do not in fact provide us with meaningful 
guidance about what to do about the specific problem of population growth in the 21st century. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EXTREMES OF PROCREATIVE ETHICS 
This chapter considers and evaluates two opposing views of procreative ethics. The first, 
which is commonly called Antinatalism, is the view that procreation is always (or at least 
usually) morally wrong.
1
 The second, which I will call Procreative Liberty, is the view that 
everyone has a right to procreate as much as they wish. According to antinatalism, there is an 
extremely strong presumption against procreating. According to Procreative Liberty, there is a 
very strong presumption against placing any limitations on procreative freedom. If Antinatalism 
were correct, then we would likely want to promote population policies that would not just 
reduce population in the short term but those that would do so until population were reduced to 
zero. In contrast, if Procreative Liberty were correct, then we might not be able to enforce any 
restrictions on procreation whatsoever. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate both that antinatalism in its extreme forms 
is false and that Procreative Liberty is false. Refuting these extreme positions will establish some 
bounds on what constitutes an acceptable procreative ethic and also set the stage for the 
principles of procreative and population ethics that will be defended in subsequent chapters. 
I begin with the most extreme form of Antinatalism, as advocated by David Benatar 
(2006, 2015). According to this view, it is always wrong to procreate. Some readers may wonder 
why it is worth even considering a position so radically at odds with ordinary moral beliefs and 
human behavior, but over the last decade, philosophers have started to take challenges to the 
permissibility of procreation quite seriously. Take, for example, this excerpt from the opening 
                                                 
1
 As will become clear in my discussion of Antinatalism, some variations are global in scope and meant to apply to 
everyone while others are more localized and sensitive to context. Given the scope of our discussion, the focus will 
be on the forms of Antinatalism with a broad scope. 
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paragraph of Jamie Nelson’s (2016) review of Permissible Progeny? The Morality of 
Procreation and Parenting: 
...the tenor of the text is that, given environmental fragility and existing children in need 
of families, bearing and begetting as such are morally fraught enterprises, certainly on the 
defensive, and possibly best seen as indulgence in an expensive hobby. Antinatalism is 
taken in general quite seriously throughout, sometimes bracketed, but never directly 
confronted. 
Nelson encapsulates a view that has been gradually gaining momentum in moral philosophy: 
despite the widespread belief that procreation is almost always something to be praised and 
celebrated, procreation is actually only permissible in a fairly narrow range of circumstances. 
This view may not be held by many people, but the correctness of a philosophical position is not 
determined solely by the proportion of people who hold the position. If the arguments in favor of 




Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument 
David Benatar (2006; 2015, pp. 18-39) argues that it is always a harm to come into 
existence and that on these grounds there is a moral duty not to procreate.
3
 Part of Benatar’s 
reasoning here just reflects what many of us already know: if you live for any decent length of 
time, it is inevitable that you will endure some harm, and some of that harm may be pretty 
severe. But few people believe that this fact entails that procreation is impermissible. In most 
                                                 
2
 One might argue that there is no point in considering a view that would never be adopted as a social norm or matter 
of public policy. This objection will be treated near the end of the chapter, but for now, it is sufficient to note that 
moral imperatives that cannot be fully realized in practice can still often be approximated in some way. We can still 
consider what policies get closest to what is morally required. 
3
 A further implication is that one should discontinue pregnancy when it is possible to do so. Benatar (2006) refers to 
this as the “pro-death” view of abortion: “On this view, it is not any given abortion (in the earlier stages of 
pregnancy) that requires justification, but rather any given failure to abort. For such a failure allows somebody to 
suffer the serious harm of coming into existence” (p. 161). 
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cases, people believe that the good people experience significantly outweighs the bad caused by 
their pain and suffering. Thus, overall, most people’s lives are good, and it was better for them 
that they came into existence rather than never existing at all. Benatar’s rebuttal to this objection 
is the foundation for his Asymmetry Argument against procreation. 
Benatar (2015) endorses a cluster of evaluative judgments that he calls the Axiological 
Asymmetry. First, he claims that (1) the presence of harm is bad, and (2) the presence of benefit 
is good. Then he claims that (3) the absence of harm is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by 
anyone, whereas (4) the absence of benefit is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this 
absence is a deprivation (p. 23).
4
 Benatar (2015, p. 23) represents these asymmetrical evaluations 
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Absence of Benefit 
(Not Bad) 
 
Figure 2: Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry 
 
                                                 
4
 The same asymmetry can be found in Benatar (2006, p. 38), but the terms “harm” and “benefit” are replaced with 
“pain” and “pleasure” respectively. The (2015) formulation is closer to what Benatar actually means. Harm and 
benefit are broader concepts than pain and pleasure, and harm is the morally salient concept in his argument. 
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A person X exists in Scenario A but does not exist in Scenario B. In Scenario A, X experiences 
both harms and benefits; in Scenario B, X does not experience either harms or benefits. To 
determine which of these scenarios is preferable, Benatar argues that we must compare (1) with 
(3) and (2) with (4). He believes that there is a clear preference for (3) instead of (1) and no 
preference for (2) over (4). On his view, an absence of benefits is not bad unless a person exists 
to be deprived of the benefits. This claim explains why the absence of benefits in Scenario B is 
not analogous to the absence of benefits in Scenario A. Since (3) is preferable to (1) and (2) is 
not preferable to (4), he reasons that nonexistence is always preferable to existence. 
Based on the argument outlined above, Benatar (2015) claims that coming into existence 
is always a harm, but he also acknowledges that this alone does not demonstrate that it is always 
wrong to bring people into existence (p. 40). Even so, given that a general principle of non-harm 
is one of the most foundational aspects of any plausible moral theory, it is not difficult to 
produce a straightforward argument that it is prima facie wrong to procreate, provided that that 
Axiological Asymmetry is endorsed.
5
 
We should pause to digest Benatar’s reasoning in a bit more depth. According to the 
Axiological Asymmetry, nonexistence always has one advantage over existence: the absence of 
harm. Benatar claims that the absence of harm is good even when no one exists to experience it, 
but while nonexistence does feature the absence of benefits, this absence is not bad because the 
absence of benefits is only bad when someone exists to experience the deprivation. In his first 
formulation of the axiological asymmetry (which uses “pain” and “pleasure” rather than “harm” 
and “benefit”), Benatar (2006) argues that we view the absence of pleasure as bad only in 
                                                 
5
 Given the ease with which this maneuver can be made, it is surprising that Benatar does not make this point. 
Instead, he opts to combine the Axiological Asymmetry with the Quality-of-Life Argument (which will be discussed 
in the next section) to show that coming into existence is not merely a minor harm but a very serious one. 
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relative terms – it is bad when a person is deprived of pleasure relative to the state the person 
would experience if they were to experience the pleasure: 
Just as absent pleasures that do deprive are ‘bad’ in the sense of ‘worse’, so absent 
pleasures that do not deprive are ‘not bad’ in the sense of ‘not worse’. They are not worse 
than the presence of pleasures. It follows that the presence of pleasures is not better, and 
therefore that the presence of pleasures is not an advantage over absent pleasures that do 
not deprive. (pp. 41-42) 
So whereas the absence of pain is impersonally good, the absence of pleasure is not impersonally 
bad. We can extent this same line of reasoning to the newer formulation of the Axiological 
Asymmetry: the absence of harm is impersonally good, but the absence of benefits is not. 
According to Benatar, if we accept this asymmetry about harm and benefit, then we ought to 
favor nonexistence over existence. 
Now one might wonder why we should favor Benatar’s asymmetry over alternative views. 
Benatar’s central supporting argument is that this asymmetry best explains other asymmetries in 
the ethics of procreation. These other asymmetries include (Benatar 2015, pp. 25-27): 
1. The Asymmetry: we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence those who would live 




2. The prospective beneficent asymmetry: it would be strange to cite the benefits to the 
child as a reason for having a child but not similarly strange to cite the child’s 
suffering as a reason not to have a child. 
3. The retrospective beneficence asymmetry: it makes sense to regret bringing a suffering 
child into existence and to do so for the sake of the child, but it does not make sense to 
fail to bring a happy child into existence and regret this fact for the sake of the child. 
                                                 
6
 This is the same Asymmetry discussed in Chapter 2. 
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4. The asymmetry of distant suffering and absent happy people: we are saddened by the 
suffering of distant existing people but not similarly sad for absent people who could 
have led happy lives on vacant areas of Earth or on other planets. 
Benatar holds that all of these intuitively plausible asymmetries can be explained by the 
Axiological Asymmetry. He also contends that the Axiological Asymmetry can resolve the Non-
Identity Problem and avoid the Repugnant Conclusion (Benatar 2006, ch. 2; 2015, pp. 34-37). 
Regarding this latter point, he is surely correct. If coming into existence is always a harm, then 
all acts of procreation – including non-identity cases – will harm the person born, and if 
nonexistence is always preferable to existence, then it is clear that a world with a massive 
population is not the moral ideal. Rather, the moral ideal would be the world with as few 
inhabitants as possible. Nevertheless, whatever advantages Benatar’s position might have, it 
should still be rejected. 
The first important observation to make about Benatar’s position is that it relies 
extensively on appeals to intuition. The central reason to endorse the four other asymmetries that 
Benatar discusses is that they appear to capture intuitions that are commonly shared in 
procreative ethics. The problem is that Benatar’s conclusion – that coming into existence if 
always a harm – is one of the most counterintuitive claims that one can make within the ethics of 
procreation. Insofar as Benatar wants to defend his position via appeal to intuitions, I cannot see 
how he can succeed: the balance of intuitions likely favors rejecting his conclusion and either 
abandoning the other asymmetries or searching for alternative ways to explain them.
7
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 It is also telling that some philosophers use intuitive verdicts about thought experiments as a way to refute the 
axiological asymmetry (e.g., Overall 2012, pp. 98-103). 
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Additionally, Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry may not have the explanatory power that 
he believes it does. First, it is clear that not all of these four asymmetries may be true. In fact, I 
argued in the previous chapter that the Asymmetry, at least as commonly examined in the 
philosophical literature, is false. I do not think it is an advantage of Benatar’s position that it 
“explains” why we should endorse an incorrect view. Second, as I argued in the prior chapter, 
there are alternative explanations for how we can avoid the Non-Identity Problem and the 
Repugnant Conclusion. I even argued that the intuition underlying the Repugnant Conclusion is 
unreliable, which leaves us to wonder whether it is really a favorable feature of Benatar’s view 
that it avoids this rather innocuous conclusion. 
The Axiological Asymmetry has deeper problems than weakness in its support, however. 
Claim (3) is simply false. It does not make sense to speak of something being “good” in the 
impersonal sense that the claim requires. Since the person in question does not exist, the absence 
of harm cannot be good for that person. Thus, when Benatar (2006) claims that “the avoidance 
of the bad by never existing is a real advantage over existence” (p. 14), we must wonder for 
whom it is an advantage. The goodness generated by the absence of harm is not good for any 
existing individual, and it is implausible to claim that goodness can be attributed to merely 
possible entities.
8
 The only way to make sense of (3) is to posit the existence of some kind of 
free-floating goodness – goodness that is somehow disconnected from being good for any 
particular person or creature. But how are we to understand goodness that is completely 
unrelated to the good some individual or group of individuals? Furthermore, how could we 
recognize this goodness or make judgments about it in ways that are empirically informed or 
                                                 
8
 Overall (2012) echoes this thought when she notes that the term “good” is a person referring term: “A mere 
absence or avoidance is neither good nor bad unless it is good or bad for someone” (p. 105). DeGrazia (2010) and 
Harman (2009a) also criticize Benatar on these grounds. 
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reliable? When we speak of goodness for individuals, we can observe their behavior, ask them 
about their mental states and preferences, and in various other ways observe the effects of 




The reliance on free-floating goodness is, in my view, a fatal theoretical flaw in the 
Axiological Asymmetry, but other substantive problems would undermine it even if this one 
could be overcome. Perhaps the biggest problem is that accepting the Axiological Asymmetry 
does not clearly entail that nonexistence is preferable to existence. This problem becomes 
obvious when we recast the argument in premise-conclusion format: 
1. Nonexistence contains something good (i.e., the absence of harm) and something 
neutral (i.e., the absence of benefits). 
2. Existence contains something good (i.e., the presence of benefits) and something bad 
(i.e., the presence of harm). 
3. A package containing something good and something neutral is preferable to a 
package containing something good and something bad. 
4. Therefore, existence is preferable to nonexistence. 
The first two premises are just restatements of the different parts of the Axiological Asymmetry, 
but even granting those to Benatar, this argument clearly fails because the third premise is false. 
Which of these packages is to be preferred will depend greatly on the quantities of the goods and 
bads being weighed.
10
 Moreover, human lives vary greatly in the quantity of benefits and harms 
                                                 
9
 DeGrazia (2012) makes a similar point when he identifies Benatar’s reliance on “free-floating interests” as a 
problem with his view (p. 146).  
10
 This weakness is highlighted nicely by Belshaw (2007), who goes so far as to call the argument “dreadful” 
because of this shortcoming. 
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experienced, so there is no prima facie reason to assume that the positive value of the benefits 
experienced will always be too low to make existence worthwhile.
11
 
Benatar’s response to this objection relies on an analogy. He asks us to imagine two 
people: S and H. S often gets sick but also has the capacity to recover quickly from sickness. H 
never gets sick but lacks the capacity to recover quickly from getting sick. Benatar (2006) argues 
that it would obviously be preferable to be H rather than S: 
The capacity for a quick recovery, although a good for S, is not a real advantage over H. 
This is because the absence of that capacity is not bad for H. This, in turn, is because the 
absence of that capacity is not a deprivation for H. H is not worse off than he would have 
been had he had the recuperative powers of S. S is not better off than H in any way, even 
though S is better off than he himself would have been had he lacked the capacity for 
rapid recovery. (p. 42) 
Benatar (2006, p. 47) represents this assessment of S and H in Figure 3 below: 
 
 
Figure 3: Benatar’s Sickness Case 
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 Benatar does supplement this argument with further claims that attempt to establish that our lives are much worse 
than we typically believe. These empirical claims will be treated separately in the next subsection since they provide 
the basis for a different argument for Antinatalism. 
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Benatar reasons that the case of S and H is relevantly similar to the case of existence and 
nonexistence. Thus, he concludes that just as H’s circumstances are preferable to S’s, we should 
prefer nonexistence to existence. 
The standard way to refute an analogical argument is to reveal a relevant dissimilarity 
between the cases being compared. Benatar’s argument is susceptible to this strategy because 
there is a clear difference between the cases. S’s capacity for quick recovery from illness is only 
valuable in circumstances where S gets sick. Since H never gets sick, the capacity for quick 
recovery from illness will never be valuable for him. The value of life’s benefits is not 
contextualized in this way. For the case to be relevantly similar, the capacity to experience life’s 
benefits (e.g., pleasure) would have to be valuable only in cases where it served to alleviate 
harms that were suffered. (After all, the capacity for quick recovery from illness is only valuable 
when it serves to alleviate the suffering caused by illness.) But the capacity to experience life’s 
benefits is clearly valuable even in circumstances where it does not serve to alleviate pain. For 
example, while the sensation of pleasure often does accompany the amelioration of some painful 
state, such as when our hunger is sated by a delicious meal, there are also circumstances where 
pleasure does not seem to alleviate pain at all. Even if I am not in a state of discomfort, 
pleasurable experiences – perhaps the feeling of a gentle breeze, the sound of pleasant music, or 
an unexpected encounter with an old friend – remain valuable. The goodness associated with 
pleasure is not dependent on the ability to experience pain in the way that the goodness of quick 
recovery from illness is dependent on the ability to fall ill. Pleasure is just a good thing to 
experience, independent of its relationship to experiencing pain.
12
 On these grounds, our 
judgments about the case of S and H can deviate from our judgments about existence and 
                                                 
12
 A similar appraisal of Benatar’s analogy is offered by Smuts (2014, pp. 716-717). 
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nonexistence. S may not have any advantages over H, but an existing person does have an 
advantage over a merely possible one – the ability to experience life’s benefits. 
One final flaw in Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry is worth highlighting. This view 
simply has absurd implications, one of which Benatar (2006) highlights himself: “One of the 
implications of my argument is that a life filled with good and containing only the most minute 
quantity of bad—a life of utter bliss adulterated only by the pain of a single pin-prick—is worse 
than no life at all” (p. 48). It would be hard to find a better candidate for a reductio ad absurdum. 
Benatar (2006) is right to mention that “a brief sharp pain is a harm” (p. 49); his mistake is his 
claim that a blissful life with only this small quantity of pain “has no advantages over never 
existing” (p. 48, my emphasis). The ability to experience life’s benefits is an advantage over the 
inability to experience them, and without that claim, we are stuck with this absurd conclusion – 
the claim that even a life better than any human life ever lived is worse than having never 
existed. Because the Axiological Asymmetry entails an absurd conclusion, it ought to be 
rejected. 
Since its publication, Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry has been subjected to many 
criticisms, including some not illustrated here (e.g., Kaposy 2009, Bayne 2010, Bradley 2010, 
Brown 2011).
13
 Despite its provocativeness, the arguments that support it are weak. If there is a 
good reason to embrace Antinatalism, then it must be found elsewhere. This is not Benatar’s 
only argument supporting Antinatalism, however, so we can see whether his other arguments 
fare better. 
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 To his credit, Benatar does attempt to address many of his critics. See Benatar (2013).  
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Benatar’s Quality-of-Life Argument 
Benatar’s second argument for Antinatalism is based on the following claim: the majority 
of human lives are very bad.
14
 Because human lives are usually very bad, we are not justified in 
subjecting people to such lives, provided that we can avoid doing so. Any act of procreation is 
too risky because the odds are overwhelming that the person born will live a very bad life. 
Benatar supports this argument with two general strategies. First, he highlights a variety 
of psychological phenomena that cause us to see our lives as being better than they really are 
(Benatar 2006, pp. 64-69; 2015, pp. 41-54). One of these is optimism bias – the general tendency 
of human beings to interpret our experiences in an optimistic fashion. This bias manifests when 
we, for example, tend to remember a greater number of positive events in our lives than negative 
events or when we overestimate how good events in the future will be.
15
 Another is the general 
phenomenon of adaptation (or habituation), which refers to our tendency to adjust our 
expectations to suit our circumstances. A pronounced example of this occurs in cases where 
those who become paraplegic often become happy again, according to their own self-reports, 
within one year after losing the use of their legs (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978). 
Paraplegics adjust to their circumstances within one year and are then able to feel just as happy 
as they did before despite the loss they have experienced. In fact, we are remarkably resilient in 
the face of negative events: few bad things affect us for longer than three months (Suh, Diener, 
and Fujita 1996). The third major phenomenon that contributes to making inaccurate perceptions 
                                                 
14
 The most thorough presentations of this argument are found in Benatar (2006, pp. 60-92; 2015, pp. 40-77). In 
some respects, this argument is related to the Axiological Asymmetry. Benatar thinks the Axiological Asymmetry 
demonstrates that coming into existence is always a harm, and this argument is designed to give us a sense of just 
how bad the harm is. However, even if one rejects the Axiological Asymmetry, “one can recognize that a life 
containing a significant amount of bad is a harm” (Benatar 2006, p. 60). In this sense, it can be interpreted as an 
independent argument for the claim that it is morally wrong to procreate. 
15
 For some examples of this research, see Matlin and Stang (1978), Taylor (1989), Weinstein (1980, 1984), and 
Taylor and Brown (1998). 
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of our own well-being is our tendency to make implicit comparisons between ourselves and 
others (Wood 1996). We often compare ourselves to those around us to assess how well our lives 
are going, but this entails that widely shared negative features of human life will be overlooked 
in our assessments of our own well-being. Moreover, we tend to compare ourselves with people 
who are worse off than we are (Brown and Dutton 1995), further biasing our assessments in an 
optimistic direction. 
Benatar argues that these three psychological phenomena alter our perceptions such that 
our self-assessments of our own well-being are inflated: our lives are objectively worse than we 
usually believe. As far as this part of his argument goes, he is surely right. The empirical 
evidence supporting this idea is substantial, and these tendencies make sense from an 
evolutionary perspective. Those with a broadly optimistic outlook on their lives will, other things 
equal, be more likely to survive and reproduce than those who are more pessimistic.
16
 As 
Benatar (2006) puts the point, these psychological phenomena “militate against suicide and in 
favor of reproduction” (p. 69). 
Even if we have these optimistic biases, however, this fact does not entail that our lives 
are often very bad. After all, two of these biases can also make us perceive our life as being 
worse than it is objectively. Just as we adapt to negative events, we can also adapt to positive 
ones. As we become more successful, for instance, we will often raise our expectations to 
correspond with our success, such that continued success at the same level is no longer as 
fulfilling to us.
17
 Similarly, if we are surrounded by people whose lives appear to be going 
particularly well, our tendency to compare ourselves with our peers may cause us to think that 
                                                 
16
 For more on this topic, see Tiger (1979). 
17
 See Kahneman, Diener, and Scwartz (2003) for various essays on this phenomenon. 
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our own lives are going worse than they actually are. Benatar (2006) acknowledges the two-way 
nature of these tendencies, but he claims that the underlying optimism bias means that “both 
adaptation and comparison operate from an optimistic baseline” (p. 68). Benatar may be right 
that overall our perceptions are generally more positively influenced by the confluence of these 
factors than they are negatively affected, but his response is unsatisfactory. The fact that we 
often overestimate the goodness of our lives does not entail that our lives are bad. His claims are 
consistent with our lives being (objectively) good or decent despite our beliefs that our lives are 
very good or even sublime. For his argument to work, we need an explanation for why the gap 
between the perceived quality of our lives and their actual quality is as enormous as he suggests. 
To see if Benatar can provide that explanation, we must look at his second strategy for 
supporting the Quality-of-Life Argument. 
According to an influential taxonomy of views concerning the quality of life, there are 
three accounts of what makes a life go well or poorly.
18
 On hedonistic theories of well-being, 
lives fare well or poorly depending on the quantity of pleasure and pain that is experienced. On 
desire-fulfillment theories of well-being, lives fare well or poorly depending on the extent to 
which a person’s desires are fulfilled. Finally, on objective list theories of well-being, lives fare 
well or poorly to the extent that they contain certain things that are objectively good or bad. 
Some items on the objective list are good or bad for one’s life independent of their connection to 
pleasure and pain or to the person’s desires. Benatar’s second means of supporting the Quality-
of-Life argument is to show that our lives fare poorly on all three of these theories. 
Benatar’s general strategy is highlighting the various negative aspects of our lives that we 
routinely minimize or overlook. From the hedonistic perspective, these take the form of minor 
                                                 
18
 This taxonomy of what makes a person’s life go well comes from Parfit (1987, pp. 493-502). 
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pains and discomforts, such as hunger, thirst, allergies, headaches, nausea, and boredom (Benatar 
2006, pp. 70-72). We are fairly familiar with the great tragedies that can befall human lives – 
early death, cancer, depression, and other chronic or life-threatening ills – but these more banal 
pains are not often taken to be bad-making features of our lives. Moreover, pleasures tend to be 
short-lived while pain and discomfort are often long-lasting (Benatar 2015, pp. 48-49). Chronic 
pain is an all-too-common experience, but there is no such thing as chronic pleasure. 
When we consider desire fulfillment, Benatar (2006) notes, “Rather little of our lives is 
characterized by satisfied desires and rather a lot is marked by unsatisfied desires” (p. 74). Some 
of our desires are never satisfied, and the others are usually only satisfied after a significant time 
has passed. Thus, we spend much of our lives in a state of desire frustration. A further problem is 
that we are often caught in a treadmill of our desires: upon fulfilling one desire, another simply 
arises to take its place, which prevents long-term desire satisfaction.
19
 The result is that our 
moments of desire fulfillment are rare and fleeting while our moments of desire frustration are 
pervasive. 
Regarding objective list theories, Benatar’s strategy is to evaluate human lives from the 
point of view of the universe. He questions why a death at the age of 40 is regarded as a tragedy 
while a death at 90 is not. If longer lives are better, then isn’t the fact that the person did not live 
until 240 an indication that the person’s life did not go particularly well?
20
 The natural response 
is that it would be ludicrous to think one must live that long to live well, given that human beings 
cannot live anywhere near that long at present. Benatar (2006) rejects this response: 
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 This phenomenon led Abraham Maslow (1970) to remark, “It looks as if the human hope for eternal happiness 
can never be fulfilled. Certainly happiness does come and is obtainable and is real. But it looks as if we must accept 
its intrinsic transience, especially if we focus on its more intense forms” (p. xv). 
20
 The basic point here can be made using possible ages. I use 240 because that is the number Benatar (2006) uses in 
his own writing (p. 82). 
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But why must it be that the good life is within our reach? Perhaps the good life is 
something that is impossible to attain. It certainly sounds as though a life that is devoid of 
discomfort, pain, suffering, distress, stress, anxiety, frustration, and boredom, that lasts 
for much longer than ninety years, and that is filled with much more of what is good 
would be better than the sort of life the luckiest humans have. Why then do we not judge 
our lives in terms of that (impossible) standard? (p. 82) 
Benatar contends that when we evaluate our lives from the view of the universe, they do not fare 
well and that this perspective is the proper one to take. There is little doubt that our lives are not 
too great when judged by such grand and idealistic standards. Even the best human lives have 
significant shortcomings in various respects (e.g., bad experiences, lack of knowledge, short 
duration). 
Benatar’s claims about how we ought to assess our lives from the perspective of 
hedonistic and desire-fulfillment theories are bold, but they do not hold up to scrutiny. One 
significant factor that Benatar overlooks is that many of the minor pains he mentions are either 
balanced by other feelings and sensations (such that we are not in constant states of discomfort) 
or even pleasant in certain contexts (Wasserman 2015, pp. 156-157). While it would be very bad 
to be in a constant state of hunger, it is hardly bad to feel hungry right before a large meal. The 
anticipation of satisfying that hunger and the actual satisfaction that follows can be far more 
pleasurable than that of a meal eaten on a partially full stomach. In similar fashion, feelings of 
minor discomfort are often nullified or entirely overridden by minor pleasurable sensations that 
we routinely fail to notice. Suppose, for instance, that the weather outside is a bit hotter than we 
would prefer, but that the surrounding greenery is also aesthetically pleasing to us. In practice, 
because both phenomena are commonplace, we might not notice either of these features of our 
surroundings. 
Herein lies a representative example of a glaring error in Benatar’s assessment of how 
well our lives go. Since he is making an empirical argument, he needs to explain – in detail – all 
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of life’s goods and how they compare to all of life’s bads (Marsh 2014, p. 447). Benatar has not 
undertaken this task: there is no serious effort to catalogue all the minor pleasures we routinely 
experience or grander pleasures and satisfactions (e.g., from accomplishing goals or completing 
major life projects). He may be right that our lives go worse than we often think, but that does 
not establish that our lives go badly. They might still go fairly well overall. To establish that 
lives go badly, we need more information. 
An additional complication in Benatar’s calculation is that certain things that people value 
and identify as making positive contributions to their lives cannot be neatly explained in terms of 
pleasurable and painful mental states. For example, people want their lives to be meaningful. 
Having a meaningful life is not equivalent to being happy or to having a certain portion of one’s 
mental states be positive in nature. In fact, there is evidence that higher levels of worry, anxiety, 
and stress correlate with higher levels of meaningfulness (Baumeister et al. 2013). Those who 
center their lives around substantial and difficult projects – which will often be a deep source of 
meaning for the person pursuing them – are more likely to experience these unpleasant mental 
states, but that does not mean that they would rather pursue a different life plan or that they are 
acting irrationally. Rather, this phenomenon highlights how there is more that we care about in 
our lives than just the aggregation of our positive and negative mental states. Insofar as a 
hedonistic theory cannot properly take these other valuable components of our lives into account, 
it fails to accurately assess a human life’s value. 
Benatar’s assessment of the desire-satisfaction view fares even more poorly. Ordinarily, 
the way we would appraise how well a life goes on the desire-satisfaction account would be to 
see how many desires the person has and how many of them are ultimately satisfied. Benatar 
does not undertake this task in an empirically informed way: there is no effort to gather empirical 
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evidence on how many desires people typically have or how many of them are typically fulfilled 
in a lifetime. Instead, he highlights the fact that many desires go unsatisfied: 
Because we typically want more than we get, more desires are never satisfied. For 
example, billions of people want to be younger, cleverer, better looking, to have more sex 
(and to have it with more or better looking people), to have a better job, to be more 
successful, to be richer, to have more leisure time, to be less susceptible to disease, and to 
live longer. Even when our desires are satisfied, they are rarely satisfied immediately and 
often take a very long time to be satisfied. The desires thus remain unsatisfied between 
when they arise and when they are eventually satisfied. When they are finally satisfied, the 
satisfaction either lasts or it does not. The latter is more common. Even when the 
satisfaction of a desire does last, new desires typically emerge. Thus the general pattern is 
a constant state of desiring punctuated by some relatively short periods of satisfaction. 
(Benatar 2013, p. 143) 
The problem is that Benatar’s conclusion – that we are dissatisfied far more often than we are 
satisfied – does not follow from this list of examples. What about all those desires that get 
satisfied? How numerous are they in comparison to these that go unsatisfied? 
Jason Marsh (2014) illustrates this flaw in Benatar’s reasoning by rewriting this passage 
through a more optimistic lens: 
Because we typically get what we want, most desires are satisfied. For example, billions of 
people want to spend time with their families, to talk to their friends, and to enjoy stories, 
music, good meals and the outdoors; they also want and get to have some kind of sex and 
to have some kind of job (which is more important than having even better versions of 
these things). True, the satisfaction of many, but not all, desires doesn’t last, but then you 
get to have other desires, most of which are fulfilled. You meet new people, visit new 
websites, cities, restaurants, and the like. Clearly the general pattern for most people, then, 
is a constant state of desiring and a constant state of getting most of what one desires. In 
fact, even if we just focused on our capacity to think about what we want to, this alone 
leads to billions of satisfied desires everyday and could alone outnumber most frustrated 
desires. (p. 448) 
Is this picture more accurate than Benatar’s? Based on the information provided, we do not 
know. Even assuming that we can make this assessment in a consistent, non-arbitrary way, trying 
to answer this question would require a great deal of difficult empirical research. Whether or not 
such research could be done in a way that gives accurate assessments, it is clear that Benatar has 
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not tried to conduct this research or gather extant research on people’s desires to adequately 
support his claims. 
As we can see, a general problem for Benatar’s analysis is that he pays insufficient 
attention to cataloging the positive features of life and rigorously comparing them to its negative 
features.
21
 An equally significant problem is that there may be no way to individuate desires in a 
way that is informative and not arbitrary. The desire to finish a fiction novel, for instance, could 
be understood as a single desire (e.g., to finish the book in its entirety) or a series of smaller 
desires (to finish chapter 1, to finish chapter 2, etc.). Which of these portrayals is accurate? How 
many desires are in play here? There may be no consistent, non-arbitrary way to answer such 
questions. But if that is true, then there is no such thing as the number of desires that we have or 
the proportion of our desires that are satisfied or unsatisfied. As a result, Benatar’s attempt to 
quantify satisfied desires and compare their proportion to unsatisfied desires will not yield viable 
results.
22
 Ultimately, the weaknesses in his strategy render his evaluation of the quality of human 
lives, whether conducted on a hedonistic account or a desire-satisfaction account, thoroughly 
inconclusive. His position also does not prove any more defensible when we use objective list 
views to evaluate the quality of human lives. 
The basic response to Benatar’s claims about objective list views is to deny that the 
evaluative criteria for determining whether a human life is good should be the universe’s point of 
view. In practice, we do not evaluate other species in this manner because we recognize that they 
                                                 
21
 Benatar and his critics also usually neglect the additional complication of how difficult it may be to actually 
compare the goods and bads of life in any sensible way. As Marsh (2014) notes, some of these goods and bads may 
be incommensurable with one another (p. 449, fn 23). The result is that there may not be a fact of the matter about 
whether certain lives are good or bad, all things considered. The goods and bads may just be too different to admit of 
a sensible comparison. For an overview of the problem of value incommensurability, see Hsieh (2016). 
22
 Marsh’s view, insofar as he assumes that desires can be coherently and sensibly individuated, is on similarly 
shaky ground. 
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have species-specific criteria for their flourishing. We do not, for example, evaluate whether our 
dog has lived a good life by virtue of how many novels she read. That would be absurd because 
dogs do not have the capacity to read, and it is not essential to what makes their lives go well. 
Instead, we will compare our dog’s life – in terms of both quantity and quality – with other dogs. 
Similarly, it seems absurd to evaluate human beings according to standards that extend well 
beyond the capacities of their species. Our lives might be better if we could live for 240 years 
rather than typically dying around the age of 80, but that fact does not imply that a life of 80 
years is bad – only that it is less good than its hypothetical counterpart. There is no compelling 
reason to hold human beings to impossibly high standards and thereby conclude that their lives 
are bad because they cannot meet those standards. 
Benatar does attempt to respond to this objection. He considers the fact that we do not 
usually evaluate physics professors by supra-human standards of intellect and so should similarly 
not evaluate human lives according to supra-human standards of quality. Counter to this claim, 
Benatar (2006) argues that we “sometimes do and should judge the brightest people by supra-
human standards” (p. 86). His illustrating case is the virtue of modesty. It is difficult to explain 
how modesty is a virtue that can be held by those who genuinely exemplify the best of human 
beings in a particular area. If they act modest and the appropriate comparison is only to other 
people, then either they are not accurately appraising their abilities or they are acting in ways 
inconsistent with their actual assessment of their abilities. The former behavior would represent 
an epistemic defect, and the latter would be an act of deception. Either way, modesty would not 
appear to be a virtue. Benatar (2006) claims that the best solution to this problem “is to say that 
although the modest person has an accurate perception of his strengths, he also recognizes that 
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there is a higher standard by which he falls short” (p. 86). This higher standard is sub specie 
aeternitatis – the point of view of the universe. 
There are several lines of response that one can pursue regarding Benatar’s points about 
modesty. One could obviously bite the bullet and deny that modesty is a virtue, but that line of 
response is rather unpopular.
23
 After all, modesty appears to provide a check on the human 
tendency to overestimate oneself in comparison to others and to be a virtue on those grounds. 
Moreover, defending the claim that modesty is not a virtue would require more detail and rigor 
than I can offer here. An alternative strategy is to deny that the epistemic defect manifested by 
modesty prevents it from being a virtue. Julia Driver (1989, 1999) has been the strongest 
proponent of this position, going so far as to characterize modesty as a virtue of ignorance. 
Driver (1999) denies the claim that ignorance is always regarded as being negatively valuable, 
noting that ignorance of one’s own beauty is thought to enhance it and that we often value 
children’s naive innocence (p. 828). This strategy may worry some readers, however, since they 
may not share Driver’s intuitions about these cases and since her account raises problems with 
the perception of a virtuous person as one who has an accurate understanding of herself and her 
abilities.
24
 For these reasons, we ought to pursue a different line of reply. 
The best response to Benatar’s analysis of modesty is to deny the dilemma that he poses: 
there are ways to understand modesty as a virtue without entailing that the modest person is 
either epistemically defective or engaging in acts of deception. One promising strategy is to 
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 Most accounts of modesty presuppose that it is a virtue and that an account of modesty that cannot explain this 
fact is therefore defective. Those who believe that virtue consists in phronesis, however, will likely deny that 
modesty is a virtue. Phronesis requires, among other things, accurate self-knowledge and appropriate responsiveness 
to salient moral reasons. Modesty, if it requires that a person be unaware of their accomplishments or act as if they 
were unaware of them, appears to be incompatible with phronesis. For these reasons, Aristotle (1980) denied that it 
was a real virtue (Book IV.7). 
24
 Driver’s account has had many critics. For a sampling, see Schueler (1997, 1999), Ridge (2000), Brennan (2007), 
Allhoff (2010), and Wilson (2016). 
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understand modesty as a virtue of attention (Bommarito 2013). It manifests when we remain 
inattentive to certain skills or accomplishments that, if we were to focus on them, might foster 
arrogance in ourselves or envy in others. It can also manifest in circumstances where we are well 
aware of our accomplishments and abilities but also remain well aware of the roles that luck and 
circumstance have played in our achievements. In this manner, modesty does not require an 
inaccurate appraisal of one’s self-worth or accomplishments, even in cases involving inattention. 
A person who is inattentive to something is not necessarily unaware of it (Bommarito 2013, pp. 
99-100). Consider the common occurrences of getting lost in thought while driving and then 
being surprised when you have arrived at your destination or navigating around people and 
objects on your walk across campus while being immersed in a conversation with a colleague. In 
both cases, we clearly have some awareness of our surroundings, but our attention is not focused 
on them while we engage in other activities. Modesty functions in an analogous manner: one can 
be fully aware of the merits of her achievements and the remarkable skills she possesses but be 
inattentive to them in her dealings with others. This does not involve ignorance. It also does not 
require deception, since the modest person could freely acknowledge her feats and abilities in 
conversation when pressed by others to do so (and will often do so with suitable 
acknowledgement given to the luck-based factors that have contributed to these things). In short, 
we can account for modesty being a virtue without falling into Benatar’s trap. 
There is also a deeper problem with Benatar’s claim that the best physicists, philosophers, 
writers, and so on should evaluate themselves in accordance to a higher standard – that is, the 
point of view of the universe. Such an outlook would not promote modesty: 
Holding ourselves to a higher standard than others is one way of being self-aggrandizing. 
Philosophers who, when hearing a paper at a conference, often think, “Oh, that’s a pretty 
good paper for them. But if it were me, I would expect more of myself” are immodest in 
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part because they take themselves to be worthy of a higher standard of evaluation than 
their colleagues. (Bommarito 2013, p. 99, original emphasis)  
Comparing oneself to a grand standard while evaluating others according to a lower standard is a 
way of acknowledging – whether overtly or implicitly – that one is better than others, and it does 
so in a way that may well be more offensive to others than a candid, realistic acknowledgement 
of one’s abilities.
25
 In this manner, Benatar’s account of modesty proves inaccurate, and on these 
grounds, we should reject his claim that it is appropriate to evaluate people by supra-human 
standards of quality. The failure of people to meet his supremely high standards does not entail 
that their lives fare poorly.
26
 
In fact, once we abandon Benatar’s imperative to evaluate human lives by such lofty 
standards, we can see that people actually do live good lives pretty frequently according to 
objective list theories. Consider some of the standard welfare criteria of these theories: longevity 
(in ordinary human terms), suitable level of knowledge and education (for a human being), 
ability to engage in self-expression, and freedom from oppression. Many people satisfy these 
conditions, so unless we have a compelling reason to adopt Benatar’s standards of evaluation, we 
ought to conclude that human welfare, at least on objective list theories, is often fairly high.  
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 In some cases, the person might be trying to compensate for the natural tendency to hold oneself to looser 
standards than others, but nevertheless, a statement that one should be held to higher standards than her peers still 
sends a message of immodesty. 
26
 It is worth mentioning that this entire line of argument against Benatar assumes, as he does, that there is a “point 
of view of the universe” or perhaps a “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) – an objective, mind-independent 
viewpoint from which the universe can be evaluated. That assumption may not be worth granting. Value may only 
be intelligible as value for a particular entity. If the universe is understood as a single entity, it is not conscious (or 
even alive) and has no point of view. Things can go well or badly for individual organisms in the universe, but 
nothing can go better or worse for the universe itself. If there is no point of view of the universe, then Benatar’s 
appeal to this standard is obviously groundless. 
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Benatar’s Misanthropic Argument 
While his earliest work on the ethics of procreation focused on the Axiological 
Asymmetry and the Quality-of-Life Argument, Benatar (2015) has recently advanced a new 
argument for Antinatalism. Rather than trying to establish that procreation harms the person who 
is created, this argument tries to establish that procreation is wrong because of the harm it causes 
to other people. Benatar (2015) labels the argument as “misanthropic” because it focuses on “the 
terrible evil that humans wreak, and on various negative aspects of our species” (p. 78). Benatar 
(2015, p. 79) presents the Misanthropic Argument as follows: 
1. We have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing into existence new members of 
species that causes (and will likely continue to cause) vast amounts of pain, suffering, 
and death. 
2. Humans cause vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death. 




The argument has valid form, and the second premise is obviously true. Although Benatar (2015) 
devotes quite a bit of space to establish this premise (pp. 80-100), it should not be controversial. 
Even the most optimistic person must acknowledge that human beings often commit moral 
atrocities, and our history of violence, oppression, exploitation, and deception provides plenty of 
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 Harrison and Tanner (2011) defend a similar argument, but they describe the central idea in terms of an 
unjustifiable gamble. They describe procreating as taking “an unjustifiable gamble that future generations will 
behave responsibly… Given the rather pathetic, late-in-the-day changes humans have managed so far it is unlikely 
future generations will do any better” (p. 114). Thus, they claim that we should not bring more humans into 
existence: “Human beings are dangerous things; too dangerous” (p. 114). Fundamentally, I do not think their 
argument meaningfully differs in spirit or substance from Benatar’s, even if the presentation of the argument is 
slightly different. 
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evidence for the claim. Thus, the first premise does all the argumentative work. Is this premise 
true? 
Benatar thinks that this premise would be widely accepted if the species under 
consideration were not human. He asks us to imagine people breeding a destructive species of 
nonhuman animal or scientists releasing a deadly virus and argues that both of these practices 
would be widely condemned (pp. 101-102). The conclusion that he suggests is that our 
reluctance to accept this premise is rooted solely in a bias toward our own species. Here, 
however, Benatar makes two mistakes. First, he is wrong about our judgments about other 
species. Many predator species cause a great amount of suffering to other animals: they have to 
savagely kill other animals for their own sustenance. Yet there is not a widespread condemnation 
of these species or a strong public outcry for the elimination of predation. In fact, we sometimes 
undertake efforts to re-introduce predator species into environments where their numbers have 
dwindled. Certainly, predators do not cause as much harm as human beings – in large part 
because their numbers are so much smaller – but these observations provide some evidence that 
not everyone would immediately accept Benatar’s judgment about the first premise even when it 
concerns nonhuman species. 
The second mistake is that Benatar overlooks the fact that human beings also perform 
actions that are morally good. No one is morally perfect, but few are as monstrous as the 
murderers and animal abusers that he references. Surely the good that people do counts in favor 
of creating more of them, so we need further discussion of just how great the harms of the typical 
person are and how they compare to the good that the person does. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence that human beings are improving. We are, for instance, much less prone to violence 
than we were in the past (Pinker 2011), and there have been growing cultural trends in the 
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developed world of acceptance of people of different races, nationalities, genders, sexual 
orientations, and religions.
28
 These trends suggest that humanity may not be the “moral disaster” 
that Benatar (2015, p. 111) claims we are. 
Benatar (2015) does acknowledge this point and make an effort to establish that the 
harms that even normal people cause are substantial (pp. 107-109). After rightly pointing out 
some of the difficulties in determining how much good would nullify the bad, he notes that each 
new human being – at least under our current rates of consumption and given our current 
population size – “adds incrementally to the amount of animal suffering and death and, via the 
environmental impact, to the amount of harm to humans (and animals)” (Benatar 2015, p. 109). 
Moreover, some of the goods that human beings produce could be produced by fewer humans, so 
procreation can be a net harm in the context of a large and destructive population. Benatar also 
places a particular emphasis on the harm done to nonhuman animals, primarily through animal 
agriculture. After citing figures that suggest 166 billion animals are killed annually per year for 
human consumption, he notes that the vast majority of human beings contribute to this 
phenomenon. The end result is that a meat-eater is, on average, “responsible for the deaths (and 
suffering) of at least 27 animals per year—which amounts to at least 1690 animals over the 
course of a lifetime” (Benatar 2015, p. 110).
29
 
One of the puzzling aspects of Benatar’s position is that, given the significance that harm 
to animals and the environment plays in his argument, he does not argue for the eradication of 
industrialized farming or swift mitigation efforts toward climate change. Why are these not 
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 This claim does not imply that racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination have been purged from society. 
The point is that equal rights and social standing for people is gradually becoming the norm, which is a stark 
contrast to the dominant and overt racism and sexism of the past. 
29
 In this argument, Benatar assumes a very strong view of the moral significance of animal suffering – particularly 
those with a very low level of sentience – that some moral philosophers would reject. See, for example, Wasserman 
(2015, p. 166). Even so, I am willing to grant this assumption. 
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preferable alternatives to prohibiting procreation altogether? Perhaps there is an assumption that 
human beings will just continue to perform various evils in perpetuity and that this pattern can 
never be stopped. So the obligation to refrain from procreating is in part a practical one – the 
only feasible way that evils of this sort could be prevented. But it seems more likely that human 
beings will change their behaviors with respect to animal farming or emitting greenhouse gases 
than cease procreating altogether. (After all, many nations are already making efforts to address 
climate change.) Thus, if there is a feasibility condition in the argument, it would seem to count 
against Benatar’s position. The more practical solutions – namely, trying to reduce animal 
suffering and live in more sustainable ways – are also likely to be more ethically preferable in 
practice because enforcing a prohibition on procreation would require massive systemic 
oppression and impose substantial suffering on many people.
30
 
A further problem for Benatar’s position is that his observations about collective human 
behavior have little import for individual procreative decision-making. One reasonable response 
to Benatar’s long list of human evils is to instill parents with procreative caution: they should be 
reflective and determine whether they can provide their child with the proper upbringing and 
education so that their children will be extremely unlikely to commit, or be complicit in, dreadful 
wrongdoing (Wasserman 2015, pp. 167-168). Many parents can meet this obligation, and for 
them, it is not wrong to procreate. Benatar could well be right that there are some fairly 
significant restrictions on permissible procreation and that many people violate them, but that 
only tell us what we probably already suspected. Parents have very strong obligations to their 
children. Not everyone is able to raise children effectively, and even for those who are able to be 
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 The harmful effects of draconian population control schemes are well-documented. See Mosher (2008, chs. 3 and 
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good parents, their life circumstances may only be conducive to raising children well at certain 
times or under certain financial conditions. Still, many people can meet these conditions, and so 
Benatar’s prohibition on procreation is not as broad as he argues. 
Consent-Based Arguments 
Benatar is not the only person to offer an argument against procreation. Seana Shiffrin 
(1999) presents an argument that could yield the same conclusion. Her argument proceeds from 
two observations. First, coming into existence renders a person vulnerable to a wide range of 
harms. Second, a person cannot consent to coming into existence. Often, it is morally wrong to 
cause harm to someone else or to expose them to risk of harm unless they give consent to the 
action in question (e.g., before undergoing surgery). If consent is indeed required to nullify the 
harms that accompany continued existence, then procreation seems morally impermissible. 
This reasoning proceeds too quickly, however. After all, we are sometimes justified in 
causing harm to someone when it prevents them from suffering a greater harm, particularly when 
it is impossible or unrealistic to acquire consent. If a speeding driver fails to stop at a red light 
when a pedestrian is crossing the street, I am justified in shoving the pedestrian to the ground if it 
is the only way to get him out of the driver’s path even though obtaining his consent to this 
action is not possible and he may suffer minor physical injuries because of my action. But 
Shiffrin (1999) claims that this justification does not hold when we harm someone merely to 
provide the person harmed with a benefit (p. 127): 
Absent evidence that the person’s will is to the contrary, it is permissible, perhaps 
obligatory to inflict the lesser harm of a broken arm in order to save a person from 
significant greater harm, such as drowning or brain damage from oxygen deprivation. 
But, it seems wrong to perform a procedure on an unconscious patient that will cause her 
harm but also redound to her a greater, pure benefit. At the very least, it is much harder to 
justify. For example, it seems wrong to break an unconscious patient’s arm even if 
necessary to endow her with valuable, physical benefits, such as a supernormal memory, 
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a useful store of encyclopedic knowledge, twenty IQ points worth of extra intellectual 
ability, or the ability to consume immoderate amounts of alcohol or fat without side 
effects. At the least, it would be much harder to justify than inflicting similar harm to 
avert a greater harm, such as death or significant disability. 
Beyond these examples, Shiffrin also suggests that it would be wrong for a wealthy islander to 
air drop gold bars into a neighboring island community when doing so breaks someone’s arm, 
even when this increased wealth makes the islanders (including the victim) better off overall and 
even when there are no other viable means of transporting his gold to this community. 
Shiffrin may be right to stress the moral seriousness of imposing harm on others or even 
just exposing them to likely harms, but her supporting examples are problematic if we try to 
extend them to the case of procreation. The harm in these cases – breaking a person’s arm – 
constitutes a rights violation.
31
 Procreation, in contrast, does not involve any clear rights 
violations. For this reason, breaking a person’s arm requires a particularly strong moral 
justification, but it remains unclear whether procreation requires a comparably strong moral 
justification, particularly when we acknowledge that we routinely expose our children to 
potential harms to provide them with pure benefits (DeGrazia 2012, p. 153). When we make our 
children play outside on a sunny day, we expose them to potential harms – bruises, cuts, 
splinters, and so on – that they would be much less likely to suffer if they stayed in a carpeted 
indoor environment, but we assume that whatever benefits come from being outdoors outweigh 
the risks of these harms. When we send our children to school, we know there is a chance they 
will be mocked, ridiculed, humiliated, or otherwise hurt by their peers, but we assume that the 
benefits associated with making friends and getting an education are worth the risk of suffering 
these harms. For these reasons, we should reject Shiffrin’s claim that it is always wrong to 
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expose someone to the risk of harm to provide pure benefits when the person affected cannot 
consent. 
Jimmy Licon (2012) offers an alternative consent-based argument against the morality of 
procreation. His argument can be outlined as follows: 
1. An individual is justified in subjecting someone to potential harm only if either: (a) 
they provide informed consent, (b) such is in their best interests, or (c) they deserve to 
be subjected to potential harm. 
2. Bringing someone into existence is potentially subjecting them to harm. 
3. Individuals that do not exist: (a) cannot give their consent to being brought into 
existence, (b) do not have interests to protect, and (c) do not deserve anything. 
4. Hence, procreation is not morally justified. (Licon 2012, p. 88) 
While this argument does avoid appealing to Shiffrin’s principle about the wrongness of causing 
harm to bestow pure benefits, the argument on the whole is not any better than hers. 
The central flaw in the argument is in its third premise. Licon claims that individuals who 
do not exist lack interests. As stated, this premise is false. The phrase “individuals who do not 
exist” could be interpreted to refer to future people, possible people, or both future people and 
possible people. The premise is only true if it is restricted to referring to possible people. As I use 
the term, a “future person” is someone who will exist later even though they do not at present.
32
 
A merely possible person is, in contrast, someone who could exist but never actually will exist. 
Merely possible people do not have interests (and never will), but future people do have 
interests. At a minimum, they have interests in the basic requirements for a decent human life. 
Indeed, much of our way of talking about future generations operates on the assumption that they 
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have interests that we can prevent or thwart. There is nothing incoherent in saying that 
someone’s grandchildren, whomever they are, have an interest in a getting a good education, and 
there is nothing incoherent in saying that people living in 2100 have interests in clean air and a 
reliable supply of fresh water. Children who are not yet born but will be born are best understood 
as future people, and so they have interests that we can promote or thwart. When we promote 
these interests sufficiently well, doing so can justify exposing them to potential harms. 
Perhaps Licon could respond by pointing out that while future people will have interests, 
they do not have interests yet. When we speak of our children having interests when they are not 
yet born, we may be misrepresenting what we really mean. Even if we can grant Licon this 
move, it does not salvage his argument. On this interpretation, the argument is invalid: we can 
affirm all three premises but deny the conclusion because future people will have interests to 
protect. Sufficiently protecting or promoting those interests is enough to justify the risk of harm, 
particularly when the probability of significant harm is extremely low and the probability of 
beneficial experiences is extremely high. This thought accords not only with my remarks in the 
prior paragraph but also with widespread considered judgments about when procreation is 
justified.
33
 To make his argument valid, Licon would have to alter part (b) of the third premise to 
read “do not have interests to protect and will not have interests to protect.” But this construction 
renders the premise clearly false, since future people will certainly have interests to protect. 
Thus, regardless of which change is made, the argument fails. 
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that it is generally justified when the child has an excellent chance of living a good life overall. 
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Häyry’s Risk-Aversion Argument 
Matti Häyry offers a further argument against the permissibility of procreation. When it 
comes to procreative decisions, he endorses the maximin rule, a principle of reasoning endorsed 
by John Rawls (1999, §26-28) in the context of his political philosophy. The maximin rule states 
that in some situations where probabilities of specific outcomes are uncertain, we ought to 
choose the alternative in which the worst outcome is superior to the worst outcomes of the 
alternatives. In other words, we seek to minimize our potential losses. 
Häyry argues that the maximin rule should be applied to reproductive decision-making 
because all lives carry a risk of being worse than having not been born at all, at least from the 
perspective of the person living such a life. The risk may be small, but it is always a possibility. 
Since we always have the option of refraining from procreation, we can always avoid this 
disastrous outcome, and Häyry (2004) thinks that is precisely what we should do: 
When people consider the possibility of having children, they confront the following 
choice. They can decide not to have children, in which case nobody will be harmed or 
benefited. The value of this choice, in terms of potential future individuals and their lives, 
is zero. Alternatively, they can decide to have children, in which case a new individual 
can be born. If this happens, the life of the future individual can be good or bad. The 
eventual value of the decision, depending on the luck of the reproducers, can be positive, 
zero, or negative. Since it is rational to avoid the possible negative outcome, when the 
alternative is zero, it is rational to choose not to have children. (p. 377) 
If we genuinely believe that the rational and morally appropriate course of action is to avoid the 
worst possible outcome in this scenario, then Häyry is right: we should refrain from procreation. 
But is the maximin rule really the appropriate decision procedure under these circumstances? 
Rawls (1999) notes that the maximin rule “is not, in general, a suitable guide for choices 
under uncertainty” (p. 133). He then specifies three conditions that must be met for an appeal to 
the maximin rule to be appropriate: 
   
85 
1. The probabilities of the possible outcomes are unknowable, or there exists some 
reason for discounting the estimated probabilities. 
2. The person choosing cares very little about what she might gain above the minimum; 
it is not worth taking a chance to try to gain a further advantage. 
3. The worst possible outcome is one that the person making the choice cannot accept – 
typically one that involves a grave risk. 
In the case of procreation, only the third condition is met. We have strong reasons to believe that 
certain children will have a very high probability of living a good life and that certain children 
will not. Thus, we can form reasonable estimates about the probabilities of the possible 
outcomes. Furthermore, although not-yet-existing children cannot choose to be born, it is clear 
that they have something substantial to gain from taking the gamble – all their positive future 
experiences. So, if they could make a choice, they might well opt for the gamble, even knowing 
that there was a small probability of a disastrous outcome.
34
 
These observations illustrate the general problem with Häyry’s reasoning: it is 
excessively risk-averse. We do not apply maximin-style reasoning very often, even in scenarios 
involving life-and-death risks. Many actions, including those as common as driving cars, impose 
unlikely but severe risks on others. Moreover, in the realm of policy, we routinely avoid 
choosing the safest policy. A 20 mile-per-hour speed limit on highways would surely prevent 
many fatalities, but would anyone endorse such a policy? Even though the harms caused by 
higher speed limits are severe, many believe that the benefits offered by the higher speed limits 
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outweigh the costs associated with the harms. The mere possibility of severe harm does not 
provide a strong enough reason to categorically avoid an action that may result in that outcome, 
and so we do not have an obligation to avoid all procreation. Out duty is to minimize the risk of 
serious harm to our children once they are born, not to forego procreation altogether. 
Contingent Anti-Natalist Arguments 
The prior arguments for Antinatalism try to establish that procreation is always (or 
virtually always) wrong. Some other arguments for broadly Antinatalist conclusions are not so 
broad in scope and aim only to establish that Antinatalism is true for some particular group of 
people, perhaps given a certain set of empirical conditions that happen to be met at present. 
According to one such argument, there is a strong presumption to adopt a child rather than 
procreating. 
Daniel Friedrich (2013) argues that some people are under a moral obligation to adopt 
children rather than procreating. His argument rests on an empirical observation and a moral 
principle. The empirical observation is that, for those of us who want to be parents, “we can 
protect parentless children from serious harm at little cost to ourselves by adopting them” 
(Friedrich 2013, p. 25). The moral principle Friedrich proposes is the claim that we ought to 
protect other people from serious harm when we can do so at little cost to ourselves. These two 
claims, if true, generate the conclusion that some people, if they are going to undertake the task 
of raising children, have a moral obligation to adopt children rather than creating their own.
35
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extremely demanding. Hence, he concedes that those who do not wish to have children can be exempt from the duty 
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Friedrich bolsters his case by considering a wide array of objections to his position. Most 
of these objections stem from false beliefs about adoptable children, such as claims that 
adoptable children are more likely to be maladjusted or have behavioral problems or that parents 
generally cannot love adopted children as much as their own biological children (Friedrich 2013, 
pp. 28-31). Friedrich rightly points out that many would probably be more willing to adopt if 
they were to abandon these false beliefs and give appropriate weight to the upsides associated 
with adoption. But he also makes a concession that threatens to undermine the argument’s 
significance. For certain people, the experiences associated with pregnancy and childbirth as well 
as other aspects of having biological children (e.g., family resemblance) are significant parts of 
their life plans, and this fact will not change even after full consideration of all the information 
concerning the choice to adopt rather than procreate.
36
 Friedrich (2013) states that such people 
are exempt from the duty to adopt (p. 31). While there is no way to know how many people 
satisfy this criterion, this admission demonstrates that the duty to adopt may only be applicable 
to a relatively narrow range of people. After all, biological and cultural factors incline people to 
prefer procreation over adoption, and people often structure their lives using the creation of a 
biological family as a focal point. Thus, a great many people may be beyond the scope of 
Friedrich’s proposed duty to adopt. 
A further limitation of Friedrich’s argument is that there are only so many children in the 
world in need of adoption. Some have argued that the number of people seeking to adopt 
children is significantly greater than the number of children who have been identified as 
requiring adoption – in both the western and non-western world (e.g., Cantwell 2003; 
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Lammerant and Hofstetter 2007, pp. 4-5; Graff 2009). Friedrich (2013) notes that the number of 
children identified as adoptable is likely much lower than the number of children who are 
actually in need of adoption (p. 34). Many countries lack the resources or cultural environment 
needed to maintain institutions that could properly identify children who need to be adopted. The 
number of children who need to be adopted may actually be millions higher than the number 
who are presently available for adoption. The problem, of course, is that until those children 
actually are available for adoption, it is not possible for would-be parents to adopt them and 
therefore implausible to suggest that these prospective parents have a duty to do so. This 
limitation renders much of the purported duty to adopt moot, and furthermore, even if all these 
children in need could be adopted, they constitute a very small percentage of the global 
population. All these children could be adopted, and there would still be billions of people 
worldwide who would have to procreate to become parents. So even if this purported duty to 
adopt were optimally fulfilled, it would only reduce the number of procreating parents by a few 
million. While that would represent some progress, it would not do much to slow global 
population growth. An adequate response must do much more. 
Beyond the practical limitations to Friedrich’s argument, there also looms a significant 
theoretical worry. The moral principle that forms the foundation of his argument is the claim that 
we ought to prevent people from serious harm when we can do so at little cost to ourselves. If 
that principle is correct, one may wonder whether adoption is really the appropriate course of 
action to take. Friedrich (2013) acknowledges that it typically costs more than $200,000 to raise 
a child in the United States (p. 32).
37
 A recent estimate by the United States Department of 
Agriculture concludes that a child born in the United States in 2015 will cost $233,610 to raise 
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(Lino et al. 2017). The problem for Friedrich’s position is that a lot more harm will be prevented 
by donating that money (or even just a significant portion of it) to cost-effective charities, such 
as the Against Malaria Foundation or Schistosomiasis Control Initiative.
38
 Thus, one may 
wonder why – at least for those who do not view children as an indispensable part of their life 
plans – this principle of preventing harm does not entail that they should refrain from procreating 
altogether when they could use the money saved to prevent a much greater quantity of harm. 
This alternative argument has recently been developed at length by James Rachels (2014). 
Rachels draws significantly on Peter Singer’s (1972, 2009) work on world hunger and 
poverty. Singer (1972) defends the following moral principle: “If it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance, then we ought, morally, to do it” (p. 231). He also observes that there are millions of 
people across the world who are suffering and dying because they do not have adequate food, 
water, shelter or medical care. Suffering and death caused by a lack of food, water, shelter, and 
medical care are undeniably bad, and many of us have the ability to prevent these harms from 
occurring by donating to cost-effective charities. Moreover, these donations will often not 
deprive us of anything important. Almost anyone living in the western world surely purchases 
some luxuries that she could forego without any meaningful impact on her welfare. Thus, Singer 
reasons that many of us are morally obligated to donate a significant portion of our income to 
charities that will help prevent these harms. 
Rachels’ views his argument as a variant of Singer’s that is designed to illuminate one of 
its surprising implications: taking this duty to reduce suffering seriously requires that many of us 
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refrain from procreating. Friedrich (2013) tries to avoid endorsing this position by arguing that 
we have a duty to prevent suffering only when we can do so “at little cost to ourselves” (pp. 25-
26). He assumes that foregoing parenthood (both of biological and non-biological children) 
would be very costly for most people but also holds that foregoing parenthood only of one’s 
biological children will often not be as costly. While this position is perfectly coherent, if one 
properly appreciates the moral weight of millions of people suffering and dying annually from 
easily preventable circumstances, it becomes more difficult to maintain. A desire to raise a single 
child, in terms of moral significance, does not remotely compare to the suffering and death that 
could be prevented through $200,000 worth of donations to cost-effective charities. Can those 
living in developed nations really justify spending so much on their own children when they 




Rachels’ argument is very powerful, and while it would be psychologically challenging 
for most of us to live up to the standard that the argument requires (i.e., to prioritize the 
prevention of suffering to this degree), such difficulty does not obviously remove the obligation. 
Even if we were destined not to perfectly adhere to such an obligation, we could still have a duty 
to strive for it, and we might well come close to meeting the standard if we really tried. Even so, 
many feel that there must be a limit to what morality can reasonably demand of us and that this 
kind of obligation surpasses the threshold of what morality can require. The relevant question is 
why: if we cannot offer a good explanation, then this thought amounts to little more than 
complaining that being moral is difficult. 
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On my view, the limits to morality’s demandingness originate from two sources: our 
limitations (both physical and psychological) as human beings and our desire to have a 
flourishing human life. When morality requires that we do something that we are physically or 
psychologically incapable of doing, then our limitations almost always release us from a duty to 
perform the task. This idea is often represented as the phrase “ought” implies “can.” It captures 
the observation that it is not reasonable to morally require people to do things that they are 
incapable of doing. The other limitation on morality’s demands can be understood as follows: 
when a moral imperative proves antithetical to one’s goal of living well, then sometimes that 
moral imperative should no longer be regarded as a strict obligation. I say sometimes because our 
life plans are often malleable enough to accommodate moral imperatives without undercutting 
our goal of living well. Without this qualification, the claim could serve to justify moral apathy 
in cases where it is not justified. 
There is nothing physically impossible about refraining from procreation, except in 
particularly dire circumstances.
40
 Fortunately, these cases are rather rare. The more common 
challenge to a duty to refrain from procreation is likely psychological: not everyone may be 
capable of resisting the psychological urge to procreate. Rachels (2014) acknowledges that it 
may be permissible for such people to have children: 
I don’t think it makes sense, either as social policy or as abstract philosophy, to hold 
people accountable for choices that are psychologically forced on them (even if they 
could physically do otherwise). For that reason, even though it would be regrettable for 
such people to have children (because their $227,000 could be better spent), I would not 
regard their decision to have children as immoral. Indeed, I’m not even sure I would 
regard it as a decision. (p. 578) 
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This exception is reasonable, but it likely does not apply to most people. Many of the 
motivations that people have for wanting children do not involve a desperate psychological need 
for them. It might be a preference, of course, but a mere preference is not sufficient to ground the 
claim that one is psychologically incapable of doing otherwise. Ultimately, “ought” implies 
“can” does ground some exceptions to this purported duty to refrain from procreation, but it will 
not get most of us off the moral hook. 
If an imperative to procreate is objectionable because it is too demanding, then the 
problem will usually be that it would impede the goal of living well. Bernard Williams (1973), in 
his critique of utilitarianism, connects this limitation to an agent’s integrity. He argues that 
utilitarianism is objectionable because any commitment an agent has must be abandoned as soon 
as it becomes inconsistent with maximizing utility. Williams (1973) imagines a person being 
required to abandon central life projects to fulfill the obligation to maximize utility and states the 
following: 
It is absurd to demand that such a man, when the sums come in from the utility network 
which the projects of others have in part determined, that he should just step aside from 
his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation 
requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action 
in his own convictions. It is to make him into a channel between the input of everyone’s 
projects, including his own, and an output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect the 
extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions 
which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is 
thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity. (pp. 116-117, original emphasis) 
Williams might exaggerate when he suggests that utilitarianism assaults an agent’s integrity, but 
the underlying point remains quite strong. We often structure our lives around certain personal 
and professional pursuits, and abandoning them would seem inconsistent with our character and 
opposed to our long-term life goals. When moral imperatives force us to abandon the individual 
pursuits that serve as the central source of our lives’ meaningfulness, sometime those imperatives 
ought to be rejected. 
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Of course, the key question is whether a duty to refrain from procreation opposes a 
person’s life plans in such a significant way. For many people, it is doubtful that a duty to refrain 
from procreation would have such a profound impact. About 40% of pregnancies worldwide are 
unintended (Sedgh, Singh, and Hussain 2014).
41
 It is a safe bet that some of these pregnancies 
were not an essential part of the parents’ life plans if they were unintentional, although those 
who identified the pregnancy as merely mistimed may have elected to have a child at some point 
later. 
Additionally, many people who do have children intentionally do not do so because it is 
an indispensable part of their life plans. Other factors, such as social pressures and expectations 
or the desire to continue one’s family line, often play a role. Moreover, some decide to have 
children based on the belief that doing so will make them happier – a belief that is not consistent 
with the empirical evidence about the effects of having children. In fact, much of the social 
scientific research on happiness suggests that having children decreases happiness (e.g., Alesina, 
Di Tella, and MacCulloch 2004; Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Twenge, Campbell, 
and Foster 2003; Gilbert 2007, pp. 242-244; Powdthavee 2008; Hansen 2012; Deaton and Stone 
2014; Margolis and Myrskylä 2015).
42
 Having children, on average, appears to have an adverse 
effect on one’s marital satisfaction, life satisfaction, and general reported happiness.
43
 Having a 
child may increase the perceived meaningfulness of one’s life even if it diminishes one’s well-
being (Baumeister et al. 2013), but the key point is that people who believe having children will, 
on the whole, make their lives better are often mistaken. 
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 In some countries, the rate is higher. In the United States, for example, 45-50% of pregnancies are unplanned 
(Finer and Zolna 2016). 
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 In this context, happiness typically refers to a person’s subjective well-being.  
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 There is some variability depending on where one lives. In most industrialized countries, having children seems to 
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This last observation strikes many as counterintuitive, but the empirical evidence is 
overwhelming. There are also plausible error theories for why we would hold these beliefs even 
if they are false. Those who hold them are obviously more likely to reproduce, and so there may 
be an evolutionary explanation for why this belief persists over time. Furthermore , social and 
cultural expectations give us plenty of reasons to endorse these beliefs, and because people must 
invest so much into raising children, coming to believe that doing so was not worth it would 
create overwhelming cognitive dissonance.
44
 So parents have strong motivations to affirm the 
value of having children, even if it does not reflect what social scientific research suggests. 
Nevertheless, we must recognize that having children is an extremely strong desire for 
many people. For those who genuinely view rearing biological children as a central aspect of 
their life plans and base this belief on a reasonable appraisal of the research on having children, I 
think it is unreasonable to demand that they remain childless, even if the money required to raise 
their children would do more good in the world if spent elsewhere.
45
 But if we are being honest, 
not many people meet this condition. How many people think so carefully and reflectively about 
the likely effects of their having a first (or second or third) child? Some do, but many do not. So 
while some may be able to justify their procreative activities, many cannot, and so the upshot of 
Rachels’ argument is that many people who reproduce are unjustified in doing so – independent 
of concerns about overpopulation. 
What can we conclude about these contingent Antinatalist arguments? In broad terms, 
none of them are successful in establishing a sweeping prohibition on procreation. Nonetheless, 
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 Rieder (2015) makes a similar point in his discussion of the “gestational project” that women often view as a 
central life project (pp. 301-302). 
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they do demonstrate that some people, particularly those who do not view procreation as a vital 
part of their life plans and who have significant financial resources at their disposal, have 
powerful moral reasons to refrain from procreation and either adopt a child instead (if 
parenthood of some form is essential to their life plans) or use some of the time and money saved 
by not raising children to help others in need. 
The Other End of the Spectrum 
As one can gather from this survey, there are many philosophical arguments that can be 
offered to support some version of Antinatalism. I have argued that they are all unconvincing, at 
least insofar as they attempt to establish a near universal duty not to procreate. This conclusion 
might comfort people on the opposite end of the spectrum – those who believe that procreation is 
not only permissible but also a fundamental right that all people should be able to exercise freely. 
Given the widespread practice of procreating, positions in favor of procreative freedom are likely 
to be more popular than any version of Antinatalism. In this section, I briefly appraise 
Procreative Liberty – the view that all people have a right to procreate as much as they wish. 
Those who hold Procreative Liberty usually regard the choice to procreate as a crucial 
and indispensable freedom. John Robertson (1994) captures this idea nicely, noting that the 
experience of procreation is often central people’s individual identity, a source of 
meaningfulness, a comfort in the face of death, and an expression of a couple’s love for each 
other (p. 24). Because of the importance of procreation to so many people, Robertson (1994) 
states that our ethical outlook should “recognize a presumption in favor of most personal 
reproductive choices” (p. 24). That presumption can easily be reflected in a right to reproduce. If 
such a right exists, then one might think that procreative choices are immune from moral 
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criticisms and that there exists a strong imperative not to impose any constraints on procreative 
behavior. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the right to procreate really is a fundamental 
and essential right. Does it follow from this claim that all people are permitted to procreate as 
much as they wish? Surely, it does not. Having the right to do something does not entail that 
doing it is morally right. I have a right to speak freely, but I can nevertheless speak in ways that 
are morally wrong. I could make disparaging remarks about minorities or mock my colleagues in 
an effort to humiliate them. Doing so would (usually) be wrong, even if I have the right to say 
such things. I may have the right to view sexually explicit content, but it may be morally wrong 
to do so because such material often objectifies women and reinforces harmful views of sexual 
interactions and personal relationships. I may have the right to vote, but I can still act wrongly 
when I vote (e.g., if I vote in favor of immoral policies, if I make no effort to become informed 
about what I am voting for).
46
 Having the right to procreate does not establish that one ought to 
procreate or that one’s doing so is always morally permissible. 
Additionally, it is implausible to think that the right to procreate is limitless in scope 
because no rights are limitless in scope. Everyone has the right to life, but we recognize that we 
may permissibly violate this right when, for instance, a person threatens the lives of innocent 
others. Everyone has a right to bodily autonomy, but we recognize that this right does not permit 
me to physically assault someone else. Rights are constrained when exercising them inflicts harm 
on other people or conflicts with the rights of those other people.
47
 Procreation can clearly harm 
other people. As emphasized in the discussion of Antinatalism, procreating carries a risk of 
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 In his recent book on the ethics of voting, Brennan (2011) makes the same point (pp. 5-6). 
47
 My exercising my right to control my body by assaulting another person would, in addition to causing them harm, 
violate the other person’s right to personal security. 
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severe harm to the child who is born. Moreover, since people consume resources to survive and 
because some of this consumption is harmful to present and future people, creating more people 
can and (as I will argue in the next chapter) often does harm others. Both these considerations 
provide grounds for restricting procreation under various circumstances. 
Conly (2016) also persuasively argues that our right to have a child can only be 
interpreted as granting us the right to have one child. Rights must correspond to fundamental 
interests that we have, and the fundamental interests that are fulfilled by procreating can be 
adequately fulfilled by having just one child.
48
 If we have an interest in having a biological child, 
that interest can be fulfilled by having a single child. One child is enough to continue genetic 
lineage, after all. If we have an interest in having a family, that interest can be fulfilled by having 
a single child. Having a large family might require additional procreation, but the right to 
procreate does not entail having a right to “the family that fulfills one’s dreams” (Conly 2016, p. 
51). We do not have a right to a family with four children any more than we have a right to a 
child who will become a professional athlete. Additionally, the notion that a larger family is 
better than a smaller family is dubious, and the central goods associated with family life do not 
require the participation of several biological children.
49
 The right to procreate could also track 
an interest in being regarded by others as equally worthy of reproducing, but equal standing can 
be achieved if the constraints are enforced on everyone equally – for instance, if everyone is 
allowed to have one child.
50
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 In fact, some of these interests – such as becoming a parent – can be satisfied through adoption and so do not 
require procreating at all.  
49
 Adoption also presents an option for increasing family size without procreating.  
50
 In chapter 6, I will actually argue that the constraints imposed on procreation in response to population growth 
ought not be enforced equally due to considerations of fairness, but the point here is that there is nothing inherent in 
the concept of restricting procreation that runs afoul of our interest in having equal standing with others. 
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The right to procreate without restriction might also be derived from a broader right to 
bodily autonomy, but that strategy is even less promising than the strategies suggested above. 
The right to bodily autonomy only allows us to exercise this freedom when doing so does not 
harm others, and procreation can harm others – both the person born and others affected by that 
person’s use of resources – under a wide variety of circumstances. Appealing to a right of bodily 
autonomy will therefore be insufficient to justify procreation in cases where it causes harm. We 
may recognize a right to procreate, but this right is certainly not unlimited in its scope, and it 
plausibly extends only to a right to have one biological child. 
To counter this point, one might argue that procreative acts do not cause harm in the way 
relevant to limiting our rights. Consider Travis Rieder’s (2016a) remarks in his review of 
Conly’s One Child: 
Conly is of course correct that having a right to bodily autonomy doesn’t mean that one 
can do whatever she likes with her body. Although I have a right to swing my arm, I do 
not have a right to swing my arm where your face is located. However, this sort of 
argument is problematic in the context of overpopulation… my procreating doesn’t harm 
anyone through its contribution to overpopulation. Precisely as she notes, environmental 
problems like climate change make traditional moral reasoning hard, because they 
involve massively complex collective action, and it just doesn’t seem true that my taking 
almost any single action harms anyone. In a population of 7.3 billion people, any number 
of people that I can add to the population makes virtually no difference—the resources 
consumed by my child, against the earth’s available resources, are infinitesimal (pp. 30-
31, original emphasis). 
Rieder does not think that procreative acts cause harm in the way that would justify restricting a 
person’s rights because one more child born has such a miniscule impact on the Earth in the 
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grand scheme of things. Conly does not offer a substantive response to this concern,
51
 but there 
appear to be two strategies she could pursue to rebut this criticism. 
 First, she might deny Rieder’s claims about harm. One way of calculating the harm 
caused by collective action is to determine one’s individual contribution, determine the total 
collective harm caused, and then calculate the individual harm that one is responsible for by 
multiplying the portion of one’s individual contribution (which will be some value between 0 
and 1) by the total harm caused. So if some collective activity caused the deaths of 100 people, 
and my contribution to this activity was 1/100th of the total, then I would be responsible for the 
harm of 1 person dying. This strategy has been employed by some philosophers to assess harm in 
cases of collective action (e.g., Nolt 2011b), but not everyone agrees that harm should be 
understood in this manner when the individual actions are innocuous in isolation. Fortunately, 
Conly has an alternative strategy available. 
One plausible constraint on fundamental rights is that the exercise of these rights cannot 
be incompatible with respecting the fundamental rights of other people. In other words, 
fundamental rights impose a type of constraint on other fundamental rights. In a very basic case, 
a person’s right to personal security places a constraint on my right to bodily autonomy: except 
in unusual circumstances, I cannot assault another person. The case with population is more 
complicated, but the underlying principle is no different. The collective exercise of an unlimited 
right to procreate will cause the rights of others – both in the present and future – to be violated, 
and the rights violated will be among the most critical rights they have: the right to life, the right 
to health, and the right the means of subsistence (Caney 2010b). These are rights that must be 
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 She acknowledges that the picture of harm is more complicated in the case of climate change than more typical 
circumstances (Conly 2016, p. 93), but as Rieder (2016a, p. 31) says, she does not seem to properly appreciate the 
significance of this observation. 
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fulfilled just to ensure a person’s physical survival; a right to procreate is important, but it is not 
that important, so these other rights should take priority over the right to procreate when they 
come into conflict. Thus, the right to procreate cannot be understood as a right to unlimited 
procreation: it is limited by the extent to which its collective exercise affects the ability of others 
to have their basic rights respected. 
In the past, there was often no danger of undermining others’ rights by procreating 
excessively: in fact, for the vast majority of human history, we needed to be rather prolific in our 
procreation just to ensure the continuation of our species. But our circumstances have changed, 
and so our limits on the right to procreate must change as well. Does this mean that our right to 
procreate should be understood as allowing us to have only one child under present conditions? 
Conly (2016) believes that it does (pp. 217-220). As I will discuss in chapter 6, I am not sure 
such an extreme position is justified. Nevertheless, I think it is clear that the only right that is 
guaranteed by a right to procreate is a right to have one child. Whether we have a right to have 
more children or not will vary depending on our circumstances.
52
 
Where We Stand 
In this chapter, I have examined two deeply opposing views on the ethics of procreation: 
Antinatalism and Procreative Liberty. While I have argued that neither position is correct, the 
swath of arguments that attempt to support Antinatalism reveal something significant about our 
procreative acts: they are much more morally problematic than people usually appreciate. There 
are powerful moral reasons that count against having children, and often people procreate 
without taking these reasons into account. In these cases, the decision to procreate will often lack 
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 For further discussion of the right to procreate, see Overall (2012, ch. 2) and Conly (2016, ch. 2-3). 
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moral justification, given the risk of harm to the child born and the arguments in favor of either 
adopting a child or remaining childless. 
We are left with a fairly surprising conclusion: procreation is permissible but not nearly 
as often as most believe. The presumption in procreative decisions would seem to be that we 
ought not procreate and that doing so permissibly requires a careful examination of the effects of 
our procreation in comparison to the effects of other actions – namely remaining childless and 
pursuing adoption. This outlook runs counter to common beliefs that procreation is almost 
always permissible and something that should typically be praised, but it also reflects the 
conclusion that many recent authors have reached on the subject (e.g., Overall 2012, Wasserman 
2015, Weinberg 2016). The practice of human reproduction is fraught with moral peril, and as a 
result, we must conclude that ordinary moral beliefs about the ethics of procreation are deeply 
mistaken. 
As I argued in the prior section, one of the major constraints on the right to procreate 
originates from the harms that procreation can cause. Thus, to understand exactly what 
constraints on procreation might be justified, we must consider just how significant the harms 
caused by population growth really are. That is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: HOW BAD IS THE POPULATION PROBLEM? 
We have nearly seven and a half billion people on Earth, and that number keeps rising. 
To determine the moral significance of this fact, we have to assess its effects. Population growth 
is not necessarily a problem in isolation: it is not as if one additional person on the planet 
automatically means that someone else in the world must live a worse life. The real significance 
of population growth lies in its status as a multiplier of other bad things (Ryerson 2010). A 
growing population exacerbates many problems we are already struggling to deal with. To 
determine just how significant the population problem is, we have to examine the problems to 
which population growth contributes. This chapter is a survey of those problems, although I 
emphasize climate change and biodiversity loss more than the others. 
Nevertheless, before focusing on these specific threats, we should begin with some 
general observations. The Earth has finite resources: there is only so much water, so much 
farmable land, and so much physical space that we can inhabit. Technological advancement may 
improve our ability to use these resources more efficiently, but there is nevertheless a limit on 
how far they can be stretched. Some have suggested that the long-term limit for the global 
population at a sustainable level is about two billion (Pimentel et al. 2010), which would suggest 
that the global population is already well beyond its sustainable carrying capacity. Such an 
estimate is unlikely to be accurate, however, because too many variables can alter what the 
Earth’s carrying capacity. Technological improvements, especially in agriculture, may increase 
the Earth’s carrying capacity while strains on available resources, such as soil erosion (Pimentel 
2006) or overfishing (UN Food and Agricultural Organization 2016), decrease it. Perhaps this 
explains why Joel Cohen (1995) never concretely answers the titular question of his How Many 
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People Can the Earth Support? While the Earth’s carrying capacity is finite, it is also constantly 
shifting. There is no precise, immutable number of people that the Earth can support. 
Even without a firm carrying capacity, it is still easy to identify ways in which humanity 
is currently pushing ecological limits. While we are still currently able to produce enough food 
globally to feed everyone (if this food were distributed more equitably), a recent estimate from 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (2006) suggests that the necessary supply of food 
will increase dramatically – by up to 70% by 2050.
1
 Additionally, under our current 
circumstances, it is foolish to imagine a world with an ideal distribution of food: the regional 
differences in population size and farmable land, especially when combined with national 
differences in political and economic circumstances, render an equitable distribution of food an 
impractical fantasy. There are almost 800 million people in the world who are undernourished 
(UN Food and Agricultural Organization 2015), and a population increase will only make it 
more difficult to provide the food that they need. 
Water shortages are another serious concern. Groundwater plays a crucial role in 
irrigating crops, providing water to those who need it, and maintaining the health of local 
ecosystems (Giordano 2009, Siebert et al. 2010). Groundwater is a renewable resource, but it can 
still be depleted when our rate of consumption exceeds the rate at which it replenishes. Our 
current practices are depleting groundwater at 3.5 times the sustainable rate, leaving 1.7 billion 
people living in areas where their groundwater resources or the ecosystems that depend on 
groundwater (or both) are threatened (Gleeson et al. 2012). A greater population will make this 
overconsumption of groundwater even more difficult to reverse. 
                                                 
1
 A recent update to this report offered little change in these estimates, although the authors do express a bit more 
pessimism in the ability to meet the global demand for food in the future, citing an increased population projection 
for developing countries as a significant reason why (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2016, p. 37). 
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Shortage of resources often leads to conflicts between or within nations, and we know all 
too well that this can result in war. Water shortage played a crucial role in triggering the recent 
civil war in Syria (Gleick 2014).  A lack of available land and inequity in land distribution 
contributed significantly to the civil war that began in Rwanda in 1994 (André and Platteau 
1998). As population grows, we can expect conflicts of this sort to arise more frequently.
2
 
These general concerns may well be enough to make us mindful of our growing 
population, but the biggest problems to which population growth contributes are climate change 
and biodiversity loss. Each of those problems warrants a more thorough description. 
Climate Change 
The changes in global climate that are occurring in the 21st century are largely the result 
of people emitting greenhouse gases (GHGs) like carbon dioxide, methane, ozone, and nitrous 
oxide. These gases absorb infrared radiation from sunlight, thereby trapping it in the atmosphere 
for a period of time. During the last two centuries, increased emissions of GHGs have caused the 
average global temperature to rise significantly.  Average global surface temperature increased 
from 1880-2012 by about 0.85°C (IPCC 2014b, p. 2).
3
 That may not sound like a significant 
increase, but the average global temperature during the most recent ice age was only 5°C lower 
that the average global preindustrial temperature. Relatively small changes in global temperature 
can have enormous impacts. 
The majority of the increase in global average temperature is a result of our emissions of 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Pre-industrial levels of carbon dioxide were about 275 parts 
                                                 
2
 Beyond the broad effects surveyed here, it is worth noting that some of the adverse effects of population growth 
are more localized. For example, increasing population often leads to overcrowding in urban areas, which can have a 
variety of negative effects on human health (Gray 2001). 
3
 Specifically, there is a 90% likelihood of the average warming having a value of between 0.65 and 1.06 °C with 
0.85°C being the most likely value. 
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per million (ppm) by volume in the atmosphere. We have now surpassed 400 ppm of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere (Kahn 2016).
4
 The effects of climate change on other human beings 
are significant and widespread. I will highlight some of the major effects, all of which are 
summarized in recent reports from the IPCC (2014a, 2014b). 
Perhaps the most powerful way to understand the harm of climate change is to consider 
the number of deaths it will cause. One study from the World Health Organization (2005) 
concludes that climate change may have been responsible for at least 150,000 deaths in 2003.  
One of their later reports (World Health Organization 2009) reaches a similar conclusion: by 
2004, the annual global death toll from climate change had reached 140,000 people. Figures 
from the Global Humanitarian Forum (2009) suggest that these estimates are too low: their 
research estimates that 300,000 people die from climate change annually with the majority of 
those deaths occurring in developing nations. More recent estimates are even bleaker. DARA 
(2012) suggests that the annual death toll from climate change is about 400,000. Their research, 
like the study conducted by the Global Humanitarian Forum, indicates that most of those deaths 
take place (and will continue to take place) in developing nations. They also project that the 
annual death toll from climate change could reach 700,000 by 2030.
5
 An even more recent study 
estimates 529,000 annual deaths being caused by climate change due to its effects on agriculture 
and food security (Springmann et al. 2016). 
                                                 
4
 Current levels of CO2, gathered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, are accessible through 
NASA’s website at https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/.  
5
 The World Health Organization (2014) estimates 250,000 annual deaths in 2030-2050 from climate change, but 
their estimate is not comprehensive because it does not account for certain “major pathways of potential health 
impact, such as the effects of economic damage, major heatwave events, river flooding and water scarcity” (p. 1). 
An additional survey on the effects of climate change on human health can be found in Kim, Kabir, and Jahan 
(2014). 
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Obviously, the particular numbers of these annual death tolls vary, but two facts are clear. 
First, on any plausible estimate, hundreds of thousands of people are already dying annually 
from climate change. Second, the number of annual deaths from climate change will almost 
surely increase as the effects of climate change become more severe. Even without increasing the 
rates of climate-change related deaths, there will still be tens of millions of deaths caused by 
climate change this century, a point highlighted by John Broome (2012, p. 33). 
Another crucial feature of climate change is its long-lasting nature. The temperature 
increase resulting from climate change will, unless we perform extraordinary feats of 
geoengineering, persist for tens of thousands of years, if not longer (Archer et al. 2009). Zeebe 
(2013) reaches a similar, though more specific, estimate: according to his models, changes to 
surface temperatures will persist for 23,000 to 165,000 years. If we tie this observation with the 
estimate death tolls caused by climate change each year, we immediately reach a stark 
conclusion: climate change may lead to billions of deaths over the next millennium, depending 
on its severity and the extent to which we are able to adapt.
6
 
We also cannot overlook the fact that many affected by climate change will not die but 
will nevertheless suffer significantly. Climate change will increase the prevalence of severe 
weather events, such as droughts, heatwaves, and hurricanes. Increased surface temperatures will 
make agriculture more difficult in certain parts of the world, and ocean acidification will reduce 
the food productivity of the oceans (IAP 2009). Temperature increases will alter and expand the 
range in which many insects can survive, causing more people to become vulnerable to various 
diseases they carry. These effects can cause death, of course, but more often they result in 
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 Suppose that the average annual deaths caused by climate change for the next 1000 years is 200,000 – a relatively 
low estimate given the studies I have cited. This would still translate to 2 billion deaths (1000 × 200,000) caused by 
climate change over the next millennium. 
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suffering. People survive but have their quality of life reduced, often severely – at least in the 
case of dehydration, malnourishment, and sickness. Although it is difficult to estimate the 
number of people who will suffer significantly (but not fatally) from climate change with 
precision, the widespread distribution of its effects and their severity indicate that these numbers 
are massive – in all likelihood at least comparable to the number of annual deaths caused by 
climate change. 
Additionally, military leaders are also concerned about climate change threatening 
national security by creating mass migrations (Carrington 2016). Droughts and other resource 
shortages caused by heat waves and other severe weather events may destabilize regions and lead 
to war. Sea level rise will displace millions of people around the world as island nations 
disappear into the ocean and coastlines creep further inland.
7
 The result is that millions of people 
will be displaced, many of whom will seek relocation to other countries. In this manner, climate 
change may cause a refugee crisis that is unprecedented in scope and magnitude. 
Finally, climate change increases the rate of species extinctions (Thomas et al. 2004). As 
ocean and surface temperatures increase, species often become unable to survive in the niches 
that they inhabit. They migrate toward the poles or to higher elevations when possible, but many 
species are simply unable to adapt to their rapidly changing environments and go extinct. Of 
course, species extinctions occur from more than just climate change, and their decline is so 
significant that the topic warrants its own separate treatment. 
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 Some of these effects have already been observed. Five of the Solomon Islands vanished beneath the sea between 
1947 and 2014, and six other islands in this area are experiencing severe shoreline recession (Albert et al. 2016). We 
have also begun seeing cities along the U.S. coastline flood as a result of climate change (Gillis 2016). 
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Biodiversity Loss 
As I use the term, “biodiversity” refers to global species diversity. Thus, biodiversity loss 
refers to decrease in global species diversity caused by human action. Human-caused 
biodiversity loss has been occurring for some time, and climate change is not its only cause 
(Barnosky et al. 2011). But while we can say conclusively that biodiversity is in decline, it is 
challenging to determine just how steep the decline is (Wilson 2016, ch. 3). The main difficulty 
lies in determining what the pre-human rate of extinction is – that is, the rate at which species 
would go extinct if not for the impact of human beings. Without an accurate estimate of that rate, 
we cannot know how much our actions are increasing the rate at which extinctions would 
ordinarily occur. Obtaining accurate numbers on how many species exist and how many are 
being lost is similarly difficult. New species are discovered each year, and many extinctions 
likely go unnoticed because the species that go extinct are unknown to us. Even so, the estimates 
we have are truly disheartening. Excluding bacteria, there are an estimated 8.7 million species on 
Earth (Mora et al. 2011). While conservation biologists previously estimated the pre-human 
extinction rate at about 1 species per million per year, recent studies suggest that this figure is 
actually about 0.1 species per million per year (Pimm et al. 2014, De Vos et al. 2015). That 
means that the current estimate rate of species extinctions – roughly 100 per million per year – is 
an astonishing 1000 times the rate at which extinctions would occur without the impact of human 
actions! 
The main contributors to biodiversity loss are captured in the acronym HIPPO (Wilson 
2016, pp. 57-58): habitat destruction, invasive species, pollution, population growth, and 
overhunting (including overfishing). While population growth is listed as its own factor, it also 
contributes to all of the other items of this list. More people means a greater need for space and 
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resources, and this often leads to habitat destruction when land is cleared for housing or farming. 
More people means a greater need for food, which can cause regional overfishing as demand for 
fish increases. More people means more traveling and a greater need to transport goods across 
borders. Non-native species often get transported to new environments unintentionally, and 
sometimes, they can eliminate native species by overtaking their ecological niche.
8
  
Naturally, the rapid loss of biodiversity has a lot of conservation biologists concerned.  
Biodiversity loss affects human beings in many ways. Perhaps most significantly, human beings 
are affected by reductions in biodiversity by being deprived of the ecosystem services that 
biodiversity enables. Ecosystem services refer to the “properties of ecosystems that either 
directly or indirectly benefit human endeavors, such as maintaining hydrologic cycles, regulating 
climate, cleansing air and water, maintaining atmospheric composition, pollination, soil genesis, 
and storing and cycling of nutrients” (Hooper et al. 2005, p. 7). These services would be costly to 
provide by alternative means (assuming that it was even feasible to do so), and these services 
provide the basic conditions necessary for human beings to survive. The loss of them would not 
be a trivial matter. 
Biodiversity is also a source of much joy for people, whether it stems from aesthetic 
appreciation of exotic species (such as the peacock) or curious fascination with the most bizarre 
ones (such as the blob fish). Alan Carter (2010) even argues that the best reason to preserve 
biodiversity is rooted in aesthetics and that the loss of a species to the loss of an entire genre of 
music or film (pp. 73-75).
9
 Certainly, there are many species that can be considered beautiful, 
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 Further details on the ways in which overpopulation contributes to biodiversity loss can be found in Foreman 
(2014, ch. 4). 
9
 Darrel Moellendorf (2014) also argues that a central aspect of biodiversity’s value for people is its aesthetic value 
(ch. 2). 
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such as the majestic bald eagle or the graceful antelope, but even species that strike us as outright 
hideous, such as the Amazonian giant centipede, can have robust aesthetic value. After all, well-
made horror films have aesthetic value even if their tone, imagery, and subject matter are far 
from beautiful. Aesthetic value is not limited to beauty alone. 
Biodiversity is also a bountiful source of knowledge. E. O. Wilson (1992) describes 
biodiversity as “The Great Encyclopedia of Life” – a relatively untapped font of knowledge that 
“would occupy 60 meters of library shelf per million species” even if each species occupied only 
a page in the volume (p. 151). Our scientific understanding of the nonhuman world is vastly 
incomplete, and the ability to study other life forms can offer crucial insights into how nonhuman 
life forms interact. Beyond fulfilling the scientific interests of many people, these discoveries can 
also give us insight into ways in which we might improve the welfare of human beings. For 
example, biodiversity provides a source biologically active compounds that can aid the 
development of medicines crucial for promoting human health (Butkus 2015). 
Many further reasons for valuing biodiversity could be offered.
10
 Nevertheless, not 
everyone really believes that biodiversity loss is important or that its loss is particularly bad. Don 
Maier (2012) offers a robust critique of the value of biodiversity in which he surveys 12 different 
reasons that one might value biodiversity and argues that none any of them can sufficiently 
ground biodiversity’s value. His strategy is to propose a particular reason as the core of 
biodiversity’s value and then raise counterexamples to this proposal. In the case of ecosystem 
services, for instance, Maier (2012) notes that the discussion of these services often omits 
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 For example, biodiversity may have value because of its ability to transform our values and alter our preferences 
(Norton 1987, Sarkar 2005) or because of its maintenance is necessary to secure future people’s autonomy 
(Zwarthoed 2016). Additionally, Rolston (1988, ch. 1) lists fourteen different reasons for why human beings 
typically value nature, many of which can apply to why we should value biodiversity. 
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discussion of ecosystem disservices (p. 167) and proceeds to list many examples of ways in 
which the services that biodiversity provides are not always so beneficial. When discussing the 
claim that biodiversity is a source of valuable medicines and pharmaceuticals, Maier (2012) is 
quick to mention that only a small portion of all the existing species actually provide this benefit 
(pp. 196-206) and that biodiversity can often increase the incidence of disease (pp. 207-220). 
Once he finishes surveying one of these purported reasons to value biodiversity, he concludes 
that it cannot be the core of biodiversity’s value and moves onto the next proposal. Once he has 
exhausted all possible proposals, he concludes that biodiversity must not be particularly valuable. 
Defenders of biodiversity’s value could respond to Maier in several ways. They may 
point out that Maier does not address nearly all the reasons on offer for thinking biodiversity is 
valuable. In other places, they may simply deny the plausibility of his arguments. For example, 
his reasons for thinking that biodiversity’s value cannot be primarily epistemic is that there 
would be much to learn “from a vastly changed biological world that contained a significantly 
different set of species with significantly different population sizes (abundances)” and that “the 
very processes involved in bringing about such an altered world…would be a rich source of 
knowledge that could not be tapped except by observing them unfold” (Maier 2012, p. 235). 
Certainly, there might be some knowledge to gain from such events, but it is difficult to believe 
that this knowledge would actually be comparable to what we can learn by studying the vast 
array of different species around the world, especially since so many of them have yet to even be 
discovered. It is also doubtful that the knowledge obtained by facilitating a mass extinction 
would be as instrumentally valuable as greater knowledge of currently existing species. Studying 
currently extant species could yield new insight into ways that these species contribute (or could 
contribute) to human flourishing. Studying their demise might give us similar insight, but then 
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the species would be gone and unable to make those contributions: the instrumental value of this 
knowledge would be greatly diminished or lost entirely. 
I cannot here survey every argument that Maier makes, but I will highlight a flaw that 
undermines his general argumentative strategy. The central problem is that Maier’s overall 
argument is invalid. He assumes that because none of the individual reasons he considers can be 
the core of biodiversity’s value, it is not valuable. But that does not follow. Suppose we ask the 
question, “What makes love valuable?” We might answer initially that love makes people happy, 
and this claim is often true: many people report being their happiest when they are deeply in 
love. But love can also be a source of great sorrow when our loved one suffers, dies, or leaves us. 
Thus, the core value of love cannot just be that it makes us happier. Perhaps we think love is a 
means of cultivating virtues like sympathy, empathy, and kindness. Certainly, it is not hard to see 
why loving someone will acquaint a person with these virtues, and yet, love can also serve as 
motivation for many despicable deeds when concern for one’s beloved trumps other moral 
considerations. Thus, the core of love’s value cannot be in the cultivation of moral virtue. 
Perhaps the phenomenon of loving someone is unique and provides special epistemic insights 
into human nature. There is little doubt that deeply loving someone profoundly changes one’s 
outlook on the world, but simultaneously, we pursue love even after we have experienced it 
many times. There is also much we can learn from the loss of love. The unique knowledge that 
love often provides cannot be the core of its value. 
We could repeat this process with love many more times without identifying any central 
reason why love is valuable. But does it follow from this observation that love has no value? 
Surely it does not: aside from the most nihilistic, we all agree that love is valuable. What this 
exercise shows is that love has many sources of value and that what makes it valuable in a 
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particular context can vary. An analogous explanation of biodiversity’s value is consistent with 
accepting all Maier’s criticisms of particular reasons that biodiversity is valuable. 
Not all valuable things in the world have a single source of all their value. Beyond love, 
we might add items like friendship, beauty, moral virtue, wilderness, and sex. The value of 
biodiversity can be understood in the same way. Certainly, in some particular cases, its value will 
not originate in ecosystem services or its means for creating new medicines. Some species may 
not ultimately prove to be treasure troves of knowledge or to add great aesthetic value to the 
world. But how often is it going to be the case that none of the many reasons for thinking that 
biodiversity is valuable will apply? How frequently could we run through every single item on 
the list and check them all as being inapplicable? Much as love rarely fails to add something of 
great value to our lives, biodiversity rarely fails to contribute something of great value to the 
world. Thus, Maier’s skepticism about the value of biodiversity is unwarranted. 
For our purposes, we should also highlight one of the most significant reasons that people 
should care about biodiversity: its elimination can lead to ecosystem collapse. Maier may be 
skeptical about the relationship between biodiversity and the maintenance of ecosystem services, 
but robust meta-analyses demonstrate a general consensus that biodiversity correlates positively 
with ecosystem functioning (Balvanera et al. 2006, Cardinale et al. 2012). What this means is 
that greater biodiversity is generally associated with greater ecosystem functioning and lower 
biodiversity is generally associated with poorer ecosystem functioning. The relations between 
species and the role that each plays in maintaining ecosystem functioning will vary significantly 
across different ecosystems, but a substantial decrease in the number of species in an ecosystem  
is very likely to have an adverse effect on ecosystem functioning. We are on pace to eliminate 
between one-quarter and two-thirds of all currently existing species (Myers 1993, Myers and 
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Knoll 2001), and there is mounting evidence that we have initiated the world’s sixth mass 
extinction event (Ceballos et al. 2015). 
Since the loss of species will be so substantial, it is reasonable to be worried about the 
destruction of ecosystems and the elimination of the ecosystem services that they provide. This is 
one of the main reasons why E. O. Wilson (2016) states, “The ongoing mass extinction of 
species, and with it the extinction of genes and ecosystems, ranks with pandemics, world war, 
and climate change as among the deadliest threats that humanity has imposed on itself” (Wilson 
2016, p. 187). The perceived gravity of the problem is why Wilson advocates setting aside half 
the Earth for the preservation of wildlife: an extreme problem sometimes calls for an extreme 
solution. Paul Watson (2012), comparing Earth to a spaceship, describes the problem as follows: 
Biodiversity destruction is the single greatest threat to human survival on this planet 
because it weakens and removes our custodians, the species that make it possible for us to 
be the passengers. What we are in effect doing is eroding the immune system of the 
planet, compromising the functioning of Earth’s life-support system. We have become 
like a deadly autoimmune disease to Earth, killing the essential crewmembers as we 
overload our spaceship with human passengers. (p. 132) 
If biodiversity loss continues at its current rates, the impact on humanity could be quite deadly. 
Wilson and Watson’s grave language may strike some as hyperbolic. Given humanity’s 
resourcefulness and our prevalence across the globe, it seems doubtful that biodiversity loss 
could lead to our own extinction. What is more likely is that massive biodiversity loss will 
manifest in a variety of less extreme effects: economic costs from ecosystem services that 
disappear, a reduction in the availability of pharmaceuticals, greater difficulties providing vital 
resources in certain regions, the permanent loss of the knowledge and beauty associated with 
particular species, and so on. In more practical terms, these effects will not lead to our extinction 
but to people living in a bleaker world – one where resources are scarcer and our numbers are 
higher. Some will die as a result, and many more will suffer. These impacts are significant 
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enough to demand our attention even if the long-term continuation of our species is not in 
jeopardy. 
What the Evidence Suggests 
Human beings are approaching the limits of what the planet can sustain. We face the 
prospect of regional food and water shortages, significant threats to human health, widespread 
and rapid species extinctions, the displacement of hundreds of millions of people, and a drastic 
rise in the risk of war. These developing problems and possibility that they could soon get worse 
make the future look grim, even on the limited survey that I have done here.
11
 At the time of 
writing, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2017) have 
placed the Doomsday Clock at two and half minutes to midnight, citing climate change as one of 
the two major perils that place us on the precipice of global catastrophe.
12
 If we are being honest 
in our evaluation of the evidence, there is no doubt that swift and substantial action is needed to 
avoid significant long-term environmental harms. Does this require us to stabilize and reduce 
global population? In the next chapter, I argue that the answer is yes.
                                                 
11
 For a much more thorough survey of the effects of population growth, see Weisman (2013). 
12
 The other peril is the potential use of nuclear weapons. 
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CHAPTER 5: INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND 
POPULATION GROWTH 
The takeaway from the previous chapter is simple: we face an assortment of 
environmental problems that threaten to harm hundreds of millions of people this century and 
potentially far more in the centuries that follow. While population growth is not the sole cause of 
the problems we have been considering, it is a central contributing factor (sometimes the primary 
contributing factor) to all of them. In this chapter, I argue that we have a collective duty first to 
stabilize global population and then to reduce it. I will discuss the policy implications of this 
general duty in chapter 6. 
My overall argument is composed of several smaller arguments, each of which is 
defended in its own section, but before delving into the details, it is worth presenting the outline 
of the argument in its entirety: 
1. We have obligations to avoid causing unnecessary massive harms to presently 
existing people. 
2. Our obligations of non-harm are just as stringent toward future people as they are 
toward present people. 
3. Therefore, we have obligations to avoid causing massive unnecessary harms to future 
people. [1, 2] 
4. If we do not dramatically reduce our current levels of environmental degradation, 
then we will cause massive unnecessary harms to future people. 
5. Therefore, we have obligations to dramatically reduce our current levels of 
environmental degradation. [3, 4] 
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6. Anthropogenic environmental degradation is the product of population and the 
average rate of environmental degradation per person. 
7. Therefore, we have a collective obligation to either reduce our population, reduce the 
average rate of environmental degradation per person, or do both of these. [5, 6] 
8. We cannot permissibly reduce population quickly enough to solve the problem at our 
current rates of environmental degradation per person. 
9. We cannot feasibly reduce the average rate of environmental degradation per person 
sufficiently to solve the problem given the current size of the world’s population. 
10. Therefore, we have obligations both to reduce our rates of environmental degradation 
per person and to reduce our current population. [7, 8, 9] 
11. We have a duty to reduce our current population. [10]  
The argument is valid, so if each premise is true, then the conclusion must follow. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I walk through the many steps in the argument and defend each 
premise. I will devote the most time to defending claims (2) and (9) because I suspect these 
premises will meet the most resistance. 
Equity of Non-Harm 
The starting point for my argument is the claim that we have moral obligations to avoid 
causing massive harms to presently existing people. “Massive harms” refer to death and the 
various forms of significant suffering (e.g., debilitating illness, physical injury, psychological 
distress, starvation), so this obligation essentially amounts to a duty not to kill, maim, injure, 
imprison, or otherwise severely harm others without a very strong justification for doing so. This 
moral duty is fundamental to all plausible ethical theories: there is no viable moral code that 
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permits causing unnecessary suffering to other people. Rejecting this principle would seem to 
require being a skeptic about all of morality. 
The second premise, however, is not so straightforwardly supported. I refer to this claim 
as Equity of Non-Harm: our obligations of non-harm are just as stringent toward future people as 
they are toward present people. One may recoil from this principle immediately, highlighting the 
fact that present people exist while future people do not. Present people are already here, and we 
do not know whether future people will come to be. That seems like a noteworthy difference that 
could make our duties of non-harm stronger with respect to present people. Some may have this 
reaction because of confusion about what we mean by a “future person.” Recall (from chapter 3) 
that a “future person” is someone who will exist later even though they do not at present; a 
merely possible person, in contrast, is someone who could exist but never actually does. There 
are clearly morally significant differences between a present person and a merely possible 
person: one has interests and experiences; the other does not (and never will). But this difference 
does not manifest between present and future people: both have interests and experiences. 
Others who object to Equity of Harm might endorse contract theories of ethics. These 
theories ground moral principles in “mutually agreeable reciprocity of cooperation between 
individuals” (Darwall 2002, p. 1). According to some of these theories, we cannot have 
obligations toward future people. These theories base moral obligations on agreement among 
people, and since future people do not yet exist, we cannot interact with them in the ways 
necessary to form fair and reciprocal agreements with them. Thus, we cannot have any 
obligations to those who do not yet exist. 
The difficulties with making contract theories extend to future generations have been well 
documented (Gardiner 2009). Insofar as contract theories can only explain moral obligations 
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between contemporaries, this fact only shows that such theories are unsuitable for addressing 
intergenerational moral questions. If proponents of this view really hold that we have no 
obligations to those that do not yet exist, they will not be able to explain even some of the most 
basic moral convictions that we have about procreation. For example, if we cannot have 
obligations to future people, how can parents have an obligation to refrain from conceiving a 
child whose life will very likely be dreadful (e.g., because of genetic illness)? They will also not 
be able to explain why anything is wrong with harming people in the distant future – even when 
the harms are incredibly severe. There are several reasons to think that our duties of non-harm do 
not vary so drastically between present and future people. 
First, consider a family of similar philosophical thought experiments involving morally 
wrong actions whose consequences are delayed to affect people who do not yet exist. To 
illustrate the kinds of cases that I have in mind, imagine that a despicable terrorist named Alec 
plants a time bomb beneath an elementary school with the intention of causing harm to its 
students. Suppose it blows up in one year, killing 10 students. Such an action is surely wrong – 
among the worst acts a person could commit. Now imagine the same scenario with one change: 
the bomb has a longer timer. In this scenario, it detonates 15 years after Alec places it but causes 
the same overall effects: 10 students die in the explosion. Does it make any difference that the 
children who were harmed did not exist when Alec first placed the bomb? Is Alec’s action 
somehow less wrong and less heinous? Assuming that Alec had good reason to think the school 
would still exist 15 years after planting the bomb, this detail does not seem to matter: 10 deaths 
15 years from now are just as morally bad as 10 deaths that occur right now.
1
 
                                                 
1
 I have used similar cases in previous work to illustrate the same point. See Hedberg (2013, pp. 29-31). 
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Second, consider the moral significance of spatial distance. The fact that a person lives in 
a particular location does not affect her moral status. Geographical location has no bearing on the 
moral value of human beings, the rights they have, or the extent to which their rights and welfare 
should be respected by others. If geographical location makes so little difference to what we owe 
others, then why would temporal location make a greater difference? My geographical location is 
a morally arbitrary factor about me – in large part determined by factors beyond my control – 
that says nothing about my character or my moral and intellectual capacities. We do not typically 
think that such morally arbitrary factors are a justification for regarding others as less than our 
moral equals. The same reasoning applies to temporal location. The time that a person lives is a 
morally arbitrary factor (completely outside one’s own control) that says nothing about the 
person’s character or moral and intellectual capacities. So just as my living in the United States 
does not in itself make my life more valuable or more worthy of moral protections than the life 
of someone who lives in Bangladesh, my living in 2017 does not in itself make my life more 
valuable than the life of someone who lives in a different time, whether they lived in 1917 or will 
live in 2117. Just as a person has the same moral status regardless of where they live, they have 
the same status regardless of when they live. Thus, whatever duties of non-harm we have to those 
living now should apply to those who will live in the future. 
At this juncture, one might object that geographical distance actually does matter to what 
we owe other people because it affects our relationships with them. Typically, we hold that our 
special relationships with our families and members of our local communities create obligations 
that we do not have to distant strangers. In the same manner, our temporal distance from future 
people seems to restrict our relationship with them since we are unable to have any kind of 
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reciprocal interaction. Perhaps this difference could explain why our duties not to harm future 
people are not as strong as our duties not to harm present people. 
While it is true that we generally have stronger duties to those who are geographically 
nearer to us, this fact does not result from geographical distance as such. What matters in such 
cases are the relationships that we form with others. After all, we can have special duties to 
friends or family members who are geographically distant from us, and advances in 
transportation and communication have made these relationships relatively common. The real 
question then is this: is the relationship that we have with future people sufficiently different 
from our relationship with present people to justify our having less stringent duties of non-harm? 
The answer to this question is no. 
It is true that we have special duties to the small portion presently existing people with 
whom we form strong interpersonal relationships, but we also have moral duties that extend to 
all people, including those we have never met and never will meet. These include duties not to 
steal their property, physically assault them, jeopardize their welfare, or otherwise cause them 
harm. These obligations cannot plausibly be grounded in any relationship we form with all these 
people. The notion that we form a relationship with all presently existing people – even a very 
loose one – is dubious. We form morally significant relationships with only a very small portion 
of those who presently exist. 
To the extent that special relationships affect our moral duties, they are usually taken to 
only affect our duties of assistance. I may well have duties to assist my friends and family (e.g., 
doing favors for them, helping them in emergencies, providing financial assistance to my 
children) that I do not have to strangers. But our duties not to harm or wrong others are usually 
taken to apply to everyone – strangers and close acquaintances alike. Just as it is wrong from me 
   
122 
to assault one of my close friends (except in unusual circumstances), it is wrong for me to assault 
a stranger. I should avoid harming other people regardless of my relationship with them. Equity 
of Non-Harm, as the name implies, only applies to duties not to harm others, so its stringency is 
not affected by whether or not we have personal relationships with others. 
A third consideration that supports Equity of Non-Harm originates from the general trend 
in ethics to ground moral status in the capacities that a person or animal possesses. Many 
theorists in animal ethics have approached what we owe to nonhuman animals as dependent 
upon the animals’ morally relevant capacities (Singer 2002; Regan 1983; Nussbaum 2006, ch. 6; 
DeGrazia 1996; Midgley 1983; Sapontzis 1987). The authors that use this approach attempt to 
establish our moral duties to animals by first identifying what features of human beings ground 
their robust moral status and then determining the extent to which certain animals possess these 
capacities. Underlying these approaches is a straightforward assumption about the moral status 
of human beings: a person’s moral status is determined by certain morally relevant capacities. 
Philosophers do not all agree about what capacities are important, but this list often includes the 
capacity to feel pleasure and pain, to exercise autonomy, to make rational decisions, to 
understand oneself as an entity that continues to exist through time, to engage in linguistic 
communication, and to establish meaningful relationships with others. 
According to these capacity-oriented accounts of moral status, if it is wrong to harm 
people who have certain morally relevant capacities, then it is also wrong to harm animals that 
possess the same morally relevant capacities. So if future people have the same morally relevant 
capacities as present people, and it is wrong to harm present people, then it will likewise be 
wrong to harm future people. Will future people have the same morally relevant capacities that 
we do? If we are speculating about the characteristics of human beings who might exist in a 
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million years, then it might be reasonable to think that such people would be significantly 
different from us. But on the shorter time scales in which we are considering our 
intergenerational moral duties, there can be no doubt that future people will be like us in all the 
morally relevant ways. They will have the same general psychological and biological 
characteristics that we possess. We have no reason to believe, for instance, that those living in 
2100 will have lost the ability to reason or will have become unable to experience pleasure and 
pain. Since future people – at least those who will exist during the next several centuries – will 
have the same morally relevant capacities as present people, our duties not to harm future people 
are just as strong as those we have not to harm presently existing people. 
These three threads of argument provide compelling support for Equity of Non-Harm, but 
economists might nonetheless be reluctant to accept it. Most economists employ a social 
discount rate to assess the value of future benefits and losses in comparison to benefits and losses 
that occur in the present. As Derek Parfit (1987) summarizes, “According to a Social Discount 
Rate, the present moral importance of future events, especially benefits and losses, declines at a 
rate of n percent per year” (p. 480). If a discount rate is used, then losses that occur in the future 
are not as morally significant as those that occur in the present, which means that preventing 
harm in the present should take priority over preventing harm in the future. 
The social discount rate has already been criticized on various grounds (Parfit 1987, pp. 
480-486; Kelleher 2012). The mere passage of time does not indicate that the moral significance 
of an event decreases. Often, the justification for a social discount rate reveals that the passage of 
time as such is not the real reason for discounting. For instance, some justify the social discount 
rate on the basis of distant future events having a lower probability of occurring than events that 
will occur in the immediate future. Granting this claim about the relative probability of events, 
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however, does not entail that future benefits and losses are less valuable than they are in the 
present; instead, what this would demonstrate is that it is harder to predict benefits and losses the 
further into the future they are projected to occur. These benefits and losses would still be just as 
morally significant in the future as they are in the present, if they were to occur. Harms that 
occur to future people are not less significant just because they take place in the future. 
Moreover, with respect to the environmental harms under discussion, we have compelling 
evidence that these harms will take place: the probability of their occurrence is overwhelmingly 
likely if our current activities do not change.  
Recently, however, Duncan Purves (2016) has offered a creative defense of the social 
discount rate. Purves appeals to a line of reasoning related to the non-identity problem. Recall 
from chapter 2 that many of our present actions will determine the identities of future people. 
Policy changes that reduce our long-term environmental impacts would cause different people to 
meet and form relationships and for people to procreate at different times in their lives. As a 
result, if we do not adopt these policies, and some future people are adversely affected by climate 
change, biodiversity loss, and other environmental impacts, it is not the case that they would be 
worse off than they otherwise would have been. After all, if we had adopted the policies needed 
to reduce the impacts of environmental degradation, these people would never have been born at 
all. I argued in chapter 2 that it still makes sense to claim that these future people have been 
harmed because the counterfactual comparison notion of harm (CCH) is false.
2
 According to this 
notion of harm, a person is harmed if and only if she is made worse off by some action than she 
otherwise would have been. 
                                                 
2
 It may be a sufficient condition for harm, but it is clearly not a necessary one. 
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Purves’ argument draws on CCH but does not rely on it being a true and comprehensive 
account of what actions qualify as harms (although he often speaks as if CCH is correct). Instead, 
his central claim is that counterfactual-comparative harms are morally worse than (merely) non-
counterfactual comparative harms: 
It is important here to acknowledge that some theories of harm imply that we can harm 
people in a non-counterfactual comparative sense, even when counterfactual comparative 
harm is absent. But, a proponent of these theories should acknowledge that an action is 
morally worse if, in addition to being harmful in the way specified by the theory, it is also 
harmful in a counterfactual comparative sense. (Purves 2016, p. 218) 
To illustrate this point, Purves evaluates Hanser’s (2008) event-based account of harm, according 
to which people are harmed when they are deprived of basic goods. Purves (2016) thinks that 
accounts like Hanser’s – that is, accounts that do not invoke CCH – will be unable to explain the 
intuitive verdict about this case:   
Burning Building George sees two of his neighbors trapped in a burning building. Jane, 
one of the people trapped in the building, has a fatal heart condition such that if she is not 
killed by the fire, she will die from her heart conditions moments later. Elroy, the other 
people [sic] trapped in the building, has no such heart condition. If he is not killed by the 
fire, he will enjoy many more good years of life. (p. 217) 
According to Purves, if George has full information about each of these people, he ought to save 
Elroy, and the reason he ought to save Elroy is that Elroy would suffer a greater harm by dying 
in the fire than Jane would. Elroy would be deprived of many good years of life if he died in the 
fire whereas Jane would be deprived of only a short bit more life. But on Hanser’s account, both 
Elroy and Jane are harmed to the same degree by dying in the fire because they would lose all 
their basic goods. That verdict is problematic, according to Purves (2016): “clearly the harm to 
Elroy is greater, and it would be morally worse” (p.219). 
We can (and should) grant Purves’ claim that we should save Elroy in the Burning 
Building case, and this case illustrates well enough why CCH is “something we should care 
about” (Purves 2016, p. 217). If we do not save Elroy, then he will be deprived of life he 
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otherwise could live whereas Jane is not similarly deprived of life if she is not saved. Thus, there 
are circumstances where CCH matters to our moral evaluations. Nonetheless, all this can be 
granted without endorsing Purves’ conclusions about the moral significance of harms to future 
people. Purves does not provide sufficient reason for thinking that counter-factual comparative 
harms are always worse than harms he would classify as non-comparative. Consider a couple, 
Tom and Sandy, living in the future. Both die in a tropical storm resulting from climate change. 
As it happens, Tom would have been born whether or not we enacted policies to significantly 
mitigate climate change, but Sandy would not have been born if we had done so. According to 
CHH, Tom is harmed by the storm and Sandy is not, even though they are both deprived of many 
years of good life by the event. Purves does not demonstrate that the harm to Sandy is less 
significant than the harm to Tom. The fact that CCH is morally significant does not demonstrate 
that non-comparative harms are automatically less significant. 
Purves’ conclusions do not have the same type of intuitive pull that his initial case 
analysis might possess when we apply them to long-term moral decisions. Do we really believe 
that 100 deaths caused by climate change in 2200 are less morally serious than 100 deaths caused 
by climate change that occur this year? After all, some of those born in 2200 will have their 
identities altered if we were to pursue policies to mitigate climate change. The fact that the 
conclusion Purves’ view would support does not have widespread intuitive appeal highlights the 
shakiness of his arguments, even assuming that we grant his use of an intuition-pumping thought 
experiment to motivate his position. 
One of the main reasons the intuitive appeal of CCH disappears in intergenerational cases 
is that it is being applied with an unusually broad scope. CCH, as employed in non-identity 
cases, “automatically aggregates all the consequences of an action and determines on the basis of 
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the resulting ensemble whether the action has caused harm” (Nolt 2013a, p. 115). In other 
contexts, CCH is never employed this way. Imagine that Jerry is crossing the street, and I strike 
him with my car while driving recklessly. He breaks his leg in several places and spends several 
weeks in a local hospital while recovering. As it happens, however, he falls in love with one of 
the nurses there, someone he would not have met had he not been admitted to the hospital. His 
love is ultimately reciprocated, and the two enjoy a lasting, loving relationship until they die. Did 
I harm Jerry by striking him that fateful day with my car? If we apply CCH in a very broad way, 
then it appears I did not, since my breaking his leg bestowed on him a benefit in the long term 
that was greater than the harm he initially suffered. But such an analysis is not consistent with 
how such a case would ordinarily be judged. Rather, it seems that my action caused two distinct 
effects – the harm of Jerry breaking his leg and the benefit of finding true love. 
The peculiarity of applying CCH in this broad, effect-aggregating manner becomes 
apparent when we consider its implications. If we were to always apply CCH this way, then we 
would be fraught with uncertainty about whether many actions were really harmful. Knowing 
whether something was really a harm would require us to know all the action’s long-term effects 
so that we could compare the harms and benefits accrued by the action. Since we virtually never 
have such knowledge, the concept of harm would become useless in our moral reasoning. Thus, 
when we apply CCH, we almost always apply it more narrowly. My striking Jerry with my car 
makes him worse off in the sense that he now has a broken leg, not in the sense that his entire life 
is now worse on the whole as a result of this event.
3
 
The same analysis can be applied to identity-affecting cases. Let’s return to Tom and 
Sandy’s deaths in the tropical storm. Our failure to mitigate climate change harms Sandy by 
                                                 
3
 Here, I have benefited from reading some unpublished material by John Nolt. 
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causing her death, and it also benefits Sandy by providing the conditions necessary for her 
existence. These are distinct effects and should not be aggregated together. Just as Jerry being 
benefited does not erase the harm he suffered, Sandy being benefited does not erase the harm she 
suffers. Ultimately, we can understand the harm that Sandy suffers in either a non-comparative 
way or in a narrowly comparative way. On either account, the harm she suffers is morally 
significant and just as morally significant as counterfactual-comparative harm that Tom suffers. 
Harms are bad and ought to be prevented. Furthermore, harms are just as morally serious 
whether they occur to present people or to future people. Therefore, just as we have an obligation 
to prevent present people from suffering massive, unnecessary harms, we also have an obligation 
to prevent future people from suffering massive, unnecessary harms. 
Massive, Unnecessary Harm 
We have a moral obligation to prevent future people from suffering massive, unnecessary 
harm. Furthermore, we know that environmental degradation will cause massive, unnecessary 
harm to future people if we continue with business as usual. The support for this claim can be 
found in the previous chapter. Climate change, biodiversity loss, and other changes to the natural 
environment could cause severe suffering and death to hundreds of millions (if not billions) of 
future people. These harms will be “massive” on any plausible meaning of the term. 
These harms are also unnecessary. One could argue that our high rates of consumption 
are necessary to maintain our welfare, but such a claim is dubious. First, for many in the 
developed world, it is simply implausible to claim that all their ecologically damaging habits are 
essential to improving their well-being. Many authors have argued that the materialistic, 
consumption-driven lifestyles of the western world do not make our lives significantly better 
than they would be otherwise (Andreou 2010; Gambrel and Cafaro 2010; Gardiner 2012, pp. 
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244-245). Second, even assuming that many of the consumption-driven activities do increase 
people’s welfare, it does not follow that the activities are necessary in any morally meaningful 
sense. The fact that stealing someone’s property would improve my welfare does not entail that it 
would be morally justified. Some environmentally destructive activities really are necessary for 
people to survive in their current circumstances, but many of these activities are not necessary in 
this sense. For instance, we do not need our homes kept at a stable temperature of 72 degrees 
year round, and we do not need to purchase large, fuel-inefficient vehicles just because their 
appearance is appealing. We could refrain from these activities with only marginal costs to our 
well-being. Thus, the harms resulting from these activities are unnecessary. 
Isolating the Population and Consumption Variables 
Claim (6) in the argument is a simple equation that isolates the two main variables that 
combine to produce environmentally degradation. The first is the population size, and the second 
is the average rate of environmentally harmful consumption within the population. Thus, the 
equation is as follows:  
anthropogenic environmental degradation = population × average rate of environmental 
degradation per person 
This formulation varies slightly from the IPAT equation, which is one of the standard ways of 
understanding environmentally destructive impact.
4
 According to the IPAT equation, 
environmental impact (I) is the product of population (P), affluence (A), and technology (T). My 
equation effectively combines affluence and technology into a single variable, resulting in a 
simpler equation. I prefer this formulation because affluence and technology are difficult to 
                                                 
4
 For an overview of how the IPAT equation has been employed in the past, see Chertow (2000). 
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quantify in isolation and can pull in opposing directions. Increases in affluence generally result 
in greater environmental impact. Improvements in technology can result in more efficient use of 
resources, but often these improvements result in greater aggregate consumption because the 
economic demand for the resource increases.
5
 The effects of technology on rates of consumption 
are thus quite difficult to quantify. For our purposes, it will be more fruitful to condense our 
analysis to two variables – population and consumption – and examine each to see what we can 
do to prevent environmental degradation. 
According to my equation, there are two contributing factors to environmental 
degradation. Hence, if we want to lower environmental degradation, we have three options: 
lower only the first contributing factor, lower only the second contributing factor, or lower both 
contributing factors. In the next section, I argue that we should reduce both contributing factors. 
Can We Just Reduce Rates of Consumption? 
Acknowledging the need to reduce our overall ecological footprint does not automatically 
mean that we have a duty to reduce population. One might propose that we focus instead on 
reducing rates of environmentally harmful consumption, especially in the developed nations 
where consumption rates are particularly high. This approach to the problem has dominated the 
literature: as discussed in the opening chapter, explicit discussions of population over the last 
two decades have been rare. Population growth is one of the main causes of increasing GHG 
emissions around the world, and yet approaches to addressing climate change have largely 
ignored it (Cafaro 2012). Naomi Klein (2014), in her book-length discussion of climate change, 
dismisses any discussion of population in a meager two sentences that is representative of this 
                                                 
5
 This phenomenon is known as the Jevons paradox and is one of the most widely known paradoxes in 
environmental economics (York 2006). 
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trend. After noting that the 500 million richest people on Earth are responsible for roughly half 
of all global GHG emissions, she makes the following remark in a footnote: 
This is why the persistent posting of population control as solution to climate change is a 
distraction and a moral dead end. As this research makes clear, the most significant cause 
of rising emissions is not the reproductive behavior of the poor but the consumer 
behaviors of the rich. (Klein 2014, p. 114 fn) 
Even if the primary cause of climate change is excessive consumption by the rich, it does not 
follow that population reduction does not matter and cannot contribute to solving the problem. 
Moreover, Klein appears to assume that efforts to lower fertility rates would focus exclusively on 
those in developing nations. As will become apparent in chapter 6, we can (and should) pursue 
measures of lowering fertility rates in developed nations as well. 
There is no doubt that any serious attempt to resolve our environmental problems will 
require radical reduction in our environmentally destructive consumption, particularly in 
developed nations that contribute the most to climate change and other ecological harms. 
Demographic momentum caused by younger populations coming of reproductive age will ensure 
that population growth continues for at least a generation or two further into the future, so 
overlooking a devastating virus or a war of unprecedented magnitude, it is not possible to lower 
global population sufficiently to maintain these high rates of consumption and avoid the 
environmental problems discussed in the previous chapter. (I will assume that manufacturing 
such a virus or initiating a nuclear war would be unethical ways of solving our environmental 
problems.) The pivotal question then is whether reducing consumption rates will be enough if 
population continues to rise at projected rates. 
The long-term emissions reductions necessary to avoid going above a 2°C average rise in 
global temperature (relative to preindustrial levels) are incredibly steep – over 5% per year for 
many nations (Raupach et al. 2014). To stay below this 2°C threshold, we must keep the 
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concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere to 450 parts per million (ppm). If we are to stabilize 
our GHGs at 450 ppm, then global GHG emissions will have to decline from 2010 levels by 40-
70% by 2050 and decline to nearly zero by 2100 (IPCC 2014b, p. 20).  Believing that the 
developed nations who must make drastic reductions can and will do so at the required pace is 
not only unrealistic but outright laughable. As it stands, the world is on pace for at least at least a 
3°C rise by the end of the century (Brahic 2014), and we may cross the 2°C threshold as early as 
2036 (Mann 2014). In the United States, the nation with the highest GHG emissions per capita, 
President Donald Trump is attempting to dismantle regulations on emissions from both vehicles 
and power plants, undoing much of the progress that Barack Obama made to address climate 
change and decrease pollution during his presidency (Davenport 2017, Thrush and Davenport 
2017). Fighting our consumption habits also requires fighting social and cultural norms. Much of 
the material consumption in the western world is driven by our desire for a lofty social status 
rather than a need for basic goods or services (Conly 2016, p. 15). Nevertheless, this status is 
important to many people and not something they are willing to relinquish easily. 
An additional obstacle toward reducing consumption is that many nations in the world 
must be allowed to increase their rates of consumption. According to data from The World Bank 
(2016), 767 million people in the world were living on less than the equivalent of $1.90 per day 
in 2013. This level of poverty translates to very little spending and very little consumption, but 
those living in such circumstances struggle to survive. It would be absurd to expect or demand 
that these people reduce their resource consumption. Rather, they must be permitted to consume 
more so that they can escape this dehumanizing poverty. Since many of the countries with large 
proportions of their citizens living in extreme poverty also have high fertility rates, their 
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increased consumption could increase environmental degradation substantially if their population 
growth continues. 
In short, we have a lot of evidence that we are reluctant to reduce our rates of 
consumption, and furthermore, some populations must be allowed to increase their consumption 
in the near term. This information suggests that reducing consumption rates at the pace required 
to avoid severe harms from environmental degradation is extraordinarily unlikely. Intriguingly, 
however, we do have evidence that we are willing to lower our rates of procreation. In many 
nations around the world, people have done it voluntarily. The fertility rate worldwide is in 
decline, and this trend is particularly pronounced in western Europe, where countries like 
Denmark, Italy, and Germany have fertility rates far below replacement levels (CIA 2017). So 
there is little doubt that people can be motivated to procreate less.
6
 
Furthermore, we know that procreative activities make an enormous contribution to 
increasing overall degradation, particularly procreation that occurs in the developed world. In 
one study examining the environmental consequences of having a child in the United States, the 
authors conclude: 
We would like all potential parents to be aware that, more than any other decision they 
ever make, their decision on whether or not to create a child will have the largest impact 
on our global environment. We conclude that the most effective way an individual can 
protect the global environment, and hence protect the well being of all living people, is to 
abstain from creating another human. (Hall et al. 1994, p. 523) 
In a more recent study, Murtaugh and Schlax (2009) examine the carbon legacies of individuals 
and conclude that each new child in the United States adds about 9441 metric tons of CO2 to an 
                                                 
6
 Conly (2016) makes the same observation (pp. 17-18). 
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individual’s carbon legacy, an amount that is roughly 5.7 times a person’s lifetime emissions.
7
 
To offer a basis for comparison, reducing one’s weekly miles driven from 231 to 155 for 80 
years would only save 147 metric tons of CO2. Thus, on their calculations, the decision to 
procreate will likely overshadow all other life choices that an American makes in an effort to 
reduce her individual carbon footprint. While the carbon footprint of those in other countries is 
not increased as much by procreating, the effect is still substantial. A new father in China has 
increased his carbon legacy by 4.4 times by procreating; a new mother in India has increased her 
carbon legacy by 2.4 times by procreating (Murtaugh and Schlax 2009, p. 18). These figures are 
also not static. The per capita emissions in China and India have increased significantly since this 
study was done and are projected to continue increasing until at least 2030 (Yeo and Evans 
2015). 
On a broader scale, we have compelling evidence that population growth is one of the 
central contributors to anthropogenic environmental stressors (Rosa, York, and Dietz 2004; 
Dietz, Rosa, and York 2007). When we examine the growth of global GHG emissions, we see 
that they have correlated with population growth at almost a 1:1 ratio (Ryerson 2010). It does not 
seem possible to adequately respond to climate change without taking population seriously. The 
basic problem was described succinctly by Frederick Meyerson (2008) during a discussion held 
by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:  
Just stabilizing total emissions at current levels, while keeping pace with population 
growth, would require reducing global per-capita emissions by 1.2 percent each year. We 
haven’t managed to decrease per-capita emissions by 1 percent in the last 38 years 
                                                 
7
 They calculate carbon legacy on the assumption that “a person is responsible for the emissions of his descendants, 
weighted by their relatedness to him. For a descendant that is n generations removed from the focal individual, the 
weight is (1/2)
n
” (Martaugh and Schlax 2009, p. 14). So a person is responsible for one-half the emissions of her 
children, one-fourth the emissions of her grandchildren, one-eighth the emissions of her great-grandchildren, and so 
on. 
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combined. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, former Vice President Al 
Gore, and many well-intentioned scientific, media, and activist campaigns haven’t 
changed that fact. And because of the rapid economic growth and increased coal use in 
China and elsewhere, we may now be headed for higher per-capita emissions. 
Historically, attempts to decrease rates of consumption have had very limited success, and future 
efforts may be undermined by continuing population growth. If we are serious about addressing 
these environmental problems, we cannot ignore population growth. The good news is that if we 
do decide to take population seriously, slowing the rise in population could make a substantial 
difference – not just in the distant future but also during this century. 
Based on projections from the United Nations that estimate low, medium, and high 
fertility scenarios and the data we have about how population affects GHG emissions, following 
the low fertility path rather than the medium fertility path – a difference of about 0.5 births per 
woman – we could achieve 16-29% of the emissions reductions needed by 2050 to stay below 
the 2°C threshold (O’Neill et al. 2010). The authors of the study add, “By the end of the century, 
the effect of slower population growth would be even more significant, reducing total emissions 
from fossil fuel use by 37-41% across the two scenarios” (O’Neill et al. 2010, p. 17525). Even 
more encouragingly, some of the measures used to reduce population, such as increased funding 
to family planning services, are much more cost-effective in mitigating climate change than other 
methods (O’Neill and Wexler 2000; Wire 2009; Cafaro 2012). Moreover, for many people, 
increased access to family planning services may provide an easier means of decreasing their 
ecological footprint than reducing personal consumption. Reducing one’s consumption usually 
requires some level of personal sacrifice, but as the data presented in earlier chapters indicates, 
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many people desire fewer children than they ultimately have (e.g., because of unintended 
pregnancies). Thus, it may be in their own best interests to reduce their fertility rates.
8
 
The picture painted by all these facts is pretty clear. We cannot realistically address 
climate change and other environmental problems by focusing solely on reducing our rates of 
consumption or by focusing solely on reducing population. To be successful in responding to 
these problems, we need to make efforts to both reduce our rates of environmentally harmful 
consumption and reduce our population size. In the near term, the best we can achieve with 
respect to reducing population at the global level is slowing our growth, so that is what we 
should pursue. 
The Techno-Optimism Objection 
Before considering the policy implications of this argument, we must pause to consider 
two related objections. Population growth is not a new challenge for humanity. We have dealt 
with rapid population growth throughout the 20th century, and technological developments have 
helped us avert catastrophe. In the past, we have been warned about the devastation that 
population growth will cause, and these predictions have proven inaccurate. More than two 
centuries ago, Thomas Malthus claimed that population growth would outstrip food supply and 
soon lead to widespread starvation. He was obviously wrong about that.
9
 Paul Erlich made a 
similar prediction in 1968 when he published The Population Bomb, suggesting that we could 
experience widespread starvation in the 1970s and 1980s. But this dire outcome did not come to 
pass. 
                                                 
8
 Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) make this same point and also add that preference-adjusting interventions (which I 
will discuss in the next chapter) could make people want fewer children (p. 870). 
9
 Beyond getting his empirical claims wrong at the time, Malthus was also criticized by Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels. For an overview of their criticisms, see Charbit (2009, ch. 5). 
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Many people point to Malthus and Erlich’s exaggerated claims about rising human 
population as evidence that such worries are unjustified. Technological progress has enabled us 
to accommodate our growing population. Malthus’s predictions, for instance, were wrong 
primarily because he did not foresee how developments in agriculture would enable us to grow 
crops on land previously thought unfarmable. Perhaps further technological progress will enable 
us to accommodate our growing population as it did in the past.
10
 
Unfortunately, as convenient as it would be if technology came to our rescue, it is 
unreasonable to rest our hopes entirely on technological progress. Even if some technological 
optimism is justified, the inaccurate predictions of the past are hardly a firm basis for skepticism 
about the problems caused by population growth in the twenty-first century. First, the warnings 
made by Malthus and Erlich both concerned food supply, but current discussions of 
environmental degradation are not exclusively concerned with food supply.
11
 Granted, as 
discussed in chapter 4, there are concerns about how increased demand for food places additional 
stress on ecosystems and how increased temperatures caused by climate change may impact food 
supply by making us unable to farm previously farmable land and decreasing the food 
productivity of the ocean.  But food supply is not the sole focus when we consider population 
growth in the 21st century.
12
 Second, the environmental effects taking place around the world are 
being studied tirelessly by experts on every continent, and their conclusions largely converge on 
one unsettling fact: we are on the cusp of experiencing some very big problems. 
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 For a recent discussion and endorsement of this claim, see Pearce (2010, pp. 204-208). 
11
 Conly (2016) makes this same point (p. 150). 
12
 One further reason that food supply is not the focus is that lab grown meat may become viable in the near future. 
A few years ago, it cost $325,000 to create an artificial hamburger in a lab (Fountain 2013). Within a few years, the 
price of creating these burgers has dropped to less than $12 (Crew 2015). Lab-grown meat may become 
economically viable within the next two decades, and it would provide an alternative means of meeting the world’s 
demand for meet and will require far fewer resources – far fewer animals and much less land – to produce than meat 
that is produced through industrialized farming. 
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I already addressed the severity of our environmental problems in chapter 4, but it is 
worth reiterating a crucial feature of them here: they are already happening. Malthus and Erlich 
were concerned about famines that might happen if population growth continued. In contrast, we 
are not speculating that we might see a rise in average global temperature in the future – the 
temperature rise is already happening. We are not just viewing substantial biodiversity loss as a 
possibility – we are already seeing substantial biodiversity loss. Rather than being possible 
obstacles in the future, these problems are already upon us. The only pertinent question is what 
we are going to do about them; to pretend they do not exist or are unlikely to occur is 
unjustifiable. 
It is likewise unjustifiable to assume that technological innovation will function as a 
silver bullet and provide a solution to these problems in the near future. Even if we acknowledge 
that a technological fix is possible, it does not follow from this fact that it is likely to occur or 
that we should expect it to occur.
13
 Certainly, at this stage, we are not justified in acting as if 
such a miracle fix is right around the corner. Moreover, subjecting future people to such grave 
risk of harm is morally blameworthy even if those harms are miraculously avoided in the future. 
We routinely hold people accountable for engaging in actions that are unnecessarily risky even 
when their actions do not actually harm anyone. This is the central reason why we impose legal 
penalties for running red lights and driving drunk even when specific instances of those 
behaviors do not actually cause harm to anyone. Thus, a failure to keep the risks to future people 
within reasonable limits, given that we have the means to do so, is morally blameworthy. 
                                                 
13
 It is possible that technology will simply not advance fast enough to alleviate these problems, but it is also 
possible that the technology will exist but not bring us the solutions we need. Mazur and Saperstein (2010) point out 
that the beneficial effects of technology are sometimes only realized under favorable social and economic 
conditions. New options for contraception and abortion can improve women’s reproductive health, for example, but 
they “have failed to improve women’s lives where underlying health, rights, and poverty issues have not also been 
addressed” (Mazur and Saperstein 2010, p. 12). 
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The Ultimate Resource Objection 
A variation of technology-driven optimism can be found in the influential work of Julian 
Simon (1996). He argues that people – primarily because of their ability to invent and adapt – are 
the ultimate resource. When a resource becomes scarce, he notes that the price of this resource 
increases and that people gain an incentive to use this resource more effectively or develop 
alternatives to it. As a result, supposed shortages of resources are routinely avoided, and we 
should not regard natural resources as “finite in any economic sense” (Simon 1996, p. 54). 
Simon’s key claim is that resource scarcity plays an important role in technological 
advancement. He summarizes the main argument for this claim as follows: 
More people, and increased income, cause resources to become more scarce in the short 
run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity and 
prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail in the search, at a 
cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the 
longrun the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen. 
That is, prices eventually become lower than before the increased scarcity occurred. 
(Simon 1996, p. 59, original emphasis) 
In this manner, Simon contends that resource scarcity has a positive influence on technological 
progress. The rising prices caused by resource scarcity provide an economic incentive for new 
discoveries to be made and then put into practice. Much of Simon’s book is an examination of 
how this phenomenon has occurred in the past with other resources that became scarce at some 
point in the past. 
Simon also argues that a growing population increases the rate of technological progress. 
He first observes that improvements in productivity come from people putting their minds to use. 
Since these improvements originate from people, “the amount of improvement plainly depends 
on the number of people available to use their minds” (Simon 1996, p. 372). If other variables 
are held constant between two independent societies, the society with the higher population will 
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develop more quickly because more people will be making contributions to its technological 
advancement. 
These two argumentative threads combine to support the following conclusion: 
population growth drives technological advancement. Other things equal, a larger population 
results in the creation of a larger amount of knowledge because there are more people generating 
ideas and trying to put them into practice. Simultaneously, a larger population leads to faster 
resource depletion, resulting in an increased demand for these resources. As the prices of these 
resources rise, new economic opportunities emerge and provide an incentive to develop new 
ways of doing things (e.g., using the resource more efficiently, finding new sources of the 
resource, developing alternatives to the resource). In a free society, solutions are eventually 
found, and in the end, the prices of the resources end up being lower than they would have been 
if the original scarcity had never arisen. In this manner, we ultimately end up being better off for 
having endured this (temporary) resource scarcity. If one is persuaded by this line of reasoning, 
then significant restraints on population growth may seem not just unnecessary but detrimental, 
since reduced population growth will hinder our technological advancement. 
Simon is right to point out that this trend has happened many times in human history. 
Even so, the argument has a number of significant problems. First, we should highlight that his 
understanding of “better off” is purely economic: being better off simply means that we are in an 
economically superior position to where we were previously. But that surely cannot be all we 
care about. If resource scarcity (even if temporary) is so pronounced and devastating that it 
results in the deaths of millions of people and the severe suffering of many million more, in what 
sense are we “better off” after this scarcity concludes? Even if we are better off in some narrowly 
economic sense, we may well be worse off in terms of aggregate human welfare, a measurement 
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that seems to have much greater moral significance.
14
 This point is perhaps most poignant with 
respect to climate change. 
Climate change can be interpreted as the scarcity of a resource – namely, the available 
carbon sinks on Earth. We have too few carbon sinks to accommodate our GHG production. 
There’s certainly plenty of incentive to develop ways of increasing our available carbon sinks. 
This thought has motivated some to investigate the possibility of geoengineering the atmosphere 
to aid climate change mitigation, but all of them carry significant risks and uncertainties. Some 
also do not appear economically viable.
15
 Herein lies a second problem with Simon’s reasoning: 
he assumes that technological solutions to problems of scarcity will always be found within a 
viable timeframe. Certainly, that has been the case many times in human history, but what 
justifies assuming that it will always happen regardless of the circumstances? Recall from 
chapter 4 that the effects of climate change will be extremely long-lasting and impose great 
suffering and hardship on large numbers of people. We have already established that increasing 
population increases the severity of this environmental problem (and many others). When the 
moral stakes are this high, it is both irrational and morally unjustifiable to exacerbate the 
problem in the hope that it will motivate people to develop a solution to the problem. 
Climate change in particular is an environmental problem that Simon does not properly 
address. In fact, some of his remarks about it are outright dismissive: 
“Given the history of such environmental scares—over all of human history—my guess 
is that global warming is likely to be simply another transient concern, barely worthy of 
consideration ten years from now should I then be writing again of these issues” (Simon 
1996, p. 266). 
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 We are also unlikely to be better off if societies collapse, a possibility that cannot be overlooked. Recent work by 
Jared Diamond (2005) highlights how ecological catastrophes – particularly when a society fails to properly respond 
to them – can lead to a society’s demise. 
15
 See Boyd (2008) for a brief appraisal of different geoengineering schemes. 
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Obviously, Simon was wrong about climate change. Moreover, climate change is already 
causing hundreds of thousands of casualties per year. The problem is here – on our doorstep – 
and the miraculous technological advancement that would solve the problem is nowhere to be 
found. This seems to be a straightforward counterexample to the claim that all problems of 
resource scarcity are solved via technological advancement. 
Simon was similarly mistaken about biodiversity. He claims that he and Aaron 
Wildavsky “documented the complete absence of evidence for the claim that species extinction 
is going up rapidly, or even going up at all” in the mid-1980s and that no one disputed their 
documents or “adduced any new evidence since then that would demonstrate rapid species 
extinction” (Simon 1996, p. 450). Whatever the state of conservation biology 30 years ago, the 
studies I have cited in chapter 4 provide ample evidence that we are experiencing rapid species 
extinctions. The consensus among conservation biologists on this point is overwhelming. Again, 
the problem is on our doorstep, and technological progress has not been able to solve it.
16
 If we 
are serious about tackling the environmental problems we face, then we must reduce our rates of 
consumption and reduce our population. Technological advances can certainly play a role in our 
efforts to meet both these goals, but we cannot continue with business as usual under the 
expectation that technology will suddenly solve all our problems. Such a path would be both 
foolish and ethically unjustifiable. 
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 There are efforts underway to create synthetic organisms. In theory, these efforts could enable us to create new 
organisms that fill the same ecological role as species that have gone extinct or even to genuinely resurrect extinct 
species. But these efforts are nowhere near coming to fruition to the extent that would be required to genuinely avert 
biodiversity loss or recover from it. It was only quite recently that we even managed to create the first synthetic cell 
(Gibson et al. 2010). 
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS 
We have a collective duty to reduce our numbers. Doing so is necessary to adequately 
respond to the environmental degradation taking place around the globe. Now we turn to the 
challenge of practical application. What should be done to promote population stabilization and 
reduction? Part of population growth has been caused by an increase in the life expectancy of 
people around the world, particularly in Africa (Kweifio-Okai and Holder 2016, Johnson 2016). 
While reproductive rates have declined overall, decreases in the rate of population growth have 
been muted because of the decrease in death rates. However, since the increases in life 
expectancy are a result of better medical care and a significant reduction in human misery, it 
seems neither desirable nor ethical to reduce population by lowering life expectancy.
1
 The 
obviously preferable way to reduce the population is to bring fewer people into existence. 
In recent decades, discussions of reducing fertility rates have given rise to serious worries 
about morally problematic coercion. Such worries are not unfounded: the implementation of 
policies in China, India, and Peru aimed at reducing fertility rates resulted in forced abortions 
and sterilizations (Mosher 2008, chs. 3 and 5; Alvarado and Echegaray 2010). These practices 
are widely regarded as human rights violations and thought morally indefensible. The challenge 
we face is how to reduce population effectively without engaging in morally objectionable 
practices. As we shall see, meeting this challenge is no easy task. 
We need to stabilize and reduce population as quickly as possible, but we also need to 
respect people’s personal freedoms. To a degree, these needs are in tension with one another. 
Thus, the general principle regarding population policies might be put as follows: 
                                                 
1
 As I will discuss later, however, we may face circumstances where we must seriously consider rationing health 
care to the elderly. 
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Minimal Coercion: we ought to implement the least coercive set of population policies 
possible that will still address the problem effectively. 
In this chapter, I consider a series of policies that could be implemented to reduce population and 
consider whether they are morally defensible. I start with the least controversial policy measure 
that would reduce fertility: increased access to contraception and family planning services. 
Contraception, Family Planning, and Effective Education 
Increasing access to contraception and family planning is one of few measures that 
enjoys substantial support among those writing the population crisis (e.g., Mazur 2010; Ryerson 
2010; Cafaro 2012; Hickey, Rieder, and Earl 2016; Kukla 2016). It is not hard to see why. 
Increased access to family planning services enhances people’s autonomy by providing couples 
with more options regarding their procreative choices. In this respect, it is the opposite of being 
coercive. When they have these options, many choose to have smaller families than they would 
otherwise have. Improved access to contraception results both in people having greater freedom 
and lowering fertility rates. 
Much progress could be made in lowering fertility rates if we were to provide 
contraception to all who have an unmet need for it. Worldwide, only 56% of married women 
between the ages of 15 and 49 use modern methods of contraception, and in Africa, this figure 
dips to 30% (Population Reference Bureau 2016). About 12% of the women in the world want to 
delay or prevent childrearing but were not using any methods of contraception; in the developing 
world, this figure rises to 22% (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). These 
figures highlight how increased funding for family planning programs could make a significant 
difference in slowing population growth. Just meeting the contraceptive needs of Africa could 
decrease the global population in 2030 by as much as 1 billion (Ford 2016).  
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Of course, we also have evidence that increased access to family planning services is not 
enough. A statistic from chapter 3 is worth reiterating here: globally, 40% of pregnancies are 
unplanned (Sedgh, Singh, and Hussain 2014). Even in regions of the world where contraception 
is readily available, a significant portion of pregnancies are unplanned. Thus, measures must be 
taken to improve people’s awareness of how to use contraceptives effectively and the risks 
associated with not using them. The most straightforward way to accomplish this feat is to 
improve the availability and quality of sex education. What this entails may vary from nation to 
nation according to their educational system, but whatever education is provided should include 
information on how to use contraception effectively. Abstinence-only programs, which promote 
abstinence until marriage and do not cover contraceptive use, have been in place in certain 
regions in the United States for decades. While these programs have consistently received federal 
funding during the last 20 years, they have proven utterly ineffective in reducing rates of 
unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections compared to comprehensive sex 
education (Advocates for Youth 2007, Stranger-Hall and Hall 2011, Breuner and Mattson 2016). 
Of course, the United States is no model for how to educate the youth about sex: only 24 states 
mandate sex education of any kind (Guttmacher Institute 2017). Given these facts, we should not 
be surprised that the United States has the highest rates of unintended pregnancy in the 
developed world. 
The case for improving access to contraception and improving sex education is quite 
compelling. Doing so will enhance people’s freedom (especially the reproductive freedom of 
women in the developing world) and improve their quality of life (since they will have fewer 
unwanted children) while also lowering fertility rates. These policies have, as Rebecca Kukla 
(2016) puts it, “no significant moral downside” (p. 845). The real question is whether or not 
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these measures would be enough to effectively respond to population growth. Suppose we 
improve sex education and give everyone in the world ready access to contraception. Under such 
circumstances, would the population problem be solved? 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to know what the precise effects of meeting these two 
conditions would be. Certainly, it would be convenient if these changes alone solved the 
problem: then we would not need to worry about answering the more difficult ethical questions 
about coercive policies. Some do genuinely believe that improved access to contraception and 
increased awareness of how to use it effectively will solve the problem. In the introduction to her 
edited volume on the population problem, Laurie Mazur (2010) states, “It is not necessary to 
control anyone to slow population growth: Birthrates come down where individuals have the 
means and power to make their own reproductive choices” (p. 16). 
Despite Mazur’s optimism, I think it is naïve to believe that increased access to 
contraception and increased education about contraception will be sufficient to solve the 
problem, for three reasons. First, the data on population suggests that unmet contraceptive needs 
are not the only contributor to population size. Consider a few examples based on recent 
population data (Population Reference Bureau 2016). In Morocco, 57% of the married women 
aged 15-49 use modern contraceptive methods, and the fertility rate is 2.4; in Malawi, 58% of 
married women in this age range use modern contraceptive methods, and the fertility rate is 4.4. 
In Libya, only 20% of these women use modern contraceptive methods, but the fertility rate is 
only 2.4. Women of the same demographic in Senegal use modern contraceptives at almost the 
same rate as those in Libya (21%), and yet the fertility rate in Senegal is 5.0. Clearly, the use of 
modern contraceptive methods is not the only factor that determines fertility rates. One of the 
major influences on fertility rates in a given country is what family size is desired by the 
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country’s citizens (Ryerson 2012, pp. 241-243). Economist Lant Pritchett (1994) went so far as 
to claim that the desire for children was the primary determinant of fertility rates and that 
“contraceptive access (or cost) or family planning effort more generally is not a dominant, or 
typically even a major, factor in determining fertility differences” (p. 39). 
Second, even under a best-case scenario where we implement these measures to improve 
sex education and access to contraception
2
 (as well as pursuing gender justice for women
3
) and 
almost immediately, we will not reduce fertility rates quickly enough to deal adequately with the 
environmental problems we now face. According to recent demographic models, the human 
population in this scenario would still closely approximate the nearly 11 billion that we will 
otherwise have on Earth in 2100; substantial reductions in the population are unlikely to occur 
until the following century (Bradshaw and Brook 2014, pp. 16611-16612). We must take 
significant action this century to avert severe climate change and biodiversity loss, so one 
worries that these actions, though important, will not be enough by themselves. As mentioned in 
chapter 5, mitigating climate change effectively this century with a continuously rising 
population is not feasible. We are already struggling to make progress on these problems with a 
population of 7.4 billion people. Increasing that number by 50% would make an adequate 
response to environmental degradation all but impossible to achieve. 
Third, the regions of the world where population reduction would be most beneficial with 
respect to ameliorating environmental degradation are developed nations, since they have larger 
per capita ecological footprints. In these nations, access to contraception is not the primary 
                                                 
2
 Comprehensive sex education programs, access to contraception, and access to abortion would likely to encounter 
strong opposition in certain regions of the world from certain religious groups, so this scenario is much more utopian 
than what we could reasonable expect. 
3
 There are compelling moral reasons to pursue gender equality that have nothing at all to do with lowering fertility 
rates, but it is true that removing laws that hinder women’s participation in society and granting them the same 
educational opportunities as men generally correlate with lower fertility rates (Roudi Fahimi and Kent 2007). 
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challenge to lowering fertility rates. While these countries often already have fertility rates lower 
than replacement levels, hastening the pace of reduction could make a huge difference. People in 
sub-Saharan Africa and other developing nations have small per capita ecological footprints at 
present; hence, small declines in fertility rates of developed nations may be more valuable than 
larger declines in developing nations. Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) offer a succinct 
encapsulation of the main point: 
While reducing fertility in developing nations is important, since their per capita GHG 
emissions are projected to increase significantly (and should be allowed to do so) over the 
next several decades, it is not nearly as critical as near-term reductions in the numbers of 
the world’s wealthy. Although it would be difficult to lower the fertility rate in the United 
States from 1.9 to, say, 1.4,  such a reduction would have a massive impact on both near-
term and long-term global GHG emissions—much more even than proportionally larger 
fertility reductions in sub-Saharan Africa. (pp. 855-856) 
Given the gravity of the problem and the need to act quickly, we must consider the ways in 
which we can lower fertility rates in the developed world even more, particularly in countries 
like the United States and Australia where the per capita ecological footprint is high and fertility 
rates are still close to two children per woman (CIA 2016). In most cases, citizens in these 
nations already have access to family planning services, so if we are looking to decrease fertility 
rates in these countries, we must pursue other measures. 
At this juncture, the ethical landscape gets a lot more treacherous. We might pursue three 
additional strategies for reducing population: preference adjustment, incentivization, and 
coercion.
4
 Preference adjustment refers to the strategy of trying to alter people’s preferences so 
that they prefer to have fewer children. Incentivization refers to the strategy of providing 
incentives that might motivate people to have fewer children. Coercion involves the prevention 
of certain procreative acts. Perhaps the most well-known example of coercion was China’s one-
                                                 
4
 I borrow this schema for sorting these different strategies from Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016). 
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child policy. Ultimately, I will argue against the imposition of coercive policies but in (qualified) 
favor of preference-adjusting and incentivizing policies. But before doing so, I must clarify an 
implication of improving access to family planning services. 
What about Abortion? 
Readers may suspect that increasing access to family planning services entails that 
women should have the right to abort unwanted pregnancies and that this service should be 
readily available to them. While providing this service would give women an additional means 
of avoiding unwanted pregnancies and thus have a positive effect on curtailing population 
growth, the conclusion that access to abortion should be increased does not strictly follow from 
the imperative to increase access to family planning services or the more general imperative to 
slow population growth. Whether women should have increased access to abortion services 
depends on the moral status of the fetus. 
Obviously, it is morally unacceptable to reduce population by murdering those who 
already exist. It is virtually always wrong to kill existing human beings, which is one of the most 
fundamental moral principles in all of ethics. If a fetus has a moral status comparable to adult 
human beings, then it follows that the imperative to reduce population will not justify killing a 
fetus. Thus, whether we should increase access to abortion as part of increasing access to family 
planning services hinges significantly on whether the fetus has such a robust moral status. In this 
manner, the imperative to reduce population does not serve as a decisive consideration that pro-
choice advocates might use to defend the permissibility of abortion. The question of whether or 
not the fetus is a person – that is, an entity deserving of the same basic moral rights and 
protections as an adult human being – cannot be bypassed because of considerations about 
population. 
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The morality of abortion and the issues concerning fetal personhood are too complex to 
discuss in full here, but a few general remarks are worth making. First, even assuming that the 
fetus is a person from the moment of conception, there are compelling arguments that abortion 
remains permissible in certain circumstances (Thomson 1971). One such circumstance is when 
pregnancy occurs as a result of rape. When a women is impregnated against her will, it is unfair 
to demand that she endure the burdens of pregnancy, and while it is unfortunate that the fetus 
will die as a result, we do not typically require people to endure substantial burdens to save the 
lives of others when they are not responsible for the other person being in life-threatening 
circumstances. A woman carrying a child to term in the case of rape would thus be a 
supererogatory action; doing so is not a moral requirement. The other commonly recognized 
exception is when the continuation of pregnancy endangers the mother’s life. In this case, the 
mother’s right to self-defense justifies her ending the fetus’s life to preserve her own. 
As a second general point, it is implausible to regard a fetus as being a person from the 
moment of conception. As Mary Anne Warren (1973) argues, an early term fetus does not have 
any of the qualities that we typically associate with personhood. She identifies the following 
features as being typical components of personhood: consciousness and the capacity to feel pain, 
the ability to reason, engagement in self-motivated activity, the ability to communicate, and the 
presence of self-concepts and self-awareness (Warren 1973, p. 55). An early term fetus does not 
have any of these features. An entity probably does not need all of them to be a person, but it 
surely needs at least one of them. An early term fetus does not possess any level of conscious 
awareness, which seems like a prerequisite for possessing the other features of personhood. 
Thus, at least early in the pregnancy, its moral status should be similar to that of other living 
things that lack the capacity for consciousness (e.g., plants). 
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The moral picture gets more complicated as pregnancy progresses, however. At some 
point during pregnancy, the fetus becomes sentient: at that point, it has the capacity to feel 
pleasure and pain. There is disagreement about precisely when the fetus becomes sentient. Some 
have placed the threshold for sentience about 30 weeks after conception (Tawia 1992, Lee et al. 
2005) while others contend that the fetus can feel pain closer to 20 weeks after conception 
(Grossu 2016). Once the fetus becomes sentient, it acquires an interest in avoiding pain, and this 
new capacity results in an elevation in its moral status. Past this point, the justification for an 
abortion must be significantly stronger than the justification offered for aborting a non-sentient 
fetus. In practice, recognizing the significance of sentience might result in a policy of permitting 
the abortion of fetuses during the first trimester (when the fetus is clearly not sentient) and only 
allowing abortions in exceptional circumstances after the first trimester (Sumner 1981, ch. 4). 
Such circumstances could include, for instance, a threat to the mother’s health or the discovery 
of significant genetic defects in the fetus.
5
 
Given my views about the moral status of the fetus, I believe that increasing access to 
family planning services should also entail giving women greater access to abortion services 
during (at least) the first trimester.
6
 But this position does not result from thinking that the 
                                                 
5
 In cases where pregnancy results from rape, the woman would have plenty of time to determine that she was 
pregnant, deliberate about whether to carry the fetus to term, and then get an abortion (if she chooses) within the 
first trimester. Thus, allowing abortions in response to involuntary pregnancy may not require any special provision 
that extends beyond the first trimester. 
6
 In one of the most widely anthologized papers on abortion, Don Marquis (1989) argues that abortion is wrong 
because it deprives the fetus of future experiences. Since Marquis believes this is the same reason killing an adult 
human being is wrong, he views abortion as being just as wrong as murdering an adult human being. At first glance, 
this argument might appear to bypass the question of whether the fetus is a person, which would suggest that my 
analysis of the moral status of the fetus is irrelevant to assessing the morality of abortion. However, Marquis’s 
argument only establishes that the fetus has a valuable good that it can lose (i.e., its future); this does not establish 
that the fetus is the kind of entity that has a right to its future or that there is anything morally wrong with depriving 
it of this good (Sinnott-Armstrong 1999). So despite his intention to dodge the question, Marquis cannot avoid 
addressing whether or not the fetus is a person. 
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imperative to reduce population automatically warrants allowing more women to receive 
abortions. One could coherently hold all my views regarding the need to reduce population but 
hold a different view regarding the moral status of fetuses and thereby reach a different position 
on whether we should make it easier for women to obtain abortions. 
Why Outright Coercion Should Be Avoided 
Having addressed the link between population reduction and access to abortion, we can 
now return to the question of what population policies we should employ to curtail population 
growth. The most direct means of reducing population would involve direct coercion – 
government action that forces individuals to keep their family size small. Coercive population 
policies are not popular,
7
 but we have some evidence that coercive policies can be effective: the 
one-child policy in China prevented at least 500 million births between 1970 and 2000 (Lee and 
Liang 2006). The main justification for implementing an extremely coercive policy is an appeal 
to the long-term benefits of doing so. As I have already mentioned, these policies have 
historically been associated with severe human rights violations in the form of forced abortions 
or sterilizations. They are also often associated with sex selection: in cultures where men are 
valued more than women, they create an incentive to abort fetuses identified as female and have 
                                                                                                                                                             
Additionally, Lovering (2005) questions whether a fetus really has a future prior to being conscious. 
Possessing a future seems to require a psychologically continuous entity, and consciousness is a prerequisite for this 
kind of psychological continuity. If Lovering’s view is correct, then Marquis’ position may not turn out to be much 
different than the view I have sketched above, where abortions are permissible in the first trimester but often 
prohibited afterward. 
7
 The philosopher who comes closest to defending them is Sarah Conly (2015, 2016), but even her proposals fall 
well short of the coercive policies under discussion here. While she thinks that a one-child policy is permissible 
when the harms caused by overpopulation are severe enough, she believes it should be enforced through economic 
penalties and not by bodily invasions (Conly 2016, ch. 4). 
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another child in the hope that it is a boy.
8
 The only moral consideration that can justify these 
injustices is the overall outcome that results from the policy. The underlying thought is that if the 
harms of unchecked population growth are significant enough, then the particular injustices that 
occur can be justified. Unchecked population growth will certainly lead to some very bad 
outcomes, and reducing their impact would indeed be a substantial benefit. Is that enough to 
justify pursuing something as coercive as a one-child policy? 
While some believe that the rights violations we have seen in the implementation of 
coercive population policies in the past are decisive reasons not to consider them, answering this 
question is not so simple. If circumstances are dire enough, we recognize that otherwise 
impermissible actions can become permissible. Killing an innocent person is one of the worst 
crimes one can commit, but if killing one innocent person is required to save the lives of ten 
other innocent people, then such a killing may well be morally permissible.
9
 In this manner, few 
(if any) broad moral principles are absolute. So while we recognize that the human rights 
violations that took place as a result of coercive population policies in the past were heinous and 
deplorable, there are at least possible circumstances in which the risk of these abuses would be 
worth taking. Nevertheless, I do not think we should pursue a one-child policy or any similar 
policy that places strict, government-enforced limitations on people’s rights to procreate. 
If a one-child policy were to be seriously pursued, it would have to be a last resort – a 
final measure implemented solely for the sake of avoiding catastrophe after we have exhausted 
                                                 
8
 Conly (2016) points out that the main cause of sex selection is the prevalence of sexist attitudes in the background 
culture of these societies rather than coercive population policies as such (pp. 193-204). Even so, in practice, the fact 
that a strict limit on the number of children a couple can have could exacerbate gender inequality remains a strong 
reason to oppose the implementation of coercive population policies. 
9
 A famous version of this type of case is found in Williams (1973, pp. 98-99). Williams describes a man named Jim 
facing the dilemma of killing a protestor of the government. If he accepts, then the other 19 protestors go free; if he 
declines, then the local military will execute all 20 of them. 
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our other options. We have clearly not exhausted all our other options. We could obviously 
improve access to family planning services in much of the world and do a better job of educating 
people on how to prevent unwanted pregnancy. Furthermore, as I will discuss in the next section, 
there are other options for motivating people to reduce their fertility rates that do not require 
these draconian tactics. We should seriously explore these options before concluding that we 
have to adopt coercive population policies. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether a one-child policy, even if enacted globally, would be the 
best means of lowering fertility rates. Citing data from Bradshaw and Brook (2014), Conly 
(2016) notes that dropping the fertility rate to 1 per woman by 2045 through full or nearly full 
compliance to a global one-child policy would shrink the population to 3.45 billion by 2100 (p. 
219). That would indeed by a drastic reduction in human population, but a global one-child 
policy would never decrease the fertility rate to that extent. As Rieder (2016a) mentions, the one-
child policy in China, which was more extreme than the kind of policy that Conly would 
endorse, only lowered fertility rates to an average of 1.6 children per couple (p. 33). Moreover, 
the fact that many European countries already have fertility rates comparable to this figure 
indicates that other strategies for reducing fertility rates might be just as effective as these 
outright coercive measures. 
There is also a more compelling practical reason not to pursue implementing anything 
resembling a one-child policy: doing so will almost surely be counterproductive to the general 
goal of reducing population. Coercive population policies have been widely condemned, and the 
repulsion people feel toward them has played a considerable role in silencing discussion about 
population. In democratic societies existing at this stage of the 21st century, coercive population 
policies are not viable because they will never garner the necessary support among voters. The 
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only likely result of pushing for them is that people will become more reluctant to discuss 
population at all. As a result, advocating a one-child policy will probably make it more difficult 
to get people to seriously consider other, less coercive measures of reducing fertility rates. In this 
manner, advocating for flagrantly coercive population policies with the aim of reducing 
population is a self-defeating strategy. We have to consider other means of reducing population 
growth beyond increasing access to family planning services, but one-child policies and similar 
proposals will not be part of the solution. 
Preference Adjustment and Incentivization 
There are two broad strategies for reducing fertility rates that are more coercive than the 
choice-enhancing measures of improving the availability of education and family planning 
services but less coercive than strict prohibitions on the number of children that people may 
have. The first is preference adjustment. This strategy involves trying to change cultural norms 
or individual desires to lower fertility rates. The second is incentivization. This strategy involves 
providing incentives for people to have fewer children. These incentives can involve providing 
benefits to those who have few children or imposing penalties on those who have too many 
children. Both these strategies are typically regarded as permissible and not thought to constitute 
rights violations. As Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) note: 
In other contexts, we readily accept similar preference-adjusting or incentivizing 
interventions in order to advance public interests or protect others from harm. We attempt 
to influence people’s sexual behavior and diet in order to minimize public health costs, 
but this does not necessarily infringe on their rights to self-determination and privacy. We 
offer various incentives to make certain careers more or less attractive, but this does not 
seem to infringe on one’s right to live according to one’s own conception of the good. (p. 
857) 
Given the general acceptance of these other practices, we ought to consider the effectiveness of 
them in the realm of procreation. 
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The primary means of adjusting people’s preferences would be through the use of mass 
media – radio, television, poster campaigns, billboards, advertising on popular online video 
media (e.g., YouTube), and so on. Sometimes, preference adjustment takes the form of rational 
persuasion, which involves objective presentation of factual information. Other times, the 
persuasion is more subtle and involves trying to change behavior through tactics like appeals to 
emotion, celebrity endorsements, or presentation through a narrative. Although some might 
worry that these latter strategies constitute undesirable manipulation, the case for such an 
objection is feeble. These strategies are already widely employed in a variety of these contexts 
without causing controversy, and they do not need to present false information or to be 
undertaken covertly. Moreover, some cultures are dominated by pro-natalist values. These 
preference-adjusting campaigns could serve to counter this widespread pro-natalism and enhance 
individuals’ autonomy by alleviating the social and cultural pressure to have children (Hickey, 
Rieder, and Earl 2016, p. 860). 
Preference-adjusting interventions have been implemented before, and they have proven 
effective. Television shows that promoted family planning and small family size aired in Mexico 
during the 1970s and 1980s, and similar programs were later launched in India. Kenya and 
Tanzania promoted the same values through radio programs. In all these cases, the launch of 
these media programs was followed by a decline in fertility rates and an increase in contraceptive 
use (Ryerson 2012, pp. 244-248). These programs often shifted their audience’s beliefs about the 
acceptability of family planning and their perceptions of family size. As a result, viewers became 
more likely to use contraception, delay childbearing, and have fewer children (Singhal and 
Rogers 1989; Rogers et al. 1999). William Ryerson (2012) estimates that expenses of $35 
million per year would be sufficient to fund similar programs in all the world’s major developing 
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countries (p. 448). Maybe that financial estimate is too optimistic, but it is clear that media-
driven preference adjustment could be an effective policy tool with respect to reducing family 
size. 
Incentives are also worth considering, although some incentives toe much closer to the 
line of unacceptable coercion than preference adjusting strategies. Negative incentives, such as 
severe fines or increased hospital delivery fees, may be indistinguishable from outright coercion 
when they are imposed on people who are in financially precarious circumstances. Moreover, 
some negative incentives in the past have been imposed in ways that are clearly objectionable. 
China’s incentive-oriented policies often pressured mothers to abortion and infanticide (Thomas 
1995, p. 10; Hesketh and Xing 1997), and India’s incentives – clothing, electronics, and 
monetary payments designed to encourage sterilization or delayed childbearing – exploited the 
low literacy rate among the poor to sterilize thousands without their informed consent (Repetto 
1968). While these incidents are morally repugnant, incentives nonetheless deserve examination. 
The evidence indicates that incentives can be effective in lowering fertility rates despite 
differences in cultural norms and resource availability (Heil, Gaalema, and Herrmann 2012). 
Thus, if we can adequately guard against abuses and avoid making them objectionably coercive, 
incentives may be worth employing. 
Clearly, some measures can be taken to reduce the risk that incentives will be unduly 
coercive (Hickey, Reider, and Earl 2016). First, we should be transparent about the political 
goals behind the incentives, the methods that are used, and the actual outcomes that result from 
them. Second, we can restrict payment for incentives to the actual would-be procreators. In 
China, local and regional officials were offered incentives to reduce the fertility rates of their 
constituents (Thomas 1995, p. 7; Hesketh and Xing 1997), and in India, incentives were offered 
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to various intermediaries to encourage other people to be sterilized (Repetto 1968, p. 13). These 
practices increase the risk that would-be procreators will be pressured by others into altering 
their reproductive behavior rather than it resulting from their own voluntary decisions. Third, we 
can take precautions to try to reduce the impact of incentive-based interventions on vulnerable 
groups. One means of doing this would be to direct positive incentives toward these vulnerable 
groups and reserve negative incentives for other, less vulnerable groups. For example, we could 
offer cash payments and tax breaks to the poor and levy fines against the wealthy (Hickey, 
Rieder, and Earl 2016, p. 868). On such a scheme the poor would not be made worse off by a 
decision to have a large family; they would simply have to forego benefits that they would 
otherwise be able to obtain.
10
 
Another incentivization strategy worth considering is the implementation of a cap-and-
trade scheme in conjunction with an allowance to have a certain number of children.
11
 Suppose 
we wanted to lower fertility rates in the United States to about 1.5 children per couple. We might 
grant everyone in the United States a sellable allowance of 0.75 children. Couples who had one 
child would then have their collective allowance reduced to 0.5 (0.25 per person). People who 
want only one child or who wish to remain childless could put the remaining sellable allowance 
up for sale in an open marketplace. In this manner, couples would have an economic incentive to 
have fewer children, and those who want larger families would have an alternative means of 
obtaining them. Couples who obtained allowances for large numbers of children could be 
                                                 
10
 This strategy has the added advantage of avoiding scenarios where children are heavily disadvantaged by the 
actions of their parents, a worry raised by Cripps (2016, p. 382). If the poor were subjected to fines, then there might 
be circumstances where a child’s welfare is threatened because the parents are heavily fined for giving birth to the 
child. Such scenarios seem deeply unjust because children have no control over the circumstances of their birth. 
11
 Programs of this sort have been implemented before with some success. A notable example is the EPA’s Acid 
Rain Program. See EPA (2016) for an overview. 
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allowed to have the appropriate number without, say, losing the tax credits that are usually 
reserved for smaller families.
12
 
Whatever incentivization schemes are put into practice, the thresholds for various 
incentives would need to be context-sensitive depending on the size of the individual ecological 
footprints in a given country. An average person living in Niger, for example, has an ecological 
footprint that is less than one-fifth of the ecological footprint of an average person living in the 
United States (Global Footprint Network 2016). It is therefore not reasonable for those living in 
Niger to face the same financial penalties (or loss of benefits) for having three children as those 
who have three children in the United States. Under current circumstances, such a policy would 
be unfair: it disproportionately restricts the freedom of people who are contributing relatively 
little to the environmental problems that motivate the policy. Furthermore, the people of Niger 
(like those in many other developing nations) should be allowed to increase their ecological 
footprints so that the country may develop and achieve a decent average standard of living, 
presumably lifting many citizens out of poverty in the process. To that end, it is reasonable 
incentivize citizens to lower their fertility rates so that the population does not expand so 
significantly that increasing per capita consumption becomes morally problematic. But the target 
for fertility rate reductions in Niger should not be as low as the target sought in the United States 
and other developed nations with large per capita ecological footprints, at least not until some of 
the necessary development begins to take place. Perhaps those in the United States really should 
only have an allowance of one child per couple whereas those in Niger are permitted without any 
                                                 
12
 I am not the first one to consider using a cap-and-trade scheme on children. Albert Mohler (2009) gestures at this 
possibility in response to Murtaugh and Schlax’s (2009) study that measures the impact of procreation on the carbon 
legacy of individuals. But Mohler views this as a detestable possibility and claims that “the gift of children must 
never be seen as an assault upon the Earth.” Obviously, I do not share his outlook on implementing a cap-and-trade 
scheme involving an allowed number of children. 
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penalty or loss of benefits to have two children per couple.
13
 The specific numbers are debatable, 
of course, but the point is that some variability in the limits on reproduction is appropriate given 
the radical difference in ecological impact that the citizens in these countries have. 
This variance in national population policy is an important way in which my position 
varies from Conly’s (2016). Conly suggests that the imperative to have only one child ought to 
apply to everyone. In connection with the importance of our right to bodily autonomy, Conly 
(2016) notes that equality is extremely important to us: we want to be able to exercise our rights 
to the same extent that others can, and “the sense that we are equal to others, and that others 
recognize that, is essential to our well-being” (pp. 90-91). On this basis, she argues that the 
constraints on procreation “must apply equally to everyone—not more children for some and 
fewer for others” (Conly 2016, p. 92). 
The problem with Conly’s position on this matter is that the constraints on procreation 
are being proposed in response to a problem where the contributions to it are not equal. Thus, 
restricting everyone’s procreation equally violates considerations of fairness: doing so suggests 
that everyone has made a roughly equal contribution to the problem, and that is not the case.
14
 A 
fairer way to impose constraints on procreation will impose harsher constraints on those who 
have made larger contributions to the problem and lighter constraints on those who have made 
smaller contributions.
15
 The impacts of environmental problems like climate change will also, in 
general, be felt more strongly by developing nations with relatively small ecological footprints. 
                                                 
13
 This may also be reflected in the cap and trade scheme if such a scheme were implemented globally. So in this 
particular case, the right to have a person in the United States might be valued in the global marketplace as 
equivalent to twice the price of having a child in Niger. 
14
 Chen (forthcoming) makes a similar observation in his review of Conly’s One Child. 
15
 In this manner, our population policies should strive to be consistent with the Polluter Pays principle – the notion 
that those who contribute to the problem should bear the burdens of solving the problem or compensating the 
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Beyond improving family planning services and education, I have gestured at some 
methods of preference adjustment and incentivization that could be employed as part of an effort 
to lower fertility rates around the globe. Improving family planning services and preference-
adjustment campaigns would be the main strategies for reducing fertility in the developing 
world. Incentivization would be employed primarily in the developed world. Of the three 
interventions under consideration, incentivizing measures come the closest to being coercive, 
and it is morally appropriate to exert more pressure on wealthier individuals to lower fertility 
rates than on others (Hickey, Rieder, and Earl 2016, p. 868). Wealth is a reliable proxy of a 
person’s ecological footprint, and so this reflects the view that those who are making larger 
contributions to the environmental problems under discussion should bear larger burdens with 
respect to addressing the problems. 
I now turn to some objections to these policy proposals. I start with two objections I 
consider fairly weak and then consider a cluster of stronger, more troubling objections. 
Antinatalist Stigma 
Rebecca Kukla worries that pursuing preference-adjustment strategies through mass 
media would not be able to avoid sending the message that smaller families are a more 
responsible choice than larger families. Should these views become entrenched in the 
background culture, then women may no longer feel like they have the “unburdened option of 
choosing a larger family” (Kukla 2016, p. 872). She also worries that this could result in a loss of 
social and economic support for large families. Access to prenatal testing created a prevailing 
                                                                                                                                                             
victims, at least in cases where the pollution is not caused by excusable ignorance. For a critical appraisal of the 
Polluter Pays principle in the case of Climate Change, see Caney (2010a). 
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norm of discontinuing pregnancies when the fetus has a genetic defect, and disability advocates 
worry that this norm may lead to reduced resources for those who choose to carry such a child to 
term (Kukla 2016, p. 873). Kukla has a similar fear about parents who want large families, 
provided that antinatalist values become sufficiently well-entrenched. She also highlights the 
ways in which vulnerable groups (e.g., the economically disadvantaged, women of color, the 
disabled) could be particularly harmed by these new cultural norms and the ways in which large-
family stigma would hinder the reproductive autonomy of women even in the developed world. 
Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) stress that targeted messaging and careful forethought 
regarding the tactics used can avoid the concerns Kukla has in mind (p. 861). Perhaps some of 
these concerns can be alleviated, but I am not so sure all the undesirable effects can be avoided. 
However, I also believe they have a better response available. In chapter 3, I surveyed many 
arguments that supported Antinatalism. While I did not find any of the arguments wholly 
successful, the moral considerations underpinning them indicate that the standards for 
permissible procreation are very high. Many acts of procreation are undertaken without the 
appropriate level of caution or critical reflection on one’s motivations for procreation. As a 
result, some children born under these circumstances are subjected to an unacceptable risk of 
harm. Since these acts are impermissible, changing cultural norms to favor less procreation 
would be preferable to the status quo; as things stand, procreative acts are too often approached 
without the care and deliberation that they warrant. Undoubtedly, there will be people who are 
made worse off by a change in cultural norms regarding procreation, just as there are currently 
people made worse off by cultural norms that put pressure on them to procreate. Neither the 
status quo nor a small-family social norm will be perfect, but a shift toward Antinatalism seems 
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preferable independent of any concerns about population. The fact that we also need to reduce 
population makes the case in favor of antinatalist preference adjustment even more compelling. 
Would Significant Population Reduction Make Us Dumber? 
A further worry one might have about reducing population concerns its long-term effects. 
This objection was illustrated in the 2006 film Idiocracy. The film opens with the observation 
that human beings living at the start of the 21st century are no longer affected by the traditional 
mechanisms of natural selection that would ensure that people of greater intelligence would be 
more likely to survive and reproduce. As a result, since the less intelligent members of society 
are more likely to reproduce, human civilization gradually becomes stupider and less civilized 
over 500 years. After awakening from a government experiment that left him in suspended 
animation until the year 2505, the protagonist Joe Bauers discovers that the United States has 
degenerated into complete idiocy and that he, despite being of only average intelligence five 
centuries earlier, is the smartest person in the world. During the remainder of the film, Joe is 
employed by the president of the United States, a former professional wrestler, to solve a variety 
of problems plaguing the country – problems that have been caused by utter foolishness and lack 
of forethought. The nation’s crop shortage, for example, results from watering plants with the 
sports drink Brawndo instead of ordinary water. 
Despite its status as a satire, Idiocracy offers the basis for a more serious concern about 
efforts to lower population. Specifically, will it result in the most intelligent members of society 
having small families while the less intelligent members have larger families? And if it does, will 
we gradually get less intelligent over time as intelligent people have fewer and fewer children? 
In the long term, such an outcome could prove very bad – worse than if we had a larger 
population with a greater number of intelligent people – because we will make less progress as a 
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society, which could even impede our efforts to develop the sustainable technologies that we so 
desperately need. 
While this line of thought is intriguing, it is not a strong objection to taking measures to 
reduce population. First, it is not clear if there is such a thing as all-things-considered 
intelligence. Given the varied and multifaceted ways in which we reason about different things, it 
may be that intelligence is too varied to be reduced to a single component. One recent 
neuroscientific study concluded that different brain structures govern different tasks and that 
intelligence manifests in different circumstances according to which cognitive system is being 
used (Hampshire et al. 2012). On such a model, how one fares on an intelligence test may vary 
widely depending on what skills are being tested, and there may be no coherent way to aggregate 
these various intelligences into some holistic concept that we could designate as all-things-
considered intelligence.  
Second, I am not aware of any data showing that fertility rates negatively correlate with 
intelligence as such. There is substantial evidence that women with higher levels of education 
have fewer children on average (Jones and Tertilt 2008, Wetztein 2011), but level of education is 
not the same as one’s intelligence.
16
 The level of education that one attains can be influenced by 
many factors that have nothing to do with one’s innate intelligence. Some professions require 
more education to pursue than others, and those who come from wealthy families will have an 
easier time obtaining an education than others will. 
Third, assuming that a higher level of education does correlate with intelligence, some of 
the policies that I have put forward would actually be favorable to the objector. Those with 
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 A recent study also found that this trend was no longer the case in the United States: in the 2000s, women with 
advanced degrees increased their fertility levels significantly such that they are no longer clearly having fewer 
children than those with lower levels of education (Hazan and Zoabi 2015).   
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higher levels of education generally have better prospects at obtaining high-paying jobs, and the 
schemes that I have suggested would make it easier for those with higher incomes to maintain 
large families than those with more modest incomes. 
Fourth, in order for my proposed policies to have the long-term effects that the objector 
fears, they would need to be enforced for a very long time (and would probably need to be more 
restrictive than what I am advocating). The need to lower fertility rates is a response to our 
current predicament. If adequate action is taken to mitigate the environmental degradation that is 
taking place, then we can return to higher fertility rates once our population has reached a 
sustainable number. The population policies we should pursue will change depending on our 
circumstances, and nothing prevents us from altering them in the future if it would be 
advantageous for us to do so. 
Moral Tragedies and the Hard Questions 
Now we turn to some of the bigger challenges to implementing strategies to reduce 
population. One of the unfortunate realities of the population predicament is that it may not be 
possible to solve the problem while avoiding all unjust outcomes. We know that failing to act 
will lead to substantial harm to future people – a great injustice. But there are also effects of 
implementing some of the policies I have put forward that may result in significant injustices. 
This combination of circumstances may suggest to some readers that none of our available 
options is morally permissible. Lisa Tessman (2015) describes these as cases of “moral failure”; 
they are also often called “moral dilemmas” (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988; McConnell 2014). I will 
refer to these scenarios as moral tragedies. I will not take a stand on whether these moral 
tragedies constitute genuine dilemmas in which all our options are morally wrong or whether 
they are just difficult moral decisions involving two bad options. In either case, we would still 
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need to make a decision about what to do, so I do not think this dispute matters much on the 
practical side of things. 
The reason we find ourselves in circumstances of moral tragedy is because two 
conditions are met: (1) many future people will be severely harmed by environmental 
degradation if population is not reduced, and (2) most likely, some present people will be the 
victims of significant injustice as a result of population reduction. In chapter 4, I summarized the 
harms that jeopardize the welfare of future people. In this section, I will briefly summarize some 
of the injustices that present people may suffer if population reduction is pursued and consider 
the implications of these consequences for our moral decision-making. 
One concern about decreasing population is that there will be too few young members of 
the population relative to the number of elderly people (Last 2013, ch. 5). One consequence of 
having a smaller working population is that the tax base declines, decreasing government 
revenue. Another is that there is an increased demand for medical care, which requires the 
government to spend more on health coverage. This combination of effects creates an obvious 
problem: either the young, working members of society must bear a greater burden to support the 
elderly, or medical care to the elderly must be more strictly rationed. To lessen the burden on the 
younger members of society, we might need to consider rationing life-extending health care to 
the elderly. Independent of any discussion of population reduction, some have argued that we 
ought to ration life-extending health care on the grounds that medical resources are limited and 
that keeping the very old alive for a bit longer through expensive procedures is an inappropriate 
use of limited resources (Callahan 1995).
17
 The need to reduce population would seem to make 
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 For a recent overview of the issues involved in rationing health care, see Morreim et al. (2014). 
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the case for such rationing even stronger, but of course, doing so means that some older members 
of society will not receive treatments that could extend their lives.
18
 
Population policies also raise significant concerns about equality. One major concern is 
that they will have a disproportionate impact on women, who bear a much larger role in 
reproduction than men. Rebecca Kukla (2016) encapsulates the concern as follows: 
I think we have plenty of reason to worry that any plausible interventions designed to 
reduce fertility will likely have a disproportionate impact on women. In turn, they will 
likely enhance an already problematic pattern of gender inequality, and intensify our 
interventionism and moralism then it comes to women’s bodies and reproductive 
practices. And again, it is especially vexed to heighten such burdens on women while 
their sexual and reproductive autonomy is systematically insecure. (p. 876) 
The main fear is that women will be subject to substantial pressure from others regarding their 
reproductive decisions and that, particularly in societies where their reproductive freedom is 
already compromised, their autonomy will be undermined. Some of these concerns can be 
mitigated by avoiding certain types of incentives. To offer one illustration, Hickey, Rieder, and 
Earl (2016) discuss paying women to attend family planning classes or visit a gynecologist (p. 
867). Such incentives might be effective, but they seem to target women exclusively, suggesting 
that it is primarily a woman’s responsibility to limit her fertility. Incentives should be gender 
neutral insofar as this is possible. Even so, given the prevailing view that women are the ones 
who are primarily responsible for their reproductive activities, it is probably naïve to think that 
these types of population policies could completely avoid having a disproportionate impact on 
women. 
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 There may also be situations where the conflict between population reduction and providing adequate medical 
care to everyone is more direct, such as if we must choose whether to fund family planning or health care (Mosher 
2008, ch. 6). 
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Another concern about inequality stems from who would be able to have large families 
under the schemes I have proposed. Since those of lower socioeconomic status will be heavily 
incentivized to have smaller families (due to the financial benefits of doing so), large families 
may become common only among the very wealthy. After all, under the cap-and-trade scheme I 
have proposed, they would be able to afford allowances for many children. Furthermore, even 
without a cap-and-trade scheme in place, fines for having too many children would have to be 
utterly exorbitant to impact their financial status. In practice, many would be willing and able to 
pay the fines to have a larger family. The poor, who would be unable to do so, would be more 
likely to have smaller families, and in this manner, family size might become associated with 
social class. More worryingly, since the poor are disproportionately likely to be people of color, 
these policies could “end up enacting a kind of indirect eugenics” (Kukla 2016, p. 877). Again, 
this is a troubling implication that we might be able to mitigate but may not be able to 
completely avoid. 
The considerations mentioned above are worrying, but perhaps no issue is more befitting 
of being called a moral tragedy than immigration policy. Considerations tied to population 
complicate this already challenging issue in problematic ways – so much so that some of the 
foundational considerations underpinning the issue have to be reassessed. For instance, the 
concept of moral equality is typically invoked to generate arguments in favor of an open-borders 
immigration policy – a policy in which people are free to cross national borders and relocate to 
another country with few or very limited restrictions.
19
 It is clear that one’s country of origin 
plays a very central role in one’s life prospects: people born in the United States will typically 
have far better life prospects than those born in Kenya, for example. Yet we do not think that a 
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 For some examples, see Cole (2012) and Carens (1987; 2013, ch. 11). 
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person being born in a particular country has any effect on their moral value or the moral 
significance of their rights and interests. So on what basis do we justify preventing individuals 
from migrating to improve their life prospects? 
Opponents of open-border positions have generally acknowledged that the moral equality 
of persons generates strong objections to their views. Consider Christopher Wellman’s (2008) 
diagnosis of the moral-equality objection to closed borders: 
For several reasons, this case for open borders presents an especially imposing obstacle to 
the prima facie case for the right to restrict immigration outlined above. For starters, both 
its moral and empirical premises seem unexceptional. How could one plausibly deny 
either that all humans are in some fundamental sense equally deserving of moral 
consideration or that the staggering inequalities across the globe dramatically affect 
people’s life prospects for living a decent life. Indeed, looked at from this perspective, 
sorting humans according to the countries in which they were born appears tantamount to 
a geographical caste system. (p. 120) 
Wellman then attempts to refute this objection. David Miller (2016, ch. 2) and Michael Blake 
(2013) similarly recognize the significance of respecting moral equality and attempt to address 
the problem that it poses for their defenses of closed-border positions. 
Overpopulation complicates the debate. An appeal to moral equality does not obviously 
favor an open-border position if it is understood to extend across generations. In chapter 5, I 
argued that we have to regard the harm done to future people as just as morally significant as the 
harm done to present people. Future people, at least in this regard, should be regarded as the 
moral equals of present people. I also argued that we must stabilize and reduce population to 
adequately respond to ongoing environmental degradation. Some developed nations, though they 
have achieved fertility rates at or below replacement levels, are still growing because of 
immigration, and when citizens from countries with low per capita rates of consumption 
immigrate to countries with higher rates of consumption, their individual ecological footprint 
increases. As a result, the global environmental degradation is increased. Thus, in the interests of 
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protecting future people form harm, some developed nations may need to restrict immigration to 
prevent their populations from growing.
20
 On these grounds, an appeal to moral equality does not 
clearly count in favor of an open-borders immigration policy under current conditions. 
A further complication arises when we consider climate refugees. The emissions of 
developed nations have contributed the most significantly to climate change, so there is a strong 
case for claiming that they are morally obligated to accommodate those in developing nations 
who are displaced by it (Nawrotzki 2014). But admitting climate refugees will increase the 
population of these developed nations and thereby increase their overall ecological footprint and 
make it harder for them to lower their overall GHG emissions. Limiting immigration to only 
climate refugees might lessen the severity of this problem, but the cost of doing so is that other 
refugees, whose lives are in immediate danger, would need to be turned away. 
Determining what immigration policies are morally justifiable cannot be done by 
considering just one or two arguments,
21
 but my aim is not to resolve the immigration debate 
here. Rather, I am highlighting yet another way in which our collective obligation to reduce 
population forces us to make very difficult decisions about what we do. We are faced in a 
situation where severe harm will befall some no matter what we do. If we take no action on 
population or take only limited action (e.g., providing contraceptive services to the developing 
world), then our response to the problem will be inadequate, and future people will suffer severe 
harms as a result. If we make a more robust effort to reduce population, then present people will 
be harmed. In both scenarios, the people who will be harmed are likely to be members of 
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 This argument is presented at length with respect to the United States in Cafaro and Staples (2009) and Cafaro 
(2015). 
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 As the surveys of Wilcox (2009) and Wellman (2015) indicate, there are a plethora of arguments to be considered 
in the debate about immigration policy, both for and against open borders. 
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vulnerable groups – those who are nonwhite and poor. Remember that the impacts of climate 
change will be felt (and are being felt) disproportionately on those in the developing world. 
Whichever path we choose, great moral tragedy will occur. So what do we do? 
Under such circumstances, considerations of justice do not offer us a resolution. It is not 
possible to do justice to all parties involved or protect all parties from harm. The best we can 
hope to achieve is to minimize the injustice that occurs and the harm that is suffered. One way to 
pursue this strategy is adopting a consequentialism of rights, a strategy discussed by Darrel 
Moellendorf (2014) in the context of climate change mitigation. He recognizes the possibility 
that some people who will not have their human rights violated under business-as-usual 
scenarios will have their human rights violated if we undertake mitigation measures 
(Moellendorf 2014, pp. 231-232). If this picture is accurate, then one may wonder how a rights-
based approach favors a policy of mitigation rather than business as usual. After all, rights are 
being violated in both scenarios. Moellendorf (2014) suggests that this problem might be 
resolved by pursuing “the course of action that is likely to lead to maximal satisfaction of rights” 
(p. 232). Of course, this maximizing approach to human rights does run the risk of not according 
strong enough protections to the rights of minorities, since the rights of the majority would 
appear to always trump the rights of minorities in rights conflicts between these groups, so 
perhaps sometimes the rights of minorities would have to be given disproportionate weight in the 
calculation. (This consideration is also not relevant to the case we are addressing because the 
interests of minority groups will be jeopardized in both scenarios we are considering.)  
Another wrinkle to this consequentialism of rights is that some rights violations are worse 
than others. Violating someone’s right to life is a more serious moral wrong than violating 
someone’s right to bodily autonomy, though both rights are significant. As mentioned briefly in 
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chapter 3, the rights that will be violated as a result from unimpeded environmental degradation 
will be among the most severe (e.g., the right to life, the right to health, the right to physical 
security). There rights violations could be experienced by hundreds of millions of people this 
century. Given the staggering numbers and the severity of the rights violations under discussion, 
we should prioritize reducing population to avoid these rights violations and accept that some 
rights violations, most likely in the form of inequality or coercion that violates reproductive 
rights, will be experienced by present people as a result, despite our best efforts to avoid these 
outcomes. These results are regrettable, but it would be morally worse for us to not take these 
measures to respond to population growth. 
This resolution will no doubt strike some readers as troubling. It certainly troubles me. I 
would much rather arrive at a solution in which all parties can be treated fairly and protected 
from harm. But our circumstances have made such a solution impossible, and we do ourselves no 
favors by denying this fact. Moreover, as bad as our options may seem under current 
circumstances, they will only get worse the longer that we wait to act. The longer we wait to 
slow population growth, the harder it will be to make the reductions in our collective ecological 
footprint in time to avert serious harms. Thus, while there are risks associated with pursuing 
preference-adjustment and incentivization, these measures must be taken seriously and should be 
gradually and cautiously implemented as part of the effort to lower fertility rates. As mentioned 
earlier, incentives would be primarily reserved for developed nations, and increased access to 
family planning services would be primarily aimed at developing nations. Preference-adjusting 
interventions likely have a role to play in both of these groups (in part because of the reasons 
unrelated to population growth that favor a less permissive attitude toward the moral 
acceptability of procreation). Pursuing these measures is far from a perfect solution, but if the 
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aim is to minimize the injustice done to both present and future people, then I believe this 
combination of strategies represents our best option. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE ETHICS OF INDIVIDUAL PROCREATIVE 
DECISION-MAKING 
In previous chapters, I argued that we have a collective duty to reduce human population 
and surveyed several possible policies that we could enact to accomplish that goal. I have also 
considered the undesirable implications of putting these policies into practice but concluded that 
they ought to be pursued (with caution) nonetheless. However, in the immediate future, it is 
unlikely that the policies I have suggested will be put into action. Even so, individuals still face 
important moral questions regarding their own procreative decisions. In light of what has been 
discussed with regard to population, how many children are people morally permitted to have? 
While prior chapters have focused on the global scope of the population problem and 
what we collectively ought to do, it is not societies or nations that have children. People have 
children. Furthermore, since extremely coercive policies – that is, those that involve mandatory 
abortions or sterilizations – are morally objectionable and impractical, population reduction must 
be achieved by individuals’ choices. Thus, we must consider just how many children would-be 
parents can permissibly have. 
Remembering What’s Been Rejected 
In chapter 3, I considered two extreme positions regarding the ethics of procreation: 
Antinatalism and Procreative Liberty. According to Antinatalism, it is always morally wrong to 
procreate. According to the view I call Procreative Liberty, everyone has a right to procreate an 
unlimited number of times. Although I will not repeat the arguments here, it is worth 
remembering that both these views have already been dismissed. This observation is important 
because it gives us some insight into what an acceptable ethics of individual procreation will 
look like. 
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Antinatalism is false, so there must be some circumstances in which procreation is 
permissible. But Procreative Liberty is also false, so people do not have a right to have as many 
children as they like regardless of the circumstances. The correct position must lie somewhere 
between these two extremes. These boundaries do not have much practical import, however, 
unless we can be more specific. After all, the view that it is only permissible to have one child is 
much different than the view that we must limit ourselves to ten children or fewer. 
In what follows, I will argue that couples should generally limit themselves to having two 
or fewer biological children – the equivalent of one biological child per person. Certainly, there 
will be some exceptions to this general rule, such as when a woman becomes pregnant with 
triplets or when someone has purchased the rights to additional child through the cap-and-trade 
scheme I suggested in chapter 6. The general point, however, is that couples are usually acting 
wrongly if they choose to have more than two children – whether or not the policies I have 
proposed are put into effect. Call this the Two or Less view. 
Christine Overall (2012) and Travis Rieder (2016b) have each already made arguments 
defending views similar to Two or Less, although they suggest these positions only apply to 
those in the developed world. Since those in the developing world have radically smaller 
ecological footprints than those in developed nations, large families do not produce the same 
ecological consequences in those regions. Thus, both authors limit the scope of their arguments 
to those living in affluent societies. 
 Overall arrives at her two-child limit by trying to balance the considerations in favor of 
procreative limitation with the fact that procreation and child-rearing plays such a central role in 
people’s life plans. She objects to a one-child-per-person view by appealing to the general 
demandingness of such an obligation, the recognition that such a view does not permit all 
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individuals to replace themselves, concerns about the effects of eliminating sibling relationships 
altogether, and worries about how a one-child policy could lead to sex selection (Overall 2012, 
pp. 181-183). Based on these considerations, Overall (2012) concludes that “an obligation to 
have only one child is at most supererogatory and unlikely to be sustainable” (p. 183). The more 
sensible position, she reasons, is to claim that adults have the responsibility to limit themselves 
to procreative replacement when their children will have large ecological footprints. 
Travis Rieder (2016b) does not follow Overall in endorsing a concrete limit on how many 
children one may permissibly have. Instead, he articulates reasons for having zero, one, or two 
children and then concludes that “whichever precise number may be correct, it seems plausible 
that the principles articulated here entail a duty for many of us to have at most two children” 
(Rieder 2016b, p. 37). In other words, Rieder thinks that two is the maximum number of 
permissible children that a family can have in the developed world. The main principle to which 
Rieder (2016b) appeals is a duty not to contribute to massive systematic harms – “a duty not to 
inject oneself as an active contributor into the large, causally complex machine” that generates 
the catastrophic harm in question (p. 29). Rieder views climate change as an example of a 
massive systematic harm, and procreative activities often make a substantial contribution to it. 
Thus, those whose procreative activities make such a substantial contribution to climate change 
have an obligation to limit their procreative activities and adopt a small family ethic. 
My argument for Two or Less differs from these prior arguments for the position in two 
ways. First, my argument appeals to the virtues of integrity and mindfulness. The moral 
considerations that Overall and Rieder examine are almost exclusively either consequentialist 
(e.g., the bad effects of procreation) or deontological (e.g., duties of non-contribution to harm, 
concerns about fairness and equity) in nature. Appeals to virtue and character do not play a 
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significant role in their arguments.
1
 Second, my argument is not limited in scope to those in the 
developed world. My argument is intended to apply to anyone making a procreative decision, 
regardless of where they currently live. In what follows, I will present my argument for Two or 
Less and defend it from various objections. 
The Integrity Argument for Two or Less
2
 
The first argument for Two or Less appeals to the concept of integrity, a commonly cited 
virtue. However, despite the general consensus that integrity is a character trait well worth 
having, a precise definition of it is elusive. There are many conceptions of integrity, and each of 
them has distinct advantages and disadvantages compared to its competitors (Scherkoske 2013). 
Moreover, integrity is sometimes used in a more general way to identify one’s quality of being a 
morally good person; as Robert Audi and Patrick Murphy (2006) put the point, “In a great many 
cases, ‘integrity’ is a specific sounding term for something like moral soundness, whose exact 
character is left unspecified” (p. 8). This general definition is too vague to be useful: it says 
nothing about what specific features of integrity are morally praiseworthy or what specific 
qualities one must possess to have integrity. 
Fortunately, better definitions of integrity are available. Marion Hourdequin (2010), 
drawing on Audi and Murphy (2006), highlights two central meanings of integrity: “integration” 
and “being integral” (p. 448). She states that being integral “involves the internalisation of 
certain commitments, such that these commitments are central to an individual’s identity” (p. 
                                                 
1
 Drawing on Jamieson (2014), Rieder (2016b) does acknowledge a small subset of virtues (pp. 56-59), but they do 
not play a role in his argument for Two or Less. Rather, he suggests that these virtues could play a role in explaining 
why we ought to limit our procreative activities even if we had no strict obligations to limit our procreation. My 
argument, in contrast, will appeal to virtues to establish a genuine obligation for individuals to limit procreation to 
one child per person. 
2
 Various portions of this section draw on a related paper that examines whether individuals have a duty to reduce 
their individual greenhouse gas emissions. See Hedberg (forthcoming). 
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448). Integration is related to being integral because it concerns how one unifies the various 
commitments she has so as to avoid conflicts among them. Integration is a special type of unity 
among the elements of character that minimizes conflicts among these elements so that “they 
form a coherent, ideally a harmonious, structure” (Audi and Murphy 2006, p. 9). In other words, 
integrity involves a certain unity of identity: a person of integrity maintains consistency among 
her beliefs and behavior across all her different spheres of identity. Hourdequin (2010) applies 
this view of integrity to the case of climate change to argue in favor of a duty to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. She argues that a person committed to working toward a solution to 
climate change in the political sphere will, in order to satisfy integration, also be committed to 
reducing her contribution to climate change in the personal sphere. A failure to act in this way 
suggests that this person lacks the “kind of unity that integrity recommends” because her 
commitments would be embodied in only a single sphere of her existence rather than all the 
different spheres she inhabits (p. 449). 
I will ultimately make an argument similar to Hourdequin’s but about population rather 
than climate change. Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging that this account of integrity 
cannot be supported so swiftly. As Scherkoske’s (2013) survey indicates, there are at least six 
distinct accounts of integrity as a moral virtue.
3
 Given that controversy, one may wonder why we 
should accept an approach to integrity similar to Hourdequin’s rather than one of the competing 
views. Fortunately, the appeal to integrity that I will be making relies only on a few of integrity’s 
most fundamental features – features that any plausible account of integrity will possess. 
                                                 
3
 There is also an error-theoretic account – which suggests that integrity is not a virtue at all – and an account of 
integrity as an epistemic virtue. The dominant view is that integrity is a moral virtue, which implies that most 
analyses of integrity assume both the error-theoretic and epistemic accounts of integrity are false. My own account 
of integrity will bypass issues about what particular account of integrity is correct, but my later remarks about 
integrity’s value can be interpreted as an argument against the error-theoretic account. 
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Scherkoske (2013) identifies eight “data points” concerning integrity, which refer to the general 
ideas that the concept of integrity typically identifies (pp. 29-30): 
▪ Stickiness: Integrity is tied importantly to sticking by one’s values and convictions. 
▪ Integrity-Within-Reason: A person of integrity must be responsive to reasons; 
integrity is not dogmatism. 
▪ Range: Integrity is not limited in application to just moral convictions. 
▪ Truthfulness: Integrity is centrally tied to traits such as honesty and sincerity. 
▪ Coherence: A person of integrity must have her values and convictions properly 
cohere with her conduct.  
▪ Resoluteness: People of integrity stand by their convictions both individually and 
socially and display a special kind of resolve. 
▪ Moral Sanity: One cannot have integrity if one is grossly immoral. 
▪ Judgment: We are keen to ensure that the people from whom we seek guidance or 
mentoring are people of integrity. 
A full account of integrity might feature all of these traits (provided all of them could be 
endorsed without creating any inconsistency), but since it is controversial whether many of these 
data points are central to the concept of integrity, we will be better served by limiting ourselves 
to the most central elements of this virtue and crafting an argument that only appeals to these 
features. 
Coherence, Stickiness, and Resoluteness are the core features of integrity: no plausible 
account of integrity can omit any of these elements. Coherence refers to the trait of ensuring a 
tight connection between one’s beliefs and one’s actions; it is the feature of integrity that 
explains why hypocrisy (which is simply the lack of this coherence) is such a fundamental 
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violation of integrity. Stickiness and Resoluteness are related concepts, so much so that 
Scherkoske (2013) even describes Resoluteness as a type of “virtuous ‘stickiness’” (p. 29). The 
main difference is that Stickiness refers to the willingness to stay mentally committed to one’s 
principles while Resoluteness refers to the willingness to demonstrate commitment to those 
principles through one’s actions. In this manner, Resoluteness can be seen as Stickiness that 
manifests properly in one’s actions.
4
 
The Integrity Argument for Two or Less can be sustained so long as the account of 
integrity that is endorsed satisfies Coherence, Stickiness, and Resoluteness. A complete account 
of integrity may well involve more than accommodating just these three data points. It may be 
impossible for a thoroughgoing Nazi to possess integrity, no matter how well he satisfies 
Stickiness, Coherence, and Resoluteness.
5
 To reiterate, however, I want to keep my account of 
integrity minimal so that this argument is not taken to hinge on a convoluted and controversial 
conception of it. I maintain that Coherence, Stickiness and Resoluteness are necessary 
ingredients any plausible account of integrity and take no stand here on whether anything further 
is required. Call this resulting conception of integrity CSR+. The “+” acknowledges that a full 
account of integrity may include other important features. 
Having specified the details of the CSR+ account of integrity, we can now examine the 
argument that uses integrity to argue for Two or Less: 
(1) Individuals have a general prima facie obligation to facilitate a collective political 
solution to overpopulation. 
                                                 
4
 As this phrasing suggests, it is possible to read Resoluteness in a robust way that encompasses Stickiness, but the 
convention in the literature has been to separate these traits. 
5
 It is worth noting that Moral Sanity, even if required, would not threaten the Integrity Argument because working 
toward a solution to overpopulation is a morally worthy cause. 
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(2) Individuals ought to live with integrity. 
(3) Individuals ought to be mindful of the effects of their actions. 
(4) If individuals have a general prima facie obligation to facilitate a collective political 
solution to overpopulation, ought to live with integrity, and ought to be mindful of the 
effects of their actions, then they also have a prima facie obligation to refrain from 
having more than two children. 
(5) Therefore, individuals have a prima facie obligation to refrain from having more than 
two children. [1-4] 
The argument has valid form, so any flaws it contains must reside in the premises. I have already 
made the case for (1) in chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation. It should be obvious at this point 
that we have a collective duty to stabilize and reduce global population. Individuals are limited in 
what they can do to enact change themselves, but at a minimum, they should adopt a 
commitment to cooperate in the quest to find a solution. Minimally, those in democratic societies 
with the power to vote should, when possible, strive to elect politicians who take overpopulation 
seriously and are committed to developing a solution to it. I will leave it open what more this 
obligation may require, but the general point is that it is a commitment that all should share. 
Supporting (2) is more complicated. To explain why one ought to live with integrity, we 
need to consider why integrity is valuable – why it is something worth cultivating in ourselves. A 
skeptic might wonder, especially given the disagreement over what integrity is, whether integrity 
is actually just misidentified as various other virtues. Perhaps it does not really identify anything 
valuable after all. The skeptic is right in thinking that integrity is a mysterious concept and that 
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its careless use has been the cause of some significant philosophical confusion.
6
 Nevertheless, 
there seems be a fairly significant consensus in the literature on at least one trait of integrity: it is 
a good thing (Scherkoske 2013).
7
 And on reflection, we can offer several reasons for thinking 
that integrity is valuable. 
Integrity’s value can in part be illustrated by considering how people react to certain 
unusual cases. Consider this example from Thomas Hill (1979): 
She [an old woman in Nazi Germany] lives on modest savings and offers no support to 
the Nazi regime either physically or morally. When the latest discriminatory laws against 
Jews are enforced, she is moved to protest. As a non-Jew she could have remained silent 
and thereby avoided much subsequent harassment. She is regarded as a silly eccentric and 
so cannot expect to make an impact on others, much less to stop the Nazi machinery. She 
still feels she should speak up, but she wonders why (p. 84).
8
 
This woman takes a stand against the Nazi regime even though it works against her self-interest 
and even though her protest is unlikely to contribute to solving the problem, but most do not 
regard her behavior as being irrational. In fact, we often praise individuals who take these kinds 
of symbolic stands to oppose practices that appear grossly unjust, even when their protests work 
to their individual disadvantage and do not make a difference to solving the problem. One 
explanation for this praiseworthiness is that these individuals exemplify integrity: they are 
unwilling to abandon their deeply held moral convictions even when it is disadvantageous for 
them not to do so. 
                                                 
6
 The relative scarcity of explicit discussion of integrity in classic virtue ethics literature also contributes to this 
problem, as noted by Audi and Murphy (2006, pp. 3-4). 
7
 This is especially true in the literature on business ethics. See Audi and Murphy (2006, pp. 7-8). 
8
 Hill (1979) examines acts of symbolic protest from a more deontological perspective; my borrowing of his case 
does not mean that I read him as endorsing my integrity-based analysis. 
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Hourdequin (2010) provides two additional reasons to believe that integrity is valuable. 
First, integrity takes proper account of human psychology: it explains why it is undesirable and 
unrealistic to promote or allow for serious discord among one’s political and personal 
commitments. People are generally happier when their aims and values within the different 
spheres they inhabit are unified rather than in conflict because they will avoid the unpleasant 
cognitive dissonance that such discord creates. Second, integrity is valuable because it 
communicates to others the seriousness with which people hold their particular commitments. In 
Hourdequin’s (2010) words: 
Interpersonally, integrity is a virtue from the perspective of intersubjective intelligibility 
and in affirming to others the authenticity of one’s commitments. Where we see in others 
a lack of coherence between their political commitments and personal choices, we often 
wonder how to make sense of this apparent mismatch, and we may question the sincerity 
with which certain commitments are held. A politician’s environmental commitments, as 
embodied in public pronouncements and legislative support, for example, may be called 
into question if he or she lives a lavish and environmentally damaging lifestyle (p. 451). 
In this manner, some of integrity’s value can be explained through consequentialist 
considerations: if we want to enact serious political change, we must appropriately unify our 
commitments so that others will take them seriously. In our personal actions, we must manifest 
the social change that we want to see in the world. If we do not act this way, then others will 
question whether we are really as committed to our cause as we claim. 
It is crucial not to underestimate the value of integrity with respect to its social 
significance. Dale Jamieson (1992) highlighted its importance with respect to climate change 25 
years ago when he noted that approaching climate change from the perspective of calculating 
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probable outcomes had “made us cynical calculators and institutionalized hypocrisy” (p. 150). 
Since we can all reason that our individual contributions to climate change are small and 
(seemingly) negligible, the effects of climate change seem fated to occur regardless of what we 
(individually) do, which means that we have no reason to change our individual behavior. If 
everyone reasons this way, the large-scale social change required will not come to pass. Thus, if 
this social change is to occur, “it is important that there be people of integrity and character who 
act on the basis of principles and ideals” (pp. 150‒151). This does not mean that the value of 
integrity is reducible to its utility in solving climate change or other collective action problems. 
Rather, the point is that promoting integrity (and other relevant virtues) is particularly important 
in the context of collective action problems. When confronted with these kinds of problems, even 
the staunchest utilitarians have reasons to take virtue seriously (Jamieson 2007). 
We can see from the prior arguments that the claim that we should live with integrity is 
more than mere rhetorical banter. Integrity is a genuine virtue, and thus, it is a character trait 
worth cultivating in ourselves. Premise (2) is defensible. The next challenge is supporting 
premise (3). 
One of the unfortunate aspects of living in contemporary society, especially in the wake 
of globalization, is that our actions often have very far-reaching consequences. If we are to act in 
morally responsible ways, we have to develop some awareness of these consequences. Dale 
Jamieson (2007) refers to this process as the cultivation of mindfulness, a virtue that proves 
particularly important in the context of environmental decision-making: 
Much of our environmentally destructive behavior is unthinking, even mechanical. In 
order to improve our behavior we need to appreciate the consequences of our actions that 
are remote in time and space. A virtuous green would see herself as taking on the moral 
weight of production and disposal when she purchases an article of clothing (for 
example). She makes herself responsible for the cultivation of the cotton, the impacts of 
the dyeing process, the energy costs of the transport, and so on. Making decisions in this 
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way would be encouraged by the recognition of a morally admirable trait that is rarely 
exemplified and hardly ever noticed in our society. (Jamieson 2007, pp. 181-182) 
Mindfulness is not just an environmental virtue, however. A general imperative to be minimally 
informed is required for us to act appropriately with respect to any moral decision. 
Exercising moral virtues and acting rightly requires being informed (Kawall 2010; Jenni 
2003). If we do not have accurate information, we are at risk of making moral mistakes when we 
act. Thus, we have a general duty to be mindful of the effects of our actions and try to understand 
how they could impact others. Certainly, it is beyond human capacities to be fully informed 
about every morally significant event currently occurring, but we at least ought to investigate the 
matters that are most salient and in which we are personally implicated, particularly when the 
information about these issues is prevalent and can be accessed at low costs to us (Kawall 2010, 
pp. 111‒116). 
Admittedly, living up to the requirement expressed in premise (3) can be challenging. We 
are relatively unaccustomed to thinking with the long-term vision that mindfulness requires. 
Even so, being aware of the consequences of one’s actions is a fundamental requirement of 
acting ethically. In light of the fact that our actions can have a substantial impact upon those who 
are geographically and temporally distant from us, we have three options: we can give up on 
trying to live ethically, we can live in ways that ensure our actions do not have far-reaching 
consequences, or we can try to be mindful of the consequences of our actions and reduce their 
negative impacts. If we take moral demands seriously, then the first option is unacceptable. The 
second option might be acceptable, if we are willing to live in the minimalist ways that it would 
require. Most of us, however, are not willing to forego the social and individual benefits 
provided by globalization and technological progress. We are not willing to disconnect from the 
power grid and pursue life in a rustic mountain village. Thus, for most of us, we are left only 
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with the third option – trying to be aware of the consequences of our actions and curtail our 
harmful behaviors accordingly. 
 With premise (3) defended, we can now turn to premise (4). This portion of the argument 
is where CSR+ does its work. If CSR+ is endorsed, then (4) becomes a fairly strong claim. 
Coherence captures the notion that such a person should bring their conviction in the political 
sphere into alignment with their behavior in the personal sphere. Stickiness and Resoluteness 
establish that this person should hold firm to their convictions and resist temptations to 
compromise them, abandon them, or fail to act on them.
9
 Thus, if one seeks to maintain integrity, 
adopting a political commitment to work toward stabilizing and reducing human population 
entails adopting a personal commitment not to promote population growth in one’s own actions. 
If both members of a couple claim that it is important to reduce population growth but then 
proceed to have three children or more in a series of intentional ordinary pregnancies, they are 
either acting incoherently, failing to live up to their own moral standards because of weakness of 
will, or inadequately informed about the consequences of their procreative activities.
10
 
At this juncture, one might suggest that it is not possible for some people in the world to 
acquire accurate information about the impact of population growth. Uncovering the truth about 
the impacts of population growth is not as easy as it could be, especially since it has received less 
                                                 
9
 This is particularly important with respect to GHG emissions because most developed countries (especially the 
consumerist United States) present many temptations for frivolously increasing one’s individual emissions, 
sometimes without even receiving any meaningful benefit from doing so. 
10
 A moral assessment of procreative decisions where the members of the couple disagree about how many children 
per person can be permissibly conceived would be more complicated. I assume that we can make compromises in 
relationships – even about important things – without violating our personal integrity. My hope, however, is that the 
arguments in prior chapters will illustrate that we all should share the political commitment to cooperate in reducing 
human population and that we should be particularly reluctant to renege on this commitment at either the personal or 
political level. The problem is just too grave to be lax in these commitments. 
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coverage in the recent past than it deserves.
11
 Nevertheless, given the scope and magnitude of 
population growth’s impacts and the fact that all individuals affect population size through their 
procreative decisions, this issue is one that we should be particularly committed to researching 
and understanding. There are surely some people who are genuinely unable to learn about the 
effects of population growth – perhaps because they live in dire poverty with no internet access 
and few other resources for acquiring information – and for this reason, the Integrity Argument 
will probably not apply to them. They may not be blameworthy for underestimating the moral 
significance of their procreative decisions and may be able to maintain integrity by acting in 
ways that are consistent with their false beliefs. Even so, maintaining integrity by holding false 
beliefs is not a morally or epistemically laudable ambition, and the sources cited elsewhere in 
this manuscript indicate that accurate information on population growth’s impacts can usually be 
found without great difficulty. While the number of people who are genuinely unable to uncover 
accurate information about population growth is hard to specify, we should not conclude that 
these exceptions undercut the general rule. Given the stakes, the presumption should be that 




If this reasoning is correct, then all four premises are true, and we must accept the 
argument’s conclusion: we have a prima facie obligation to refrain from having more than two 
children. This obligation may be overridden in extreme cases, but the presumption is that two 
                                                 
11
 The mass media often ignores or understates the significance of population growth, but the problem runs deeper 
than that. Shragg (2015) documents a number of environmental organizations and institutes that do not acknowledge 
the contribution of overpopulation to the environmental problems that they are trying to resolve (pp. 23-32). Some 
examples include the Jane Goodall Institute, The Nature Conservancy, and the Rainforest Action Network. 
12
 This requirement holds with respect to procreation in general, independent of overpopulation. As discussed in 
chapter 3, many moral considerations suggest that procreation is not permissible nearly as often as people typically 
believe. So people should investigate whether their circumstances permit procreation even when population growth 
is not a concern. 
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children is the limit. This presumption will be particularly strong for those living in the 
developed world where the environmental impact of having children is extremely high, but this 
argument is intended to apply to everyone. Under present circumstances, the political 
commitment that starts the argument is one that all human beings should share. 
Objections to the Integrity Argument 
Even if the prior reasoning appears persuasive, one might think that having integrity is 
actually not worth cultivating because living with integrity is too demanding. Most believe that 
there are limits to what morality can reasonably demand of us. As individuals, we must be 
allowed some choice in how we live so that we can pursue personal projects and ambitions that 
are important to us; otherwise, life would cease to have the meaningfulness that we usually 
associate with human flourishing. According to this objection, it might be morally praiseworthy 
to live with integrity to the degree required by the Integrity Argument, but doing so is 
supererogatory. 
Consider the earlier example of the woman who voices her criticism of the Nazis. This 
behavior may be morally praiseworthy, and it may exemplify integrity. Still, it does not follow 
from those facts alone that acting with integrity is all-things-considered desirable. Living with 
integrity could, at least in the context of how we impact the environment, be quite demanding 
given the severity of the environmental problems we face and the various ways in which the 
great majority of us contribute to the problem. The demandingness may be particularly 
pronounced for those in the developed world since people in these countries have such 
substantial ecological footprints. In many cases, radically reducing our ecological footprint may 
have negative effects not only on us but also on our families, friends, and others who depend on 
us. If living with integrity really demands so much of us, then perhaps it is not really something 
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worth cultivating in ourselves. One could just bite the bullet and claim that integrity is, perhaps 
like many other virtues, a challenging character trait to develop and sustain, but such a response 
is unlikely to placate objectors. The Integrity Argument requires a stronger defense. 
By way of an initial response, appeals to demandingness are sometimes greatly 
exaggerated. Many so-called “sacrifices” of living in a more eco-friendly way are not really 
sacrifices at all; they are just lifestyle changes. Some of them even work to our advantage in the 
long run. Some people will be a little uncomfortable in the summer if they set the air conditioner 
to 75 degrees instead of 72, but in a few weeks, they will adapt. Then this lifestyle change will 
actually be to their benefit because they will save money on utility expenses. It is also worth 
reiterating a point made in chapter 5: the values and lifestyles that our consumption supports do 
not clearly make our lives significantly better (Andreou 2010; Gambrel and Cafaro 2010; 
Gardiner 2012, pp. 244‒245). The claim that a lifestyle change is “too demanding” may often 
serve as a mere rationalization for avoiding minor lifestyle changes. Tying these thoughts 
together, the general point is that living in a more eco-friendly way need not be construed as a 
debilitating sacrifice. Like the bullet-biting reply, however, this point cannot suffice as a 
response by itself. What about real sacrifices? Are we really required to limit our family size or 
potentially forego child-rearing experiences altogether? 
Integrity does not make such harsh demands on a person. Remember that one of the core 
features of integrity is Coherence – the unity of one’s values and convictions. We are all likely to 
have a large number of values and convictions that conflict with our commitment to reducing our 
ecological footprint. We may value the welfare of our spouse or children and not want to subject 
them to harsh lifestyle changes that would make their lives significantly worse. We might find 
great aesthetic value in film but recognize that we cannot easily view films without using 
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electronic devices that are powered by fossil fuels. We may love our family members and value 
getting to see them over the holidays even though it requires us to fly across the country (an 
activity that emits a lot of GHGs). In these cases, we have conflicts between various values we 
hold, and we have to determine how to settle them. In all likelihood, different values will survive 
these conflicts in different contexts. We might even compromise between values, for instance, by 
deciding to only fly across the country twice a year instead of three or four times. It is obvious, 
however, that if we never choose to act in ways that reduce our ecological footprint, then we lack 
integrity: either we are rationalizing our unwillingness to change our ways, or we do not 
genuinely hold the commitments that we claim to hold. 
Remember that the Integrity Argument allows individuals to permissibly have up to two 
children, even if they live in a part of the world where their environmental footprints are large. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 3, the fundamental interests associated with having children 
can be achieved by having only one child. Having two children (or fewer) is not a debilitating 
sacrifice. In fact, even just limiting the scope to our contributions to climate change, some 
philosophers have argued for far harsher duties regarding how much we ought to reduce our 
ecological footprints.
13
 Given how large a role population growth plays in exacerbating 
environmental problems (especially climate change), a limit of one child per person is perfectly 
reasonable: couples will still be able to enjoy the most substantial benefits associated with having 
children while tempering their impact on the environment. The Integrity Argument should not be 
dismissed because of concerns about demandingness. 
                                                 
13
 Nolt (2013b) argues that we have a moral obligation to stop using all unnecessary GHG-emitting devices. Broome 
(2014, ch. 5) argues that individuals are required to live in a carbon neutral way – that is, they must live such that the 
net balance of carbon emitted into the atmosphere over their lives is zero. On Broome’s view, this does not mean 
that we refrain from emitting all GHGs: we can achieve this carbon neutrality through offsetting our emissions. 
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A skeptic might think the concern about demandingness could be put a different way, 
however. Perhaps the problem is that people, even when they have access to the relevant 
information, are incapable of psychologically accepting the implications of the facts. Perhaps 
they cannot grasp the significance of the information or are in the grip of fear or anger so deep 
that they cannot take the facts at face value. For these reasons, living up to the requirements of 
integrity and mindfulness is too demanding because doing so violates the principle of “ought” 
implies “can” (which I briefly discussed in chapter 3). According to this principle, people cannot 
be morally obligated to do what they cannot in fact do: being morally required to φ entails an 
ability to φ. Such a principle is deeply appealing because it explains why we routinely excuse 
otherwise unethical behavior when we realize the person could not have reasonably avoided 
acting as they did. If people really are incapable of cultivating this degree of integrity and 
mindfulness, then perhaps we ought to excuse them from this obligation. 
It is possible to challenge the “ought” implies “can” principle,
14
 but I will grant it for the 
sake of argument. How many people genuinely lack the ability to cultivate this degree of 
integrity and mindfulness? The answer depends in part on our perspective. Developing these 
virtues will usually take some time and effort. The development and maintenance of integrity is 
an ongoing, interminable process because we are often tempted to abandon or compromise our 
values. With mindfulness, the challenge is different but no less significant: we have to be 
constantly receptive to information and how that information applies to the geographically and 
temporally distant effects of our actions. Nevertheless, the development of these virtues can be 
achieved with practice – a process sometimes called habituation. This process is not foreign to 
how we might approach other problems in environmental ethics. Many believe, for instance, that 
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 See, for example, Martin (2009) and Graham (2011).  
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it is wrong to consume factory-farmed meat, but it may be difficult to instantly cull all factory 
farmed meat from one’s diet. Rather than give up hope, however, one should work to reduce 
one’s meat consumption gradually over time until this eating habit can finally be abandoned 
altogether. 
The real question is whether people are willing and able to engage in the process of 
habituation to the degree necessary to realize the necessary level of integrity and mindfulness. 
An empirical question of this sort is hard to resolve, and I imagine there are some for whom it 
will be psychologically impossible. But I also believe that we ought not to underestimate 
people’s potential in this regard. Too often, concerns about psychological difficulty are used as a 
means of rationalizing moral apathy. Too often, they serve as a justification for not taking any 
action in the first place. We may not have a clear grasp of what we are psychologically capable 
of, but adopting a defeatist attitude about cultivating these virtues is a surefire way to fail in our 
quest to cultivate them. We will do better to assume that their cultivation is possible and strive to 
achieve that goal, even if that goal turns out to be more of an ideal than something that is 
achievable for everyone. In short, there are good reasons to act as if these virtues are attainable 
even if some will fail in their efforts to cultivate them. We should strive to expand the scope of 
our moral awareness and the extent to which we live up to our values and not be content with 
leaving them where they are, at least so long as we can clearly do better.
15
 
An alternative objection may arise from the argument’s starting assumption. While it is 
clear that population growth is a significant problem, a pessimist about our current political 
systems might reject the claim that we have any individual obligation to adopt the political 
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 The view expressed here is similar in spirit to one defended by Raterman (2012). According to his position, while 
we are not required to become environmental martyrs, we should generally strive to do more than whatever we 
currently do with respect to limiting our contributions to environmental harm. 
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commitment that begins the argument. Take the United States as an illustrative example. The 
national political system is beholden to large financial donors who are invested in maintaining a 
carbon-based economy and maintaining economic growth, and the system strongly discourages 
genuine third-party alternatives. Under these circumstances, it may not seem like adopting a 
political commitment accomplishes much. After all, are any politicians seriously going to push 
for constraints on procreative freedom? This line of thought may prove even more powerful in 
countries like Denmark or Russia where the political pull is often in the direction of encouraging 
their citizens to have more children. Guaranteed ineffectiveness in the political arena would 
undermine the presence of a duty to work toward a collective solution to overpopulation and 
thereby threaten the Integrity Argument’s starting point. Since it would be impossible to achieve 
a collective solution to overpopulation, one would have little reason to pursue the attainment of 
that solution. 
There are two basic responses to this objection. The first, which we might call the 
optimistic response, is to deny that political action is doomed to be insignificant or ineffective. 
Just as there are corporate and political interests in avoiding discussion or pursuit of population 
reduction, there are also corporate and political interests interested in encouraging people to have 
fewer children. These are not just limited to organizations with environmental aims, such as the 
Population Institute; they also include organizations that are simply interested in promoting 
women’s sexual and reproductive health, such as Planned Parenthood.
16
 The political landscape, 
in other words, is not a one-way street. Furthermore, it is becoming more socially acceptable (at 
least in many areas of the world) to have fewer children, and we have evidence from prior 
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 Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that I would not specify in great detail precisely what – beyond responsible 
voting – the political obligation requires. However, for those worried that voting may be ineffective, involvement in 
these organizations may serve as an alternative means of adopting the political commitment. 
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chapters that people can be motivated to have fewer children through means that are not as 
politically objectionable as extremely coercive measures. There is no reason to assume that 
cultural shifts in procreative norms could not make certain political views palatable even though 
they are presently unfavorable. In the United States, such a cultural shift took place rather rapidly 
with respect to general acceptance of homosexuality. The political picture is not yet bleak 
enough to give up hope in the effectiveness of political action.
17
 
Additionally, even if one remains worried about the effectiveness of political action, I 
argue that such a defeatist perspective ought to be avoided. Adopting an attitude of resignation 
with respect to political action toward population growth only makes it more likely that the 
problem will remain unsolved until it is too late to escape its gravest effects. If belief in political 
ineffectiveness becomes widespread, it may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy by inhibiting the 
social change that is a necessary catalyst for a lasting solution to population growth. Given the 
severity of the impacts of population growth and the many problems to which it contributes, we 
must resist adopting this outlook: we should not promote this attitude in ourselves or others and 
must act as if political action (of some sort) can make a difference, even if our doubts persist. If 
we act to the contrary, then we are only increasing the chances that our worries will be realized 
and that our efforts at avoiding environmental catastrophe will fail. 
Why Not One Child? 
Suppose that my reasoning thus far has been persuasive. Many readers will be left with a 
curious question: why don’t the arguments from the previous sections lead us to the conclusion 
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 Karen Shragg (2015) is one activist who has recently argued that the population problem is solvable, although she 
does not think that the solution will start with appealing directly to politicians. She believes that first a grassroots 
movement will need to demonstrate to politicians that there is a “groundswell of concern out there demanding their 
action” (Shragg 2015, p. 76). 
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that we should limit ourselves to a single child? In chapter 3, I argued that the fundamental 
interests associated with rearing children can be satisfied with only one child. In chapter 4, I 
emphasized the severity of various environmental crises on the horizon and the ways in which 
population growth contributes to these problems. If the problems are really as serious as I have 
indicated, why are couples permitted to have two children rather than just one? 
Overall actually considers a similar concern in her own treatment of the issue and offers 
several responses. Some of her responses appeal to the effects of a one-child imperative, such as 
encouraging people to have families where children never have siblings and the ways in which 
this could promote sex selection (Overall 2012, p. 182). She also notes that such an obligation 
would be hard to sustain at a societal level because noncompliance of others and the knowledge 
that future people might not need to make these procreative sacrifices could undercut one’s 
motivation to live up to this one-child imperative (pp. 181-182). These concerns, however, are 
best understood as reasons why such an obligation might not be feasible as a social policy or 
might be challenging for individuals to adhere to. Such concerns are reasonable but not pertinent 
to what is under discussion here. In this chapter, we are trying to establish what individuals 
morally ought to do. General concerns about policy implications or the effects of people not 
living up to their moral obligations do not establish that they lack the moral obligation to limit 
themselves to one child per couple. 
Overall also offers an argument against a one-child obligation based on a right for 
individuals to replace themselves through procreation. Since her articulation of the argument is 
brief, I present the relevant passage here in its entirety: 
...I suggest that a further problem with the one-child-per-couple obligation is that it 
implicitly negates one person in the couple. If a couple has two children, however, there 
is a child for each one—not in the sense that each raises only one child, but in the sense 
that each individual has replaced himself or herself. By contrast, a moral rule of only one 
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child per couple says, in effect, “You ought not to replace yourself.” (Perhaps it would 
also carry the message “You do not deserve to be replaced.”) (Overall 2012, p. 182) 
Overall’s reasoning here is hard to decipher, but the core idea appears to be that there is 
something morally objectionable about the following moral principle: you ought not to replace 
yourself. The underlying thought may be that all people, merely by virtue of being rational and 
autonomous agents, have a right to replace themselves through procreation. Alternatively, the 
parenthetical remark may indicate the real problem – the concern that such a moral imperative 
would carry with it a pejorative message that we ought not promote. 
Unfortunately, I cannot see an interpretation of this argument that renders it plausible. 
The moral rule we are considering is contingent upon certain background conditions – namely, 
overpopulation and its ongoing effects – and so the moral rule of one-child-per-couple would say 
something more akin to “Under current conditions of overpopulation, not all people ought to 
replace themselves.” This principle clearly doesn’t connote the pejorative implication that people 
“do not deserve” to be replaced since it is derived from tragic social circumstances. (The 
rationale for the principle has nothing to do with what people deserve.) The notion that a person 
in a couple is “negated” when they are only allowed to have one child is also puzzling: it is not 
as if parents designate that a particular child is the father’s replacement or the mother’s 
replacement. Both parents claim the child as theirs. Why is it so important that parents be 
allowed to have enough children to ensure numerical replacement, particularly when the 
consequences of their doing so contribute to such significant detrimental consequences? 
Overall later suggests that what is objectionable about a one-child-per-couple obligation 
is that it does not properly acknowledge the value of adult human beings. Although not directly 
stated, this claim can be inferred from what she says about the benefits of a one-child-per-person 
obligation: 
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All persons get to (try to) have a child of “their own,” if they want one, and the value of 
every adult is implicitly endorsed through the fact that each one is allowed to reproduce 
herself or himself. Such a responsibility implies that every person is sufficiently valuable 
to be worth replacing… (Overall 2012, p. 183). 
The suggestion here is that a one-child-per-couple policy would not imply that every person is 
sufficiently valuable to be worth replacing, but Overall is mistaken in her belief that a one-child-
per-couple obligation entails this claim about the value of people’s lives. In fact, the justification 
for this restriction on procreation arises directly from a concern about the value of people’s lives 
– particularly, the negative value associated with widespread human suffering. In advocating a 
one-child-per-couple obligation, we would be claiming that the welfare loss of present and future 
people is so significant that we must limit our procreative activities. This reasoning does not 
imply making judgments about who is worth replacing and who is not. In fact, what we hope in 
the long term is that we can create background conditions that will enable people to “replace 
themselves” through procreation with greater liberty. In light of these considerations, I cannot 
see a reason why the parents’ ability to achieve numerical replacement could be regarded as so 
morally important as to render a one-child-per-couple obligation problematic. 
Overall does, however, allude to one other argument against a one-child-per-couple 
obligation that is more promising than these others. She notes that this procreative limitation 
could be a substantial hardship for many people, especially for single people who will not be 
able to procreate unless they can find another single person who has no children. Based on these 
considerations, she remarks that a one-child-per-couple obligation is “at most supererogatory” 
(Overall 2012, p. 183). Given the hardship that a one-child policy imposes on many people and 
the central role that child-rearing plays in so many people’s lives, an obligation for couples to 
restrict themselves to only one child. 
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While I believe that it is morally better – at least at the present time and under ordinary 
circumstances – to have only a single child or to have none at all, it is only morally required that 
a couple not have more than two. The replacement rate is approximately 2.1 births per woman, 
so having two children will not increase the overall population in the long term (though it will 
also not do much to slow its growth). Stabilizing and reducing human population can only be 
achieved through large-scale collective action, so it is unreasonable to demand that individuals 
undertake severe sacrifices in the absence of a collective scheme to address the problem unless 
their actions are making the problem worse. People value their children for many reasons, and 
children often occupy a prominent role in people’s life plans.
18
 A birth rate of two children per 
woman does not make the population problem worse: collectively, we need to aim for a lower 
birth rate than this, but at least this birth rate would eventually bring us to a population that was 
not continuously growing in size. A birth rate of three children per woman, on the other hand, 
would clearly make the problem worse because it would cause the population to grow. 
The general moral principle applicable to cases of individual procreation might be put 
this way: absent any collective scheme to stabilize or reduce human population, individuals 
ought to act in such a way that their individual actions do not clearly make the population 
problem worse. In practice, this means that all couples should strive for two children or fewer 
and that all individuals should refrain from procreating more than the equivalent of one child per 
person. The prima facie obligation established by the Integrity Argument applies to everyone, 
                                                 
18
 See Dillard (2010) for a survey of the reasons that people value having children. 
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regardless of where they live, and although there will be exceptions in unusual cases,
19
 the 
standard of Two or Less is one we should all follow. 
                                                 
19
 Since those in developing countries have a lower ecological footprint than those in the developed world, citizens 
in developing countries will sometimes have an easier time arguing that their individual circumstances constitute an 
exception to this general obligation. Nevertheless, the obligation extends to everyone, and the default position is that 
two children is the maximum. 
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CHAPTER 8: LINGERING QUESTIONS 
Overpopulation contributes to a host of environmental problems, the most notable of 
which are climate change and biodiversity loss. Since these problems cannot be addressed 
entirely by reducing our rates of environmentally harmful consumption, we must also strive to 
halt population growth and (in the long term) reduce global population to a level that we can 
sustain for the long term. In pursuing the goal of population reduction, we want to enact policies 
that are no more coercive than what is required to solve the problem. Thus, we should start by 
increasing access to contraception and family planning services, increasing educational 
opportunities for women in the developing world, and promoting awareness of the contributions 
that population growth makes to various problems around the world. These measures, however, 
are unlikely to be enough on their own, and so we will also need to consider methods of 
preference adjustment and incentivization that could be effective in lowering fertility rates. Even 
if no substantial policy efforts are made to reduce population, I have also argued that individuals 
should have two or fewer children on the grounds of maintaining integrity. 
Despite the arguments I have presented thus far, several important questions about this 
issue remain unaddressed. In this chapter, I raise some of these lingering questions and highlight 
some of the moral considerations that future research on solving the population problem will 
need to investigate. 
What About the Nonhuman Community? 
Throughout this dissertation, I have assumed an anthropocentric perspective. I have only 
examined the effects of environmental degradation insofar as they matter to human beings. I 
believe, along with many other environmental ethicists, that some members of the nonhuman 
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community have direct moral standing and that their interests ought to be considered when we 
make moral decisions, but I have said nothing about how much these interests matter or how 
they ought to be factored into our deliberations about solving the population problem. Even in 
my discussion of biodiversity loss, biodiversity was only presented as valuable in virtue of its 
instrumental value to human beings. 
While I encourage other environmental ethicists to catalogue the effects of population 
growth on the nonhuman community and debate the moral significance of those effects, I have 
deliberately avoided doing so for two reasons. First, I have sought to demonstrate that we should 
stabilize and reduce population even if we adopt the most minimal assumptions about moral 
status possible. Non-anthropocentric arguments do not carry the same weight in policy 
discussions as anthropocentric arguments, and hinging my arguments on claims about the moral 
status of animals may allow skeptics about their status to easily dismiss my arguments. My 
arguments do not hinge on any controversial claims about the moral standing on nonhuman life 
(or anything else in the nonhuman world). 
Second, however strong my arguments are, they will be much stronger if the moral 
significance of animal suffering is taken into account and if species extinctions are evaluated 
through a non-anthropocentric lens. When assessing the gravity of the population problem, I 
gave no weight to animal suffering, and I said nothing about how biodiversity loss adversely 
affects the lives of animals in various ecosystems. To the extent that these non-anthropocentric 
considerations are morally significant, they will only increase the significance of the population 
problem. This effect will likely be most pronounced with respect to animal agriculture. We 
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slaughter billions of animals annually for human consumption,
1
 and billions more are harvested 
from the sea.
2
 People require food for sustenance, so the more people there are, the greater the 
need to slaughter animals for consumption. While it is possible for many of us to survive on 
vegetarian diets, most in the world do not, and under current circumstances, rising population 
leads to rising pressures to farm more animals and harvest more fish. The way these creatures are 
raised and harvested often subjects them to severe suffering.
3
 To name a few of the more 
common ways these animals suffer, fish often die of suffocation, pigs and other animals have 
their throats cut or stabbed (often without being stunned beforehand), chickens live in cramped 
and crowded battery cages where they lack the space to even stretch their wings, and veal calves 
are confined to such small spaces that they can barely move at all. Any ethic that takes animal 
suffering seriously will regard these harms as quite severe, particularly given their enormous 
frequency: to reiterate, the number of animals under killed for human consumption every year is 
well over 100 billion on even the most conservative estimates.   
If what I have argued in earlier sections of the dissertation is correct, then we have a 
moral duty to stabilize and reduce population when we limit moral consideration to just human 
beings and human interests. If we extend the scope of moral consideration to include members of 
the nonhuman community, then we will only find further support for such a duty. For this reason, 
                                                 
1
 Current data is compiled by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (2017) and can be accessed at 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data. Their data from 2010 concludes that roughly 63 billion animals were 
slaughtered that year, and this figure recurs in the literature somewhat frequently (e.g., Benatar 2015, p. 116 fn 43; 
Wadiwel 2015, p. 6 fn 17), although their estimates exclude animals that die in the process of collecting animal 
products (like eggs and milk) or are killed by human beings for recreational purposes. 
2
 The number of marine animals that die annually is quite difficult to estimate due to variance in regional fisheries 
and the fact that catches are reported in weight rather than individual fish caught. Estimates range from 90 billion 
(ADAPTT 2017) to over 1 trillion (Mood & Brooke 2010). 
3
 A brief but chilling list of the types of suffering these animals endure is found in Benatar (2015, pp.94-95). 
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my arguments in prior chapters very likely understate the moral importance attached to the 
population problem. 
How Many People Should We Aim For? 
Throughout this dissertation, I have stressed a need to eventually reduce our population 
below our current levels. I have not, however, specified exactly what number we should target in 
the long term. As mentioned in chapter 1, some have advocated that we pursue a target of two 
billion people, an approximation of how many people the Earth could sustainably support if 
everyone lived a lifestyle similar to those currently living in Europe (Smail 1997, Foreman 
2012). Karen Shragg (2015) sets the number even lower – 1.5 billion (p. 94). 
I have not specified a number because I expect this number will change significantly in 
the future. Given the current population – about 7.4 billion people – it is clear that we should aim 
for something lower. That will be even truer in the future when global population approaches 9 
billion, an outcome that is virtually guaranteed regardless of what population policies we pursue, 
since it will take time to alter our demographic trajectory. Simultaneously, technological 
improvements could alter the number of people that the planet can sustain: the number of people 
we can accommodate on Earth is not infinite, but this number is also not static. So for now we 
should aim to stop population growth and start shrinking our numbers. Once our numbers are on 
the way down, we can reassess exactly how much shrinking should take place. I do not think we 
can specify in advance what our long-term target should be. 
What About Religious Exemptions? 
Some readers may be curious whether certain individuals may be exempt from general 
population policies. Specifically, some may believe that restrictions on procreation would be a 
violation of their religious freedom. Sometimes, we recognize religious exemptions to state laws 
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that allow individuals or organizations not to abide by certain laws that conflict with their 
religious beliefs. Could this exempt certain individuals from a duty to abide by whatever 
population restrictions (or recommendations) are put in place? 
One simple way to answer this question in the negative is to deny that religious beliefs 
deserve any special privilege over other beliefs. On such a view, religious beliefs should not 
ground exemptions to laws any more than other beliefs do, which means that religious beliefs 
will generally not provide the basis for being exempt from state laws. Although this line of 
argument has been endorsed by some (e.g., Leiter 2012), I suspect that such a view is too strong 
because it undervalues the role that religious belief often plays in people’s lives. Religious 
beliefs are very personal and precious to many people, and so it is worth taking the possibility of 
religious exemptions seriously. 
Even so, we often recognize that constraints on the exercise of religious belief are 
appropriate when the beliefs can cause harm to others. We would never condone a practice of 
human sacrifice, for instance, even if adherents of a certain religion genuinely believed that it 
was required by their faith. As discussed in chapter 3, population growth does not cause harm in 
quite the same way that directly killing or injuring a person does, but given the widespread 
nature of the harms and the need to curtail them, imposing restrictions on people’s freedoms may 
be appropriate. As I argued in chapter 3, rights are often constrained by the presence of other 
rights. The exercise of religious freedom is one such right, and like the right to procreation, it can 
be limited when the harms associated with its collective exercise are inconsistent with respecting 
the most fundamental rights of other people (e.g., right to life, right to health, right to physical 
security).  
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It is also important to recognize that none of the policies I have proposed would prevent 
people from having more children than the established standard. They would have to deal with 
economic penalties (either a loss of certain tax exemptions or a fine), but they would not be 
strictly required (via abortion or sterilization) to limit their number of children. That will, of 
course, make the pursuit of lifestyles associated with certain religious beliefs more difficult, but 
this may be the best balance that can be struck. We are, after all, trying to reach a compromise 
between two important moral goals – trying to properly respect people’s religious freedom and 
trying to ensure that the welfare of future people is properly protected. As the discussion of 
moral tragedy in chapter 6 indicates, many of the problems created by population growth are 
unlikely to have tidy solutions. 
Can We Actually Solve the Problem? 
The final question to consider in this dissertation is whether it is actually possible to solve 
the myriad of environmental problems we now face. A reader could theoretically agree with 
everything I have argued but still believe that we should not make extensive sacrifices of our 
procreative liberties to avert these catastrophes because their outcomes are unavoidable. We have 
known about climate change for some time, but international discussion has not led to 
widespread reduction in global GHG emissions. We may know about the contributions that 
population growth makes to climate change, biodiversity loss, and other environmental 
problems, but we have also examined evidence that demographic momentum ensures that 
population growth will continue for the next few generations regardless of whether any major 
efforts to limit procreation are undertaken. These considerations can lead one to a rather 
pessimistic outlook on our situation. Scientist Stephen Emmott (2013) expresses this sentiment 
rather bluntly in the final lines of Ten Billion: 
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As I said in the beginning, we can rightly call the situation we’re in an unprecedented 
emergency. 
We urgently need to do—and I mean actually do—something radical to avert a global 
catastrophe. But I don’t think we will. 
I think we’re fucked. (pp. 215-216) 
If there genuinely is nothing that can be done to avert the harms that await, then our attempts to 
do so may appear pointless. Why should we make sacrifices for the welfare of future people if 
those sacrifices will not make a difference? 
This line of thought is a product of a common but inaccurate way of thinking about moral 
problems. We have a tendency to view them as being either solvable or unsolvable and believe 
that there is a sharp distinction between these categories. If we believe a moral problem is 
solvable, we strive to solve it. If we believe a moral problem is unsolvable, then we try to figure 
out how best to live with it, since it would be pointless to try to solve it. Many moral problems 
are genuinely solvable. If you steal from someone, you can return their property or provide them 
adequate compensation. If you say something offensive, you can apologize to the offended 
parties and make amends. But moral problems that occur on a grand scale often do not allow for 
comprehensive or straightforward solutions, and I suspect that most of them are not “solvable” in 
any strict sense. 
Virtually anyone with a functioning moral compass will acknowledge that the elimination 
of race-related discrimination is a morally worthy pursuit, but is it possible to fully eliminate 
racism? I doubt it. No matter how much progress is made, it is a safe bet that certain forms of 
racial discrimination will persist. After all, the abundant research on implicit bias reveals that 
even those who consciously reject prejudiced ways of thinking can unintentionally express racist 
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attitudes and preferences through subconscious cognitive processes.
4
 This means that racism may 
be an unsolvable moral problem,
5
 but this fact does not make trying to eliminate racism a less 
worthwhile pursuit. Moreover, the moral progress we have made with respect to eliminating 
racism is undeniable and has improved the lives of billions of people during that time. The world 
is surely a better place now that race-based slavery has been widely condemned and that 
members of all races are typically regarded as having equal moral and legal status. 
There is no doubt that our actions will lead to many destructive outcomes in the 21st 
century. Many species will go extinct. Some natural environments will be destroyed. Some low-
lying island nations will be swallowed by the ocean, and their populations will have to relocate. 
We will witness more frequent extreme weather events. Members of some nations will suffer 
from harsh heat waves, droughts, and famine. These effects are already observable to some 
extent, and they will only get worse as time passes. In some cases, the damage done may well be 
irreversible, but just because these problems cannot be fully prevented (or solved) does not mean 
that the situation is hopeless. 
The scope of harm done to present and future people (and to the nonhuman world) will 
vary drastically depending on what we do this century. Some harm has already been done, and 
more will come. But how much more? In large part, we will answer that question by what we 
decide to do in the next 50-100 years. We cannot solve the problem of climate change: we cannot 
erase its effects or shield all future people from its harms. We cannot solve the problem of 
biodiversity loss: we cannot prevent all vulnerable species from going extinct. But we can make 
                                                 
4
 For an overview of research on implicit bias in philosophy, see Brownstein (2015). 
5
 Its complete solution may require neural modification or require such a significant degree of racial mixing that 
discrimination on the basis of race becomes impractical. As of now, it is unclear whether the proper technology or 
cultural circumstances will manifest to make the complete elimination of racism a viable possibility. 
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these problems a lot more manageable for ourselves and our descendants. We can still improve 
the welfare of present and future people tremendously by working to minimize the harm that 
occurs. The problems are not solvable, but their harms can be mitigated. Thus, it is wrong to 
believe that acting to avert these harms is pointless. 
Of course, under present circumstances, serious political action aimed at slowing 
population growth is unlikely to be forthcoming (Shragg 2015, ch. 12). Population activists like 
Dave Foreman (2014, ch. 13) sometimes provide lengthy lists of what individuals can do to 
promote awareness of overpopulation and what organizations are taking action to reduce the rate 
of population growth. Sometimes additional political actions are suggested, like calling one’s 
local political representatives or advocating for local caps on population growth in your city or 
region. These measures will likely play a crucial role in developing the broad consensus among 
the public that is needed to make politicians take the population problem seriously, but a genuine 
response to overpopulation requires political action on an international scale that simply will not 
materialize any time soon.
6
 Nonetheless, that fact does not make this project any less valuable or 
significant. 
In time, the population problem will force itself upon us. The harms associated with 
population growth will eventually become so pronounced and so dire that we will face a choice: 
mobilize to reduce the impacts of the problem and work toward a long-term solution or face 
catastrophic losses to perhaps billions of people. Under those circumstances, I am optimistic that 
                                                 
6
 The desire for a growing population is in part connected to a broader desire for continued economic growth. 
Endless growth is not possible in a world of finite resources, and the evidence shows that we need to start setting 
limits on our aspirations toward economic growth. But until this ideal becomes more widespread and we make the 
necessary changes to the neo-liberal economic project that we have undertaken during the last century, it is unlikely 
that we will reach a broad consensus on setting limits to population size.  
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we will respond, and when that time comes, we will be glad that some philosophers and 
environmentalists have given thought to what we should do in response to the problem. 
For now, we must confront the grim reality that most people do not yet take population 
seriously, and remarkably, even some who know the facts about population still retreat from 
discussing it. Consider Alan Weisman’s interview with haredi environmental educator Rachel 
Ladani. When asked what will happen when Israel’s population doubles by 2050 and when the 
world population teeters near 10 billion, she replies, “I don’t have to think about it. God made 
the problem, and He will solve it” (Weisman 2013, p. 12). A divine solution to the problem 
would certainly be convenient, but if God intends to intervene, he is certainly biding his time. 
We will probably have to cope with the problem on our own. 
Not everyone takes refuge from population worries in religion. Others, as discussed in 
chapter 5, place their hopes in currently nonexistent technologies. Others embrace denial. These 
reactions are understandable. Many of us are reluctant to think deeply about our population 
problem – to seriously confront the challenges it poses and the efforts that are needed to address 
those challenges. Population discussions make us uncomfortable. Procreative decisions are 
personal in a way that few other choices are. But we have to stop hiding from the problem. There 
are more of us on the planet each day, and the sooner we take the moral significance of that fact 
seriously, the more favorable our options for stabilizing and reducing our population will be. If 
we wait too long to take the problem seriously, then more draconian measures really might 
become necessary for our response to be adequate, and it will be that much harder to explain to 
our children why the world they inherit is so much bleaker than the one we inherited.
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